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The present work is an attempt to express what I take to be the funda-
mental ideas of a true social philosophy. I have criticised and inter-
preted the doctrines of certain well-known thinkers only with the view
of setting these ideas in the clearest light. This is the whole purpose of
the book; and I have intentionally abstained from practical applications,
except by way of illustration. It is my conviction, indeed, that a better
understanding of fundamental greatly contribute to the more principles
would very rational handling of practical problems. But this better un-
derstanding is only to be attained, as it seems to me, by a thorough
examination of ideas, apart from the associations of practical issues
about which a fierce party spirit has been aroused. And, moreover, it is
my belief that the influence of the ideas here maintained upon practical
discussion, would be, in a certain sense, to detach it from philosophical
theory. The principles which I advocate would destroy so many party
prejudices, would put the mind in possession of so many clues to fact,
that practical “social” issues would in consequence be considered as
problems of life and mind, to be treated only with intimate experience,
and by methods adequate to their subtlety. The result would be that such
discussions would be regarded, if one may use the expression, more
respectfully, and would acquire an independence and completeness worthy
of their importance. The work of the social reformer should no more be
regarded as a mere appendix to social theory than that of the doctor is
regarded as a mere appendix to physiology. Such a division of labour is,
of course, no hindrance to the interchange of facts and ideas between
theory and practice. On the contrary, it tends to promote such an inter-
change, by increasing the supply on either side, and improving the intel-
lectual communication between them.6/Bernard Bosanquet
It will occur to philosophical readers that the essence of the theory
here presented is to be found not merely in Plato and in Aristotle, but in
very many modern writers, more especially in Hegel, T. H. Green, Bra-
dley,1 and Wallace.2 And they may be inclined to doubt the justification
for a further work on the same lines by one who can hardly expect to
improve upon the writings of such predecessors.
On this point I should like to make a brief explanation. To begin
with, it is a truism that every generation needs to be addressed in its own
language; and I might even plead that the greatness of a tradition justi-
fies some urgency in calling attention to it. But further, as regards T. H.
Green in particular, whom in many points I follow very closely, I had
two special reasons for desiring to express myself independently. One of
these is to be found in my attempt to apply the conceptions of recent
psychology to the theory of State coercion and of the Real or General
Will, and to explain the relation of Social Philosophy to Sociological
Psychology. For a short discussion of the Imitation Theory, which the
purpose of the present work would not permit me to include in it, I may
refer to a paper which will shortly appear in Mind.
My other reason lay in the conviction that the time has gone by for
the scrupulous caution which Green displayed in estimating the value of
the State to its members. I have referred to this subject in the body of my
work (ch. x.); but I desire to emphasise my belief that our growing
experience of all social “classes” proves the essentials of happiness and
character to be the same throughout the social whole. Scepticism on this
point is the product, I am convinced, of defective social experience.
Indeed, it seems worth while to observe that the attention which is now
rightly paid to such disadvantages, affecting the poorer classes of citi-
zens, as it may be possible to remedy, has given rise to a serious confu-
sion. The zeal of the advocate has led him to slander his client. In prov-
ing that under such and such conditions it would be no wonder if “the
poor” were bad, he forgets to observe that in fact they are generally just
as good as other people. The all-important distinction between a poor
home and a bad home is neglected. And yet it seems probable that,
omitting the definitely criminal quarters, there is no larger proportion of
bad homes among the poor than among the rich. Such terms as “den”
and “slum” are too freely used, with an affectation of intimacy, for homes
in which thousands of respectable citizens reside. Our democratic age
will be remarkable to posterity for having dimmed the time-honoured
belief in the virtues of the poor. There was cant, no doubt, in the olderThe Philosophical Theory of the State/7
doctrine, but it was not so far from the fact as the opposite cant of to-
day; and it is time that the truth in it should be revived.
I must repeat that these remarks are not intended to be controver-
sial. There is nothing in them which serious men of all schools may not
accept. They are meant to defend my attitude in treating the Real Will,
and Freedom in the greater Self, as matters of universal concern, and
not merely as hopes and fancies cherished by “educated” persons. In-
deed, although it would be churlish for a student to disparage literary
education, it must never be forgotten that, as things are to-day, the citi-
zens who live by handicraft possess a valuable element of brain-culture,
which is on the whole denied to the literary class. Whatever, therefore,
may be wanting in the following pages, it is not, I think, the relation of
their subject-matter to the general life of peoples.
The social student should shun mere optimism; but he should not be
afraid to make the most of that which he studies. It is an unfortunate
result of the semi-practical aims which naturally influence social phi-
losophers, that they are apt throughout to take up an indifferent, if not a
hostile, attitude to their given object. They hardly believe in actual soci-
ety as a botanist believes in plants, or a biologist in vital processes. And
hence, social theory comes off badly. No student can really appreciate
an object for which he is always apologising. There is a touch of th is
attitude in all the principal writers, except Hegel and Bradley, and there-
fore, as I venture to think, they partly fail to seize the greatness and
ideality of life in its commonest actual phases. It is in no spirit of obscu-
rantism, and with no thought of resisting the march of a true social
logic, that some take up a different position. They are convinced that an
actual living society is an infinitely higher creature than a steam-engine,
a plant, or an animal; and that the best of their ideas are not too good to
be employed in analysing it. Those who cannot be enthusiastic in the
study of society as it is, would not be so in the study of a better society
if they had it. “Here or nowhere is your America.”
Bernard Bosanquet
Caterham, March, 1899.
Preface to Second Edition
The present edition contains a new Introduction, defining my attitude
towards movements in European thought which have declared their na-
ture more distinctly in the interval since the first publication of my work.
A few alterations have also been made in the text and notes, and the8/Bernard Bosanquet
opening of ch. viii has been rewritten. With regard to pressing social
questions, I have maintained, as before, an uncontroversial position,
though I have found it inevitably necessary to illustrate some of my
contentions by references to social experience.
Bernard Bosanquet
Oxshott, Nov. 12, 1909.
Introduction to the Second Edition
Since the present work was first published, it has become apparent in
many ways that the wealth of new experiences which modern life brings
with it is tending to obscure the definite outlines of such a theory as is
here advocated. There are three directions in particular in which the
classical theory of the State might appear to be undermined; and it will
be well to say a word on each of them. The philosophy of political
society, in view of modern phenomena and modern investigations, is
held to be too narrow and rigid, too negative, and too intellectualist.
1. It is held to be too narrow and too rigid. Too narrow, because the
analysis which applies easily to the City-state, and with some reinter-
pretation to the Nation-state, is held to be inapplicable to the varied
gradation of communities with which modern life makes us acquainted
— to a man’s membership in the Empire composed of free dominions,
or in the European concert of nations, or in the Parliament of man, the
federation of the world; not to speak of the hierarchy of societies in
which we are involved within the boundaries of the Nation-state itself.
The idea of the Nation-state, it may be thought, might even come to lose
its distinctiveness and supremacy through the impossibility of determin-
ing in which of several concentric communities its peculiar prerogatives
lay. There might be a return, on other lines, to mediaeval conditions,
which scarcely admitted of a truly independent sovereign State. Again,
the theory may appear too rigid, because the strict democratic account
of self-government is most, readily understood as applied to the exer-
cise of power, if not necessarily by primary assemblies, at least through
elected representative bodies, not merely in the case of Parliament, but
in local administration on the one hand and Imperial organisation on the
other. But tendencies and phenomena are now visible which suggest that
elected representative bodies may not be in every case the preferable
type of organs of the general will, whether in the microcosm of munici-
pal administration, or in the macrocosm of the Empire or the Federa-
tion.The Philosophical Theory of the State/9
(i) In dealing with the suggestion of narrowness, I would beg in by
calling attention to that argument of the present work which treats of the
State as the ultimate and absolute power of adjustment, and as neces-
sarily, therefore, single in respect to every individual,3 and also to the
point of view4 which refers the difficulty of recognising what we call the
State in the large-scale characteristics of modern phenomena, simply to
the tendency not to see the wood for the trees; so that our analysis is
hard to verify just because it is so true, and is really much more appli-
cable, because there is much more for it to apply to, in the case of
modern experience, than in that of the lesser and more clear-cut objects
from which it was originally drawn. We are thus led to see more plainly
the true character of the State as a source of pervading adjustments and
an idea-force holding together a complex hierarchy of groups, and not
itself a separable thing like the monarch or the “government,” or the
local body with which we are tempted to identify it. And I would further
illustrate the problem by reference to the late Professor Maitland’s de-
lightful Introduction to his translation of Gierke’s Political Theories of
the Middle Age.5 The position there sketched by him, according to which
the real or general will is present in its degree in every co-operating
group of human beings, is one with which the theory of the State is fully
in accord. Where two or three are gathered together with any degree of
common experience and co-operation, there is pro tanto a general will.
The uniqueness of the general will of the State, and the necessity that it
should be unique, is an additional and peculiar feature, depending on
the necessity referred to above, that an absolute power should be single
in reference to each individual. How far even the absolute power of any
one group in relation to individuals within it may be interfered with by
constitutional tradition or by a conflict of authorities (as, e.g., the con-
flict between a State and the Federal Government in the U. S. A.), or by
International Courts or Leagues, is a question of degree and detail. It
must be remembered that our theory does not place Sovereignty in any
determinate person or body of persons, but only in the working of the
system of institutions as a whole.6 There is therefore no technical diffi-
culty in the modification of the Nation-state towards larger forms of
authoritative co-operation, so long as it is made clear to what system of
authorities every separate human being is subject in respect of the ulti-
mate adjustment of claims upon him. And it would seem that there must
always be at least a machinery for making this clear (like the Court
which interprets the constitution of the U.S.A.), if civilised life is to be10/Bernard Bosanquet
possible. The all-important point is that the recognition of the Real or
General Will should be maintained. And this, as we have seen above, it
is the tendency of recent legal theory to sustain as the recognition of an
actual fact.
(ii) The question of rigidity may be treated more briefly. It is plain
from what has been said above and from the whole trend of our theory,
that the administrative expression of the general will is not necessarily
confined to ad hoc elective bodies, but may take any efficient and con-
venient shape7 without violation of the theory of democratic self-gov-
ernment. It is impossible to lay down in detail any indispensable form
even for the supreme direction of affairs, the manner of which varies
very greatly between States which may be supposed to be in principle
equally free and democratic. As in all practical matters, the first neces-
sity is bona fides, which means in this case a genuine intention through-
out society to make the institutions express the best will of the people. It
is always through a complex of institutions, and never through the mere
voices of a crowd, that a people’s freedom finds utterance; and every
complex of institutions must be criticised on its own merits as an ex-
pression of freedom. Parliamentary government, in one shape or an-
other, seems hardly likely to be superseded as the normal form for civilised
peoples. But the example of the English judiciary, which, I imagine, is
generally approved, suffices to show that for certain functions a very
high degree of independence is desirable in the social interest, and that
even responsibility — the indispensable guarantee of freedom — may
mean rather the inevitable effect of publicity than immediate subordina-
tion to a popular body. These observations are made simply in the inter-
est of maintaining the concreteness and adaptability of our theory. There
is at present an enthusiasm for the study of group-life at first-hand, and
for practical amelioration of it, which, partly under the influence of
such criticisms as have just been noticed, tends to submerge the interest
of strict political theory. But for a true comprehension of group-life it
will always be necessary to refer its inward and spiritual side to some-
thing like the general will, and its outward and visible form to a com-
plex of institutions, and thereby to set its outward and inward aspect in
their true relation to each other and to the social unity.
2. The theory of the State is held to be too negative.
(i) This objection is directed against the principle, drawn from Kant,
and identical with that adopted by Green, which is defended in the present
work. The principle rests on the obvious truth that the distinctive actionThe Philosophical Theory of the State/11
of the state cannot be in pari materia with the positive end of the social
whole, but is, qua distinctive, confined to dealing with external acts in
the sense in which all that can be dealt with by compulsion is external.8
From this follows the doctrine that the distinctive province of the State
is rightly described as the hindrance to hindrances of good life. The use
of spiritual influences in a spiritual form is only open per accidens to
State agency, while the promotion of spiritual ends by external means,
and, pre-eminently, by external means in which compulsion is opera-
tive, is only possible through very delicate and indirect methods.
(ii) We have here the same peculiarly modern difficulty, describable
as not being able to see the wood for the trees, which was referred to in
the previous section. State activity has bewilderingly increased and
multiplied its shapes and organs. Though there are some things that the
modern State, as compared with the ancient city, rules out of its pur-
view, such as religion and fine art, yet on the whole it probably plays a
greater part in life than the City-state in its prime; so much more is
known to-day about desirable outward conditions; so many more claims
for the regulation of outward life are publicly recognised.
But this big bulking of the modern State in our eyes makes it all the
more important to be clear as to its truly distinctive powers and func-
tions. The harder the distinction is to make, the more disastrous it is to
fail in making it. If nobody expected much from the State, there would
be no danger; but when all eyes are turned to it, it is fatal not to under-
stand precisely the conditions of its interference.
(iii) The error lies, on both sides, in an insufficient appreciation of
what is involved in man’s social being. Between visible activities backed
by the force of the State, and the narrowest self-assertion, equally vis-
ible, of the separate, or would-be separate, human person, the whole
social development — the development, that is, of man’s universal na-
ture, of which these are merely extreme limiting cases — fails to obtain
due recognition.
a. The one party credits the individual — the supposed self-existent
isolable being — with all that does not emanate from the formal proce-
dure of the political group as such; and thus, setting down, for example,
art and religion as “individual” activities and concerns, has a certain
justification for alleging that the individual is the end to which society
(at most, the argument should run, the direct machinery of politics) is a
means.9
b. The other, rightly aware that the deepest and loftiest achieve-12/Bernard Bosanquet
ments of man do not belong to the particular human being in his repel-
lent isolation, and, like its antagonist, recognising only two opposites —
society as the State, and the man at his minimum as the individual,
naturally claims for the State the glamour which belongs to the highest
self-expression by which man transcends his isolation. I do not say that
poetry and philosophy are actually treated as a product of political ac-
tivity; but I do say that the fascination attaching to all that is “social” —
all that springs from the co-operation and the sympathies of human
beings-is habitually attached and restricted to that legal and political
form of co-operation which we call the State.
Between the two parties, the profounder meaning of the term “so-
cial” goes unrecognised. We thus lose a great and important truth, that
which Aristotle expressed in the position he gave to Theoria as the quin-
tessence and consecration of the social whole. We then take as represen-
tative conceptions the State and the atomic individual respectively, and
thus forfeit all possibility of understanding the nature of an activity
which is neither semi-political on the one hand, nor “individualistic” on
the other; and any reference to the negative conditions of legislative and
administrative operations we are therefore inclined to regard as blas-
phemy against man’s social possibilities as a whole.
(iv) But if we take the point of view just suggested, we can conceive
how the working of the State proper, as society armed with force, has in
it a negative element, without being driven by a false antithesis to as-
cribe all fertile and positive achievement to “individualistic” factors.
The true terminology would be to take the ultimate achievements we
have referred to as the fullest examples of true social activity, under-
standing that they are at once ultra-social as being above all compul-
sory group-arrangements, and ultra-individual as being beyond the as-
pect of exclusiveness, which, however falsely, clings to the current con-
ception of individuality. It is easy to grasp that in the profoundest sense
it is this ultra-social and also ultra-individual level of life which repre-
sents the highest fulfilment at once of society and of the individual. And
below it, but belonging to the same general line of progress, is the whole
enormous complex of “social” co-operation, which is associated with
the State in very various degrees of indirectness. And both of these be-
long, strictly speaking, neither to the State, nor yet to the private person
who hugs his privateness.
If we apprehend the phenomena in this light, a degree of negativity
in State action follows at once from its being that form of social self-The Philosophical Theory of the State/13
expression which is inevitably mixed with compulsion.
a. To begin with the simplest point, which is really decisive of the
whole question. It is absolutely certain that morality and religion cannot
be enforced by the State. The thing is a contradiction in terms. This case
must not be disregarded because it is so familiar. It means that the most
powerful of all social and human motives cannot be directly controlled
or moulded by the public power as such. It may be urged that they can
be “promoted”; but that is another question, and falls within what we
shall say below.10
To illustrate the absurdities that spring from disregarding this truth,
we may notice the pessimistic complaint that the basis of society as now
arranged is not ethical, in the sense that material success does not corre-
spond to moral merit and social service. Now to make this a complaint
depends upon ignoring the necessary opposition between the nature of
the power of the State and the nature of the good life which is its ulti-
mate end. To attempt to assign material success in proportion to true
merit and social service would be flatly self-contradictory. Material suc-
cess belongs to a certain sort of career which displays a certain definite
sort of capacity and utility. The distribution of it depends, on the whole,
upon the principle “the tools to him who can use them,” which is on the
whole, under any and every possible economic system, a socially useful
principle. But no one will be blind enough to deny that if we are to speak
of the truest and greatest social service, the first rank belongs to the
great poets or the great religious teachers. And the suggested apportion-
ment would have the effect that these men would be crushed with colos-
sal fortunes, or, under any system, with great material responsibilities,
which would at once be fatal to their special form of life, and would also
probably have disastrous effects on society. The relation of external
means to spiritual ends is much more subtle than this; and even the
rashest devotee of mere ethical justice must surely be revolted by the
idea that the best — the spiritually strongest — is to have the easiest
and pleasantest lot.11 If we look at the analogous case of physical strength,
we ourselves should scorn to adopt the principle assumed in the com-
plaint, supposing us to be apportioning burdens for a mountain climb or
a campaign. The fact that the goodness of the best has a certain deep
underlying relation to external success,12 in as far as goodness is the
nature of things, further demonstrates the subtlety of the problem, but
does not justify the direct relation desiderated by the complaint.13
b. Further, then, every negative, of course, has a positive side; and14/Bernard Bosanquet
the fact that the action of the State, being confined to externals,14 cannot
directly promote its spiritual end, does not mean what has been called
administrative nihilism. The problem is one familiar in various degrees
throughout the whole of life, especially to all who are or make them-
selves responsible for the lives of others. It is that of the evocation of
spiritual good by dealing with external circumstance; and the solution
of the problem is in general terms that such evocation must be indirect.
We are aware of the dangers of parasitism,15 and of the subtle and easily
disconcerted nature of those external conditions — we may take as ex-
amples bodily health, comfortable homes, effective income — which
are most akin to spiritual goods, and are therefore the least capable of
being maintained by the agency of compulsion.16 All this experience
gives rise, in the minds of those who most fully appreciate it, to the
paradox of social reform, in which practical necessity corroborates our
theory of the State. Perhaps I may quote from a writing in which I have
dealt with the matter more in detail. “Our common purpose is the excel-
lence of human souls: the only means to this purpose which as social
reformers we can handle lies in legal provisions and acts of public and
private administration, which cannot directly affect anything at all ex-
cept external circumstances. Our purpose, therefore, can only be pro-
moted indirectly, and for that reason, the greatest skill and the finest
adjustment are needed in the handling of projects of reform. Simply to
do in every case what you desire to see done is a policy that frustrates
itself.”17
c. Finally, this position may be illustrated by the general de facto
relation of the content of State action in the way of social amelioration
to what I have here called social action in contrast to the action of the
State. As I have pointed out elsewhere in greater detail,18 and as the
most extreme of recent proposals for the increase of State action admit
and maintain,19 the content of legislation and administration with a view
to the public good, the inventive, experimental, creative element, is al-
most entirely supplied by one or other of the forms of social action
which are not due to the initiative of the State. The relation on the whole
is like that by which a tree makes its wood, or a living body deposits its
skeleton. The work of the State is de facto for the most part “endorse-
ment” or “taking over” — setting its imprimatur, the seal of its force, on
what more flexible activities or the mere progress of life have wrought
out in long years of adventurous experiment or silent growth. True so-
cial work, independent of the public power, is the laboratory of socialThe Philosophical Theory of the State/15
invention. The taking over of social inventions by the State is something
like the taking over of a private business by a limited company, and
there are analogous results for good and evil. The introduction of State
socialism would be a gigantic taking over of this kind. We are not now
discussing the advantages or disadvantages on the whole of such taking
over on the large scale. We are only pointing out that in detail the nor-
mal course of improvement starts from origination by pure social inven-
tion, and passes subsequently, if at all, into adoption by the State. Of
course it is not meant that the representatives of the State are incapable
of invention and adaptation. But there is a mass of experience to cor-
roborate the plain theoretical inference that what is distinctive and nor-
mal in State action, as it cannot be the direct enforcement of good life,
so is not primarily the power of invention, adaptation, fine adjustment
in the promotion of it.
d. It is not denied that the organs of State can learn and borrow the
methods of indirect self-subordination to spiritual ends. The gist of our
whole contention is that these methods are just what it has to learn, and
to rely upon, so far as it passes beyond the nature of the “Rechtsstaat”
— the mere maintenance of an order according to law. This necessity is
imposed upon it by the same characteristic which is its raison d’être,
the need for the expression of the end of life through force as well as in
spiritual form, and the harder it is to discern this factor amid the wealth
of the functions which it assumes to-day, the more fatal it is to fail in
discerning it. The end of the State, we repeat, is assuredly good life or
the excellence of souls; but for a power which deals primarily with the
compulsory arrangement of externals, and for all of us so far as in our
degree we have power over externals affecting others, the only path to
that end lies in very fine adjustments directed to eliciting what ex hy-
pothesi they cannot produce.20
3. The theory of the State is held to be too intellectualist. The philo-
sophical crusade against “intellectualism” cannot be properly dealt with
as an annexe to another subject. But it is undoubtedly affecting the theory
of the State, and so far we must indicate an attitude towards it.
(i) A great movement, we may briefly suggest, seems to have fused
itself with a great fallacy. Europe is full to-day of the ethical and demo-
cratic demand for real progress, guided by the actual interests and emo-
tions of mankind; for a future to be moulded by and for humanity.21
With it there comes from many quarters, supported by strange alliances,
a distrust of the highly intellectual consciousness. We have had it from16/Bernard Bosanquet
Schopenhauer, imported from the east, in John Henry Newman, and in
Mr Kidd, no less than in Professor William James and M. Bergson.22
Now a movement like this, of course, is not founded on a mere illusion.
It is based, and feels itself to be based, on something essential, and
something which has, say, since Rousseau, been gaining ground, in the
self-recognition of humanity. There is in it something of an insurrection
of the powers of earth against an intellectual Olympus, of the revolution
portrayed by Victor Hugo, in which Jupiter was to kneel before Pan.23
But its value for theory must depend on its interpreters. And in one
crucial point — a technical but fundamental point — the most promi-
nent of them have led it into an impasse, the great fallacy of which I
spoke.24
(ii) In the first edition of this book I already called attention to the
extraordinary treatment of identity and difference by the “imitation”
theorists; a treatment having at least a pronounced tendency to split
identity from difference, repetition from novelty, imitation from inven-
tion; with the result of setting up a barrier between the normal intellec-
tual process and such activities as progress and creativeness. Since that
time the tendency has become more emphatic, and wide acceptance has
been accorded to a philosophy which rests upon the assumption that the
intelligence has for its province only what is covered by the principle of
identity construed as tautology;25 that life, novelty, creativeness, are in-
compatible with its nature, and, that intelligence, consequently, is pow-
erless to identify itself with freedom or with creative progress.
(iii) We are thus brought into the presence of a curious form of
agnosticism. Life, volition, immediate experience become, as it were, a
Kantian thing-in-itself. For in as far as mind finds articulate utterance
or expression it departs — so the argument runs — from its self-com-
plete and concrete being. And like all Agnosticism, this readily turns to
pessimism. For pessimism is at hand whenever we are led to suppose
that the determinate is the derivative and the secondary, and that the best
experience and the true inwardness of life are unutterable.
The effect of such an attitude on the theory of the State is easy to
see. We may contrast it, for example, with the tone of Hegel’s words. “It
is just freedom that is the self of thought; one who repudiates thought
and talks of freedom knows not what he is saying.”26 This is because
what thought means for him is just identity realised in difference; the
breaking down of barriers, the fusion of inner and outer, old and new,
oneself and the other. But if an immediate experience, of which intelli-The Philosophical Theory of the State/17
gence is a secondary phenomenon, is set up as the thing in itself, then all
explicit organisation is discredited and degraded. The difficulty is not so
much that social analysis is enlarged by tracing back the social interests
and feelings to instincts which have a long biological history behind
them. Plato would not have objected to this. and in fact does a good deal
of it himself. It is rather that in this analysis,27 a great deal of the actual
content of social — still more of super-social — life, simply disappears.
We are left with a foundation which has no superstructure.
All this fatal alternative, not the analysis of instinct and emotion,
but the omission of organised ideas from the analysis of the social mind,
springs, technically speaking, from the postulate that identity is the prin-
ciple of the intelligence, together with the conception of identity as tau-
tology, or as one with the similarity presented in repetition. Instead of
believing that “ideas have hands and feet,” we are taught to conceive of
them as static systems, which can only represent what is alive by enter-
ing into a rapid succession like that of the pictures in a cinematograph.
Whatever is not tautological becomes ex hypothesi irrational.
(iv) If we abandon that indispensable postulate, the alternative be-
tween reason and the true inner life falls to the ground. An idea may be
held, as the greatest thinkers have held it, to be the intensest and the
most concrete just because the most highly organised phase of mental
concentration, which maintains in its complex the interest and emotion
due to its content. And the realisation of an idea is the essence of what
we mean by volition; and therefore we have in the State at once a con-
ception which serves as an adjustment of all adjustments, and also, in
this conception, a standing will.
I believe that it could be shown that views of the type here advo-
cated not only give the truest interpretation of social forces and pro-
cesses, but have in the recent past proved the most fruitful guide and
inspiration of social improvement. I hope to establish this more com-
pletely in a future work; but it seems desirable to take this opportunity
of drawing attention to such an expression as that of Professor William
James,28 “a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious,
but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and
sorrows.” I do not think that the chapter from which this sentence is
taken could have been written by any man who had at all reflected on
the nature of social work and the influences that have inspired it in the
English-speaking world during the past half century.29
I am convinced, then, that the ancient theory of the State can only18/Bernard Bosanquet
be strengthened and amplified by the wealth of modern experience. And
little as the present work can claim to deal with the whole province of
recent State development and activity, I believe that, resting on a tradi-
tion derived from thinkers who have been the sanest and profoundest
students of civilised life, it affords a serviceable clue to the interpreta-
tion of such developments.
Chapter I.
Rise and Conditions of the Philosophical Theory
of the State
1. First, it will be well to indicate, in a very few words, what is implied
in a “philosophical theory,” as distinguished from theories which make
no claim to be philosophical. The primary difference is, that a philo-
sophical treatment is the study of something as a whole and for its own
sake. In a certain sense it may be compared to the gaze of a child or of
an artist. It deals, that is, with the total and unbroken effect of its object.
It desires to ascertain what a thing is, what is its full characteristic and
being, its achievement in the general act of the world. History, explana-
tion, analysis into cause and conditions, have value for it only in so far
as they contribute to the intelligent estimation of the fullest nature and
capabilities of the real individual whole which is under investigation.
We all know that a flower is one thing for the geometrician, another for
the chemist, another for the botanist, and another, again, for the artist.
Now, philosophy can of course make no pretension to cope with any one
of the specialists on his own ground. But the general nature of the task
imposed upon it is this: aiding itself, so far as possible, by the trained
vision of all specialists, to make some attempt to see the full signifi-
cance of the flower as a word or letter in the great book of the world.
And this we call studying it, as it is, and for its own sake, without
reservation or presupposition. It is assumed, then, for the purpose of a
philosophical treatment, that everything, and more particularly in this
case the political life of man, has a nature of its own, which is worthy of
investigation on its own merits and for its own sake. How its phases
come into being, or what causes or conditions have played a part in its
growth, are other questions well worthy of investigation. But the philo-
sophical problem is rather to see our object as it is and to learn what it
is, to estimate, so to speak, its kind and degree of self-maintenance in
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Yet such phrases as “what it is” and “for its own sake” must not
mislead us. They do not mean that the nature of any reality which we
experience can be appreciated in isolation from the general world of life
and knowledge. On the contrary, they imply that when fully and fairly
considered from the most thoroughly adequate point of view, our sub-
ject matter will reveal its true position and relations with reference to all
else that man can do and can know. This position and these relations
constitute its rank or significance in the totality of experience, and this
value or significance—in the present case, what the form of life in ques-
tion enables man to do and to become—is just what we mean by its
nature “in itself,” or its full and complete nature, or its significance
when thoroughly studied “for its own sake” from an adequate point of
view. Further illustrations of the distinction between an adequate point
of view and partial or limited modes of consideration, and of the rela-
tions between the former and the latter, will be found in the following
chapter.
2. In a certain sense it would be true to say that wherever men have
lived there has always been a “State.” That is to say, there has been
some association or corporation, larger than the family, and acknowl-
edging no power superior to itself. But it is obvious that the experience
of a State in this general sense of the word is not coextensive with true
political experience, and that something much more definite than this is
necessary to awaken curiosity as to the nature and value of the commu-
nity in which man finds himself to be a member.
Such curiosity has been awakened and sustained principally if not
exclusively by two kindred types of associated life—the City-state of
ancient Greece, and the Nation-state of the modern world. It will throw
light on the nature of our subject if we glance rapidly at the characteris-
tics to which it is due that political philosophy began in connection with
the former, and revived in connection with the latter.
In considering the Greek city-states in connection with the birth of
political philosophy, there are three points which press upon our atten-
tion:  . the type of experience which they presented; ß. the type of mind
which that experience implied; and  . the type of interpretation which
such a mind elicited from such an experience.
 . A Greek city-state presented a marked contrast to the modes of
human association which prevailed in the non-Greek world. It differed
from them above all things by its distinct individuality. No doubt there
was a recognisable character in the life and conduct of Egypt or of20/Bernard Bosanquet
Assyria, of Phoenicia or of Israel. But the community which has a youth,
a maturity, and a decadence, as distinct as those of a single human be-
ing, and very nearly as self-conscious; which has a tone and spirit as
recognisable in the words and bearing of its members as those of a
character in a play; and which expresses its mind in the various regions
of human action and endurance much as an artist expresses his indi-
viduality in the creations of his genius— such a community had existed,
before the beginnings of the modern world, in the Greek citystate, and in
the Greek city-state alone. A political consciousness in the strict sense
was a necessary factor in the experience of such a commonwealth. The
demand for “autonomy”—government by one’s own law,—and for
“isonomy”—government according to equal law—though far from be-
ing always satisfied, was inherent in the Greek nature; and its strenu-
ousness was evinced by the throes of revolution and the labours of leg-
islation which were shaking the world of Greece at the dawn of history.
The very instrument of all political action was invented, so far as we
can see, by the Greeks. The simple device by which an orderly vote is
taken, and the minority acquiesce in the will of the majority as if it had
been their own—an invention no less definite than that of the lever or
the wheel—is found for the first time as an everyday method of decision
in Greek political life.
ß. Such a type of experience implies a corresponding type of mind.
It is not surprising that science and philosophy should owe their birth to
the genius from which politics sprang. For politics is the expression of
reason in the relations that bind man to man, as science and philosophy
are the expression of it in the relations which link together man’s whole
experience. The mind which can recognise itself practically in the order
of the commonwealth, can recognise itself theoretically in the order of
nature. And ultimately, though not at first (for curiosity is awakened by
objects perceived in space and time, before attention is turned to the
very hinge and centre of man’s own being), science passes into philoso-
phy; and mind, and conduct, and the political consciousness, are them-
selves made objects of speculation. It has become a commonplace that
this transference of curiosity from the outer to the inner—really, that is,
from the partial to the total world—took shape in the work of Socrates,
who invested with the greatness of his own intelligence and character a
movement which the needs of the age had rendered inevitable. And thus
there arose the ethical and political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,
the successors of Socrates, just at the time when the distinctive politicalThe Philosophical Theory of the State/21
life of Greece was beginning to decay.
  This philosophy, like all genuine philosophy, was an interpretation
of the experience presented to it; and in this case the interpretation was
due to minds which were themselves a part of the phenomena on which
they reflected. Such minds, hostile as they may feel themselves to the
spirit of the age, and however passionately they may cry out for reform
or for revolution, are none the less its representatives; and their inter-
pretation, though it may modify and even mutilate the phenomena, will
nevertheless be found to throw the central forces and principles of the
time into the clearest light. So Plato’s negative treatment of the family,
and of other elements which seem essential to Greek civilisation, was no
bar to his grasping, and representing with unequalled force, the central
principle of the life around him. The fundamental idea of Greek political
philosophy, as we find it in Plato and Aristotle, is that the human mind
can only attain its full and proper life in a community of minds, or more
strictly in a community pervaded by a single mind, uttering itself con-
sistently though differently in the life and action of every member of the
community. This conception is otherwise expressed by such phrases as
“the State is natural,” i.e., is a growth or evolution, apart from which
the end implied in man’s origin cannot be attained; “the State is prior to
the individual,” i.e., there is a principle or condition underlying the life
of the human individual, which will not admit of that life becoming
what it has in it to be, unless the full sphere or arena which is constituted
by the life of the State is realised in fact. The whole is summed up in the
famous expression of Aristotle, “Man is a creature formed for the life of
the City-state.” The working out of this idea, as we find it in Plato’s
commonwealth, is bizarre to our minds; but its difficulty really lies in its
simplicity and directness; and there is no sound political philosophy
which is not an embodiment of Plato’s conception. The central idea is
this: that every class of persons in the community—the statesman, the
soldier, the workman—has a certain distinctive type of mind which fits
its members for their functions, and that the community essentially con-
sists in the working of these types of mind in their connection with one
another, which connection constitutes their subordination to the com-
mon good. This working or adjustment obviously depends in the last
resort on the qualities present in the innermost souls of the members of
the community;. and thus the outward organisation of society is really
as it were a body which at every point and in every movement expresses
the characteristics of a mind. We must not pause here to follow up the22/Bernard Bosanquet
consequences of such a conception; but it will be seen at once, by those
who reflect upon it, to imply that every individual mind must have its
qualities drawn out in various ways to answer to—in fact, to consti-
tute—the relations and functions which make up the community; and
that in this sense every mind is a mirror or impression of the whole
community from its own peculiar point of view. The ethical assumption
or principle of Plato’s conception is, that a healthy organisation of the
commonwealth will involve, by a necessary connection, a healthy bal-
ance and adjustment of qualities in the individual soul, and vice versa.
An attempt will be made to illustrate this principle further in the latter
portion of the present work. The general nature of Plato’s conception—
the characteristic conception of Greek political philosophy—is all that
concerns us here.
It is important to observe that during the very genesis of this philo-
sophical conception of society, an antagonistic view was powerfully
represented. The individual could not freely find himself in the commu-
nity unless he was capable of repudiating it; the possibility of negation,
as a logician might express it, is necessary to a really significant affir-
mation. Thus we find in the very age of Plato and Aristotle the most
startling anticipations of those modern ideas which seem diametrically
opposed to theirs. We find the idea of nature identified not with the
mature fulness, but with the empty starting point of life; we meet with
the phenomena of vegetarianism, water-drinking, the reduction of dress
to its minimum, in short, the familiar symptoms of the longing for the
“return to nature,” with all that it implies; we find law and political
unity treated as a tissue of artifice and convention, and the individual
disdaining to identify himself with the citizenship of a single state, but
claiming to be a stranger in the city and a citizen of the world. To prove
that these ideas were not without their justification, it is enough to point
out that in some instances they were accompanied by a polemic against
slavery, which, as a form of solidarity, was upheld in a qualified sense
at least by Aristotle. The existence of this negative criticism is enough
to show how distinctly the Greek intellect set before itself the fundamen-
tal problem of the relation between the individual and society, and of
how high a quality was the bond of union which maintained this relation
in such intimacy among minds of a temper so analytic.
3. Many writers have told the story of the change which came over
the mind of Greece when the independent sovereignty of its City-states
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tion to the fact that with this change the political or social philosophy of
the great Greek time not only lost its supremacy, but almost ceased to be
understood. From this period forward, till the rise of the modern Na-
tion-states, men’s thoughts about life and conduct were cast in the mould
of moral theory, of religious mysticism and theology, or of jurispru-
dence. The individual demanded in the sphere of ethics and religion to
be shown a life sufficing to himself apart from any determinate human
society—a problem which Plato and Aristotle had assumed to be in-
soluble. Stoicism and Epicureanism, the earliest non-national creeds of
the western world, triumphantly developed the ideas which at first, as
we saw, were little more than a rebellion against the central Socratic
philosophy. Cosmopolitanism, the conception of humanity, the idea of a
“Society of Friends”—the Epicurean league—from which women were
not excluded, and the precept of “not expecting from life more than it
has to give,” take the place of the highly individualised commonwealth,
with its strenuous masculine life of war and politics, and its passionate
temper which felt that nothing had been accomplished so long as any-
thing remained undone.
With this change of temper in the civilised world there is brought
into prominence a great deal of human nature which had not found ex-
pression’ through the immediate successors of Socrates. In the period
between Aristotle and Cicero there is more than a whisper’ of the sound
which meets us like a trumpet blast in the New Testament, “neither Jew
nor Greek, barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.” But the unworldli-
ness which took final shape in Christianity was destined to undergo a
long transmigration through shapes of otherworldliness before it should
return in modern thought to the unity from which it started; and the
history of ethics and religion has little bearing upon true political theory
between the death of Aristotle and the awakening of the modern con-
sciousness in the Reformation.
In so far as the political ideas of antiquity were preserved to modern
times otherwise than in the manuscripts of Plato and Aristotle, the influ-
ence which preserved them was that of Roman Jurisprudence. The Ro-
man rule, though it stereotyped the state of things in which genuine
political function and the spur of freedom were unknown, had one pecu-
liar gift by which it handed to posterity the germs of a great conception
of human life. This is not the place to describe at length the origin of
that vast practical induction from the working of the “foreigners’ court”
at Rome which obtained for itself the name of the Law of Nations, and24/Bernard Bosanquet
which, as tinged with ideal theory, was known as the Law of Nature.
Whatever fallacies may be near at hand when “natural right” is named,
the conception that there is in man, as such, something which must be
respected, a law of life which is his “nature,” being indeed another name
for his reason, and in some sense or other a “freedom” and an “equality”
which are his birthright—this conception was not merely a legacy from
Stoic ideas, which had almost a religious inspiration, but was solidly
founded on the judicial experience of the most practical race that the
world has ever seen.
4. In order that the forces which lay hidden in the conception of
Natural Right and Freedom, like the powers of vegetation in a seed,
might unfold themselves in the modern world, it was necessary that
conditions should recur analogous to those which had first elicited them.
And these earlier conditions were those of the Greek City-state; for it
was here, as we have seen, that the conception of man’s nature had
flourished, as the idea of a purposive evolution into a full and many-
sided social life, while in Stoic philosophy and Roman juristic theory it
had become more and more a shibboleth and a formula which lost in
depth of meaning what it gained in range of application.
To restore their ancient significance, expanded in conformity with a
larger order of things, to the traditional formulae, demanded just the
type of experience which was furnished by the modern Nation-state.
The growth of Nation-states in modern Europe was in progress, we are
told, from the ninth to the fifteenth century. And it towards and after the
close of this period, and especially in the seventeenth century when the
national consciousness of the English people, as of others, had become
thoroughly awakened, that political speculation in the strict sense be-
gins again, after an interval extending back to the Politics of Aristotle.
To let one example serve for many; when we read John of Gaunt’s praises
of England in Shakespeare’s Richard II., we feel ourselves at once in
contact with the mind of a social unity, such as necessarily to raise in
any inquiring intelligence all those problems which were raised for Plato
and Aristotle by the individuality of Athens and Sparta. And so we see
the earliest political speculation of the modern world groping, as it were,
for ideas by help of which to explain the experience of an individual
self-governing sovereign society. And for the most part the ideas that
offer themselves are those of Roman Jurisprudence, but distorted by
political applications and by the rhetoric of Protestant fanaticism. As
Mr. Ritchie30 points out, the conception of natural right and a law ofThe Philosophical Theory of the State/25
nature makes a strange but effective coalition with the temper of the
Wycliffite cry
“When Adam dalf and Eve span,
Who was then the gentleman?”
 The notions of contract, of force, of representation in a single legal
“person,” are now applied separately or together to the phenomenon of
the self-governing individual community. But the solution remains im-
perfect, and the fundamental fact of self-government refuses to be con-
strued either as the association of individuals, originally free and equal,
for certain limited purposes, or as the absolute absorption of their wills
in the “person of a despotic sovereign. The revival of a true philosophi-
cal meaning within the abstract terms of juristic tradition was the work
of the eighteenth century as a whole. For the sake of clearness, and with
as much historical justice as ever attaches to an attribution of the kind,
we may connect it with the name of a single man—Jean Jacques
Rousseau. For it is Rousseau who stands midway between Hobbes and
Locke on the one hand, and Kant and Hegel on the other, and in whose
writings the actual revival of the full idea of human nature may be
watched from paragraph to paragraph as it struggles to throw off the
husk of an effete tradition. Between Locke and Rousseau the genius of
Vico and of Montesquieu had given a new meaning to the dry formulae
of law by showing the sap of society circulating within them. Moreover
the revived experience of the Greeks came in the nick of time. It was
influential with Rousseau himself, and little as he grasped the political
possibilities of a modern society, in matters of sheer principle this influ-
ence led him on the whole in the right direction. His insight was just,
when it showed him that every political whole presented the same prob-
lem which had been presented by the Greek City-state, and involved the
same principles. And he bequeathed to his successors the task of substi-
tuting for the mere words and fictions of contract, nature, and original
freedom, the ideas of the common life of an essentially social being,
expressing and sustaining the human will at its best.
According to the view here indicated, the resurrection of true politi-
cal philosophy out of the dead body of juristic abstractions was inaugu-
rated by Vico and Montesquieu, and decisively declared itself in Jean
Jacques Rousseau. The idea which most of us have formed of “the new
Evangel of a Contrat Social” is not in harmony with this representation26/Bernard Bosanquet
of the matter. Was it, we may be asked, a genuine political philosophy
which inspired the leaders of the French Revolution? And the question
cannot be evaded by denying all connection between the theory and the
practice of that age. The phraseology of the revolutionary declara-
tions31—which will strike the reader accustomed to nineteenth century
socialism as exceedingly moderate and even conservative in tone—is
undoubtedly to a great extent borrowed from Rousseau’s writings.
Perhaps the truth of the matter may be approached as follows. The
popular rendering of a great man’s views is singularly liable to run
straight into the pit-falls against which he more particularly warned the
world. This could be proved true in an extraordinary degree of such
men as Plato and Spinoza, and still more astonishingly, perhaps, of the
founder of the Christian religion. The reason is obvious. A great man
works with the ideas of his age, and regenerates them. But in as far as he
regenerates them, he gets beyond the ordinary mind; while in as far as
he operates with them, he remains accessible to it. And his own mind
has its ordinary side; the regeneration of ideas which he is able to effect
is not complete, and the notions of the day not only limit his entire range
of achievement—where the strongest runner will get to must depend on
where he starts—but float about unassimilated within his living stream
of thought. Now all this ordinary side of his mind will partake of the
strength and splendour of his whole nature. And thus he will seem to
have preached the very superstitions which he combated. For in part he
has done so, being himself infected; in part the overwhelming bias of his
interpreters has reversed the meaning of his very warnings, by transfer-
ring the importance, due to his central thought, to some detail or meta-
phor which belongs to the lower level of his mind. It is an old story how
Spinoza, “the God-intoxicated man,” was held to be an “atheist,” when
in truth he was rather an “acosmist”; and in the same way, on a lower
plane, the writer who struggled through to the idea that true sovereignty
lay in the dominion of a common social good as expressed through law
and institutions, is held to have ascribed absolute supremacy to that
chance combination of individual voices in a majority, which he ex-
pressly pointed out to have, in itself, no authority at all.
But there is something more to be said of cases, like that under
discussion, where a great man’s ideas touch the practical world. If the
complete and positive idea becomes narrow and negative as it impinges
upon every-day life, this may be not only a consequence of its transmis-
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do. The narrower truth may be, so to speak, the cutting edge of the more
complete, as the negation is of the affirmation. And the vulgar notion of
popular sovereignty and of natural right may have been necessary to do
a work which a more organic social theory would have been too delicate
to achieve. Like the faith in a speedy second coming of Christ among the
early Christians, the gospel according to Jean Jacques may have taken
for the minds of Revolutionary France a form which was serviceable as
well as inevitable at the moment. If, as we said above, the great man is
always misunderstood, it seems to follow that when his germinal ideas
have been sown they must assert themselves first in lower phases if they
are ever to bear fruit at all. And therefore, while not denying the influ-
ence of Rousseau on the Revolution, we shall attempt to show that he
had another and a later influence, more adequate to the true reach of his
genius.
Chapter II.
Sociological Compared with Philosophical
Theory.
I. There is no doubt that Sociology and Social Philosophy have started,
historically speaking, from different points of view. The object of the
present chapter is to ascertain the nature and estimate the importance
and probable permanence of the difference between them. I propose
first to explain the difference in general; then to review the sources of
social experience, which in other words are facets or aspects of social
life, by which social theory has been influenced, and with which it has
to deal; and, finally, to form some idea of the distinctive services which
may be rendered by sociology and social philosophy respectively in view
of the range of experience which it is the function of social theory to
organise.
Beginning with Vico’s32 New Science, there has been more than one
attempt in modern Europe to inaugurate the Science of Society as a new
departure. But the distinctive and modern spirit of what is known as
Sociology, and under that name has had a continuous growth of half a
century at least, first found unmistakable expression in Auguste Comte.
The conception which he impressed upon the science to which he first
gave the name of sociology or social physics, was a characteristically
modern conception. Its essence was the inclusion of human society among
the objects of natural science; its watchwords were law and cause—in28/Bernard Bosanquet
the sense in which alone Positivism allowed causes to be thought of—
and scientific prediction.33 It is true that the large conception of unity
which Comte embodied in his philosophy had very much in common
with the principles insisted on by the Greek social philosophers. The
close interdependence of all social phenomena among each other, the
unity of man with nature, and the consequent correlation of moral and
political theory with the organised hierarchy of mathematical and physical
sciences, are ideas which Comte might have borrowed directly from
Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless the modern starting-point is wholly
different from that of antiquity. The modern enquirer—the sociologist
as such—was to ask himself, according to Comte, in the language of
physical science, what are the laws and causes operative among aggre-
gations of human beings, and what are their predictable effects? The
ancient philosopher—the ethical and metaphysical theorist—had before
him primarily the problem, “what is the completest and most real life of
the human soul?” The work of the latter has been revived by modern
idealist philosophy dating from Rousseau and Hegel, and finding a sec-
ond home in Great Britain, as that of the former has developed itself
within the peculiar limits and traditions of sociological research, flour-
ishing more especially upon French and American soil. The continu-
ance of these two streams of thought in independent courses, though not
without signs of convergence, is a remarkable phenomenon of nineteenth
century culture; and it will be one of the problems which the present
chapter, and in a larger sense the whole of the present work, must deal
with, to consider how far it is necessary or desirable that they should
blend.
2. Every science, no doubt, is to some extent, the playground of
analogies; but the complexity and the unmateriality of human relations
has forced this character upon social theory in an extraordinary degree.
It is impossible to account for the tendencies of sociological as well as
of philosophical thought without making some attempt to pursue the
line of investigation suggested by Mr. Bagehot in his Physics and Poli-
tics. Predominant modes and types of experience necessarily colour the
whole activity of the mind, and, as indicated above,  this influence more
especially affects a province of research which is not prima facie acces-
sible to direct experiment or sensuous observation. I must, therefore,
endeavour to review, in a brief outline, the principal branches of experi-
ence which have furnished ideas for application to social theory, and to
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to preoccupation with one or another special analogy.
i. The Newtonian theory of gravitation is the entrance gate to the
modern world of science. “When the Newton of this subject shall be
seated in his place”34 is the aspiration of the modern investigator in
every matter capable of being known. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the inclusion of human society within the range of matters capable of
being definitely understood, should have been symbolised by demand-
ing for social science a completeness of explanation and a power of
prediction analogous to those displayed by astronomy or by mathemati-
cal physics. Representative of this conception is the title, Social Phys-
ics—for Comte the alternative and the equivalent to the name Sociol-
ogy. It is easy to see both the merits and the dangers of such an ideal,
which, as the embodiment of perfection in a natural science, is presup-
posed by the attitude of sociology down to the present day. Is a science
necessarily a natural science, and is a natural science necessarily an
exact science?—these are the fundamental questions involved in the
adoption of a mathematical ideal for the study of society. No fault can
be found with it on the ground of its implying the highest degree of
harmony and precision; the only question is whether an adequate type of
comparison is afforded for, let us say, the growth of an institution, by
the law of a curve. The general conception, indeed, of a continuity be-
tween human relations and the laws of the cosmic order is thoroughly in
the spirit of Plato, and betokens a scientific enthusiasm worthy to be the
parent of great things. And especially in the sphere of economic science,
where certain relatively simple hypotheses have proved on the whole to
be effective instruments of explanation, an analysis of intricate phe-
nomena has been effected, which in some degree justifies the aspiration
after the ideal of an exact science.
ii. But it has been recognised from the earliest days of political
speculation that, within the general ideal of a perfect natural science,
the more special analogy of the living organism had a peculiar bearing
upon social phenomena. Beginning in the ancient world with the com-
parison between individuals as “members” of a social whole, and the
parts or organs of a living body, or even the constituent elements of a
mind, this analogy has been extended and reinforced in modern times by
what amounts to the new creation of the biological and anthropological
sciences. The sense of continuity thus intensified and implying all that is
understood by the modern term evolution, has brought an immense ma-
terial of suggestions to sociological research, but has imposed upon it at30/Bernard Bosanquet
the same time a characteristic bias from which it is  just, perhaps, begin-
ning to shake itself free. This characteristic may be roughly stated as the
explanation of the higher, by which I mean the more distinctly human
phenomena, by the lower, or those more readily observed, or inferred,
among savage nations, or in the animal world. Any one familiar with
logic will be aware that there is a subtle and natural prejudice which
tends to strengthen such a bias by claiming a higher degree of reality for
that which, as coming earlier in temporal succession, presents itself in
the light of what is called a cause. So strong has been this bias among
sociologists, that the student, primarily interested in the features and
achievements of civilised society, is tempted to say in his haste that the
sociologist35 as such seldom deals seriously with true social phenomena
at all; but devotes his main attention to primitive man and to the lower
animals, occasionally illustrating his studies in these regions by allu-
sions, showing no great insight or mastery, to the facts of civilised soci-
ety. Such a complaint becomes less and less justified as the years go by,
and sociology recovers its balance as against the overwhelming influ-
ence of the sciences of lower life. How far the approach from this “lower”
or more purely natural side will remain in the end characteristic of so-
ciological science, is an integral part of the main problem concerning its
nature and destiny with which we have to deal in the present work. But
it remains true to say and very important to observe, that no such seri-
ous successes have as yet been won in the name and by the special
methods of sociology as have been achieved by many investigators ap-
proaching their problems directly and with an immediate interest; whether
in the sphere of political economy proper, or in dealing with various
questions of social and ethical importance, such as pauperism, charity,
sanitation, education, the condition of the people, the comparative study
of politics, or the analysis of material and geographical conditions in
their reaction upon social and artistic development.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the epoch and influence of
which we speak has bequeathed a legacy of imperishable value to the
theory of society. In a word, it has made us sensitive to the continuity of
things, and therefore also to their unity. It has shown us the crowning
achievements of the human race, their States, their Religion, their Fine
Art, and their Science, as the high-water mark of tendencies that have
their beginnings far back in the primitive organic world, and in their
original sources have also a connection with each other—as in the prac-
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est individual development. The “return to nature” and the “noble sav-
age” have been invested with a significance which can never be forgot-
ten, and which criticism can never set aside. This is the sum and sub-
stance of the general contribution which the latter half of the eighteenth
century and the greater part of the nineteenth have made to sociology
through the science of life and of man.
More particularly, it is necessary to notice the double operation of
biological influence on sociology, according to the unit from which the
analogy is drawn.
a. The idea which still bulks most largely in the popular mind, as
contributed by biology to social theory, is unquestionably that of the
struggle for life, or the survival of the fittest. It should be noticed that
the social application of this analogy rests entirely on the comparison of
a human society, not to the individual animal organism, and still less to
the individual mind; but to a whole animal species, or even to the aggre-
gate of all animal species, so far as they or their members are in compe-
tition with one another. One whole side of the sociological doctrine,
which Mr. Spencer has advocated with unwearied persistence, is founded
upon this applica- tion of the biological analogy, and the paradox which
he has made his principle professes to be borrowed directly from the
dealings of nature with the individuals of the animal species. This para-
dox, that benefits should be assigned inversely as services in infancy
but directly as services among adults, is his ultimate sociological basis;
the modification of which, to suit human society, by the introduction of
benevolence or altruism, so to speak, on the top of it, only serves to
display its inadequacy. But we may take it that the analogy of the struggle
for life has made it clear that, in any given position, life can be main-
tained only in virtue of definite qualities. adapted to that position. And
formal as this prin- ciple is when taken by itself, its application in hu-
man society can never be unnecessary.
b. A more recent school has insisted on the complementary analogy,
which might be taken as resting upon the comparison of a society with
an individual organism. Here, it must be remem- bered, lay the resem-
blance which, in this region of ideas, first caught the eye of social phi-
losophers in antiquity. But it is alleged that the aspect of co-operation
can be traced as between individual members of the animal world no
less than between the parts of a single organism, and it is. affirmed that
the view which sees nothing but internecine competition in the animal
kingdom has been too rough and too superficial in its reading of the32/Bernard Bosanquet
facts. And therefore it is suggested that. the phenomena of social fellow-
ship, no less than those of individual competition, have their source and
root in the world of lower nature; and perhaps sociology is now not far
from the recognition that competition and co-operation are simply the
negative and positive aspect of the same general fact——the fact of the
division of labour, of essentiality of function, and of uniqueness of true
individual service. If it is suggested by the one organic analogy that life
depends upon qualities adequate to the position which is to be filled, it is
made obvious by the other that the qualities which satisfy the claims of
a certain position are those, in general and in principle, by which a
function is discharged in the service of the whole.
In Mr. Spencer’s doctrine the two sides above indicated have been
brought into very marked relation by a suggestive criticism,36 which he
has taken special pains to answer. If human society corresponds to an
individual organism—as is, in many ways, Mr. Spencer’s well-known
doctrine— how is it that the absolute central control in which the per-
fection of an organism consists is, for Mr. Spencer, a note of imperfec-
tion when it appears in a human society? And the answer is in effect that
human society corresponds in many of its features rather to a local va-
riety of a species than to an individual organism. It is essentially dis-
crete, not individual, and at this point, therefore, the analogy of the
individual organism gives way to that of the group or species.
But Mr. Spencer does not really mean that a human society has no
more intrinsic bond between its members than the local group of an
animal species. To indicate its true nature he gives us a good word—but
a word only—the word “super-organic.”37 It is a significant term, and
brings us perhaps to the limit of what biological sociology is able to
suggest with regard to the unity of a human commonwealth, and points
us to something beyond. It is remarkable that when the facts of true
human society are more thoroughly realised than by Mr. Spencer, but
the clue of the individual organism and the co-operative side of animal
life is not followed up, there is a tendency to sever the links which unite
man to “lower” nature, and to represent the ethical and cosmic pro-
cesses as absolutely opposed. We see this point of view decidedly adopted
by Mr. Huxley,38 and its adoption perhaps indicates the inception of an
epoch in which sociology will cut itself free from a good deal of pseudo-
scientific lumber. Nevertheless, a patient and careful study will con-
tinue to recognise the elements both of competition and of co-operation
as ineradicable and inseparable moments in human society as in theThe Philosophical Theory of the State/33
animal world; the essential meaning of competition in its higher forms
being the rejection and suppression of members who are unable to meet
the ever advancing demand for co-operative character and capacity;
and the study of parasitism39 and of regressive selection will continue to
be a warning against the attempt to emancipate mankind from the sterner
general conditions of the cosmic order. It will be recognised that there is
an adaptation to conditions which consists in degradation; but the fail-
ure will be understood by comparison with the only true “survival of the
fittest,”40 being that which reveals the full unity and significance of or-
ganism and environment. It is important to observe that, at least in the
two eminent biologists just alluded to, the doctrine of the individual
self—of the relation between self-assertion and self-restraint—is alto-
gether of an uncivilised and anti-social type. Biological categories do
not, in their case at least, appear to have afforded any suggestion for the
treatment of the social self as more and greater, in a positive sense, than
the self which is less bound up with social obligations. As for the deny-
ing spirits in Plato’s Republic, so for both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Huxley,
“nature” is essentially self-assertion, and “society” self-restraint.41 Here
again we touch the same limitation which met us in Mr. Spencer’s term
“super-organic,” and we feel that a different point of view must be brought
to bear.
iii. Political Economy existed before modern Sociology was born,
and is still the only part of it which is obviously and indisputably suc-
cessful as a science of explanation. The triumphant development of this
theory reacted even upon Hegel’s political philosophy, by suggesting to
him the distinction between “Bourgeois Society” and “The State.” A
fortiori it could not but have a serious influence on the growing science
of sociology itself, the ideal of which might not unfairly be regarded as
the extension to society as a whole of that type of investigation which
had proved so successful in economic matter. From this influence has
arisen the tendency in sociological research which has been called by
the name of the economic or materialist view of history, and conse-
quently of society. Primarily connected with the name of Marx, it may
also be illustrated by many contentions of Buckle and Le Play, and has
become, indeed, the formula of a school. In sum, the point of view
amounts to this: that the fundamental structure of civilisation, the type
of the family, for example, and the order relations and development of
classes in society, have been and must be determined by the primary
necessities of human existence, and the conditions of climate and nutri-34/Bernard Bosanquet
tion under which these necessities are met. Economic facts alone, it is
suggested, are real and causal; everything else is an appearance and an
effect.
Before saying a word as to the true importance of this point of view,
we may profitably correct the commonplace idea of its nature. Materi-
alism, in a strict philosophical sense, means the conviction that nothing
is real but that which is solid, or, perhaps, which gravitates. By a not
very convincing analogy from this idea, all those passions and necessi-
ties which we speak of in a quite loose and popular way as connected
with the body, may be and often are regarded as “material” in opposi-
tion to energies which it seems pleasanter to ascribe to incorporeal mind.
But it should be noted that this secondary usage, especially in time when
no one denies the physical correlation of all psychical activity, has no
important ethical implication. Like the “flesh” or the “body” of St. Paul’s
religious language, the “bodily” or “material” needs and appetites of
man are an element of mind, the rank and value of which must be deter-
mined on other grounds than the notion that they are connected in some
peculiar degree with “physical” conditions. The economic view of his-
tory has been called and has called itself materialist partly because of
the commonplace usage, which I have just described, by which certain
passions and necessities, which it takes to be fundamental, are apt to be
called material as opposed to ethical or ideal—a wholly unjustified op-
position—and partly from the notion, which I referred to at the begin-
ning of this chapter, that the success of political economy was in some
way analogous to that of the mathematical science of abstract matter.
Stripping off, then, the unjustified suggestion of philosophical ma-
terialism,42 what we have in the economic view of history, amounts pretty
much to what is expressed in the saying that while statesmen are argu-
ing, love and hunger are governing mankind. Climate and natural re-
sources make a difference to history; occupations determine the type of
the family; an agricultural and an industrial society will never exhibit
the same relations between classes, and very vast commercial opera-
tions cannot be carried on by the same methods or by the same minds
which sufficed for the retail trade of a petty shop. But when it is clearly
seen that economic needs and devices are no detached, nor, so to speak,
absolutely antecedent department of human life—a fact which the epi-
thet “materialist” has done something to obscure, for, in truth, in eco-
nomics there is no question of genuine material causation—then it be-
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of social existence, but simply certain important aspects of the opera-
tions of the human mind, rather narrowly regarded in their isolation
from all others. If we seriously consider the import of such an economic
conception as the “standard of life,” it becomes plain that the contrast
too commonly accepted43 between the mechanical pressure of economic
facts and the influence of ideas44 stands in need of a completely fresh
criticism and of entire restatement. Discounting, however, the exaggera-
tions which have arisen from confused notions of materialism, and from
the genuine achievements of economic science, we have remaining, in
the point of view under consideration, a thoroughly just assertion of
man’s continuity with the world around him. Undoubtedly man lives the
life, of his planet, his climate, and his locality, and is the utterance, so to
speak, of the conditions under which his race and his nation have evolved.
The only difficulty arises if, by some arbitrary line between man and his
environment, the conditions which are the very material of his life come
to be treated as alien influences upon it, with the result of representing
him as being the slave of his surroundings rather than their concentrated
idea and articulate expression. Do we think that Homer, Dante, and
Shakespeare would have been greater or more free in their genius if one
had not been the voice of Greece, another that of Italy, and the third that
of England? The world in which man lives is himself, but is constituted,
of course, by presentation to a mind and not by strictly physical causa-
tion; and even where strictly physical causation plays a part, as in the
bodily effects of a hot climate or of a certain kind of nutrition, still it
cannot determine a type of human life except by passing into the world
which a human being presents to himself.
The exclusive importance which has been attached to considerations
of this kind in recent social theory is partly due to an unfounded opinion
of their novelty. It is somewhat striking, though following naturally
enough from the sort of schism in the world of letters which modern
sociology and ancient social philosophy represent, that the firm and
well balanced handling of these problems which we owe to Plato and
Aristotle is for the most part ignored by modern sociologists.
The entire social conception of those writers is a continued applica-
tion of the principle, fundamental in their whole philosophy, that “form”
is the inherent organising life of “matter,” so that the better life of a
commonwealth can be nothing but the flower and crown of the possi-
bilities inherent in its material conditions and industrial and economic
organisation. The law which is ultimately to reveal itself as the spring of36/Bernard Bosanquet
all righteousness in the State, has its most obvious and external sym-
bol—so Plato tells us—in the economic exchange of services; and every
circumstance of site, and industry, and trade, and the racial type of the
citizen, helps to constitute, both for him and for Aristotle, the living
organic possibility from which, in some appropriate individual form,
the higher life is to spring. If we ask ourselves what then is the differ-
ence between the ancient view of economic causation, and that of the
“materialist” historical school, we shall find the answer in the absence,
from the former, of that unreal isolation upon which we observed above.
The relation of “matter” or “conditions” to “form” or “purpose” is not,
for the Greek thinker, the pressure of an alien necessity, of a hostile
environment, but the up-springing of a life, continuous in principle
through all its phases. The thought of the legislator fixes in the shape of
distinct consciousness and will, what the assemblage of conditions em-
bodies. as a physical or instinctive tendency, as the artist, to use an
ancient simile, finds the statue in the marble. Working with this idea, the
connection is far more thoroughly, because more sympathetically, traced
than it can be when we think that our science is but laying bare the
fetters of humanity. And following in the spirit of the Greek thinkers
themselves, modern students of antiquity have devoted themselves to
eliciting the positive connection of conditions with history, up to a point
of success of which the common run of modern sociologists appear to
have no conception. When we reflect how typical and, comparatively
speaking, how readily isolated and exhausted is the history of Ancient
Greece in the greatest age, it seems extraordinary that the considerable
and minute researches which have been bestowed upon its geographi-
cal, commercial, and economic conditions should not be commonly drawn
into account with a view to the illustration of the relations between natural
resources, commercial and economic development, and historical great-
ness.45
However this may be, here at any rate, in the analysis of economic
and quasi-economic conditions in their bearing upon the life of peoples,
we get a real subject-matter which is perhaps, so far as can yet be seen,
the territory least disputably belonging to the pure sociologist. It is not
really a sphere of natural causation, but it is a sphere of certain simple
and general conditions in psychical life, corresponding to external facts
which admit of more or less precise statement, and, we may hope, of
reduction to fairly trustworthy uniformities. Such for instance are M.
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the division of labour,46 or Professor Giddings’ observations upon the
causes and limiting conditions of the aggregation of populations.47 We
now proceed to a branch of experience which seriously strains the working
conceptions of the sociologist.
iv. A completely new vista reveals itself to the student of social
theory when he turns from biological analogies and economic condi-
tions to consider the wealth of experience and of ideas which is fur-
nished to him by Jurisprudence and the Science of Right. He knows,
indeed, by this time, that the obvious aspect of a province of fact will
not be the only one, and that a unity will certainly be traceable between
all the facets of social existence. But none the less, he will be able to
restrain the itch to explain things away, and he will fairly and candidly
give weight to the significance and suggestiveness of the mass of history
and of reflection which is now brought before him.
a. For here, as the plainest and most unmistakable data of experi-
ence, we are confronted with ideal facts. The vast mass of documents
which form the basis of the Science of Right— a more complete and
comprehensive set of records, perhaps, than any other branch of social
science can boast—bears witness in every case to one social phenom-
enon at least, to a formal act of mind and will, aimed at maintaining
some relative right or hindering some relative wrong, and stamped with
what in some sense and in some degree amounts to a social recognition.
Theorists have said too hastily, though with a sound meaning, that right
is independent of fact. It would be as true to say that reason is indepen-
dent of civilisation, or the soul independent of culture. Right is not ex-
hausted in the facts of past history; but it is at every moment embodied
in facts; and to com- prehend that the social phenomena which are among
the most solid and unyielding of our experiences, are nevertheless ideal
in their nature, and consist of conscious recognitions, by intelligent be-
ings, of the relations in which they stand, is to make a great step towards
grasping the essential task of science in dealing with society. From the
beginning of social theory the facts of law have been set in Opposition
to the idea of a natural growth. It has been observed that, as a definite
institution maintained by formal acts of will, society is artificial, con-
ventional, contractual. We all know to-day that there is much more than
this to be said about the nature and principles of social growth. Never-
theless, it remains true that the social whole has an artificial aspect, an
aspect of will and of design, of the agreement and mutual recognition of
free conscious beings. And in so far as the history of law has resulted in38/Bernard Bosanquet
the conception of natural right, this in no way derogates from the artifi-
cial or ideal character of society as above understood. For “natural”
right belongs to a “nature” which includes and does not exclude that
action of intelligence in virtue of which society may be termed artificial;
and is merely the revelation of the principle towards which the social
will is working, and which in some degree it has always embodied.
Therefore the facts of Jurisprudence and the Science of Right, or of
“Natural Right,” as the issue and outcome of Jurisprudence, necessarily
counterbalance the extreme ideas of continuous growth and natural cau-
sation which social science derives from other analogies. We are re-
minded that, after all, we are dealing with a self-conscious purposive
organism, which is aware of a better and a worse, and has members
bound together by conscious intelligence, though, it may be, not by con-
scious intelligence alone. At one time the ideas of Jurisprudence, such
as Sovereignty or Contract, were considered sufficient by themselves to
equip a social theory. And if they are now seen to need completion from
both sides,—from the side of lower nature, and from the side of the
national spirit and culture,—this should not make us neglectful of the
important truths which the facts of law and recognised obligation, more
than any others, establish on solid ground.
b. It is of course the case that Law has been treated from the stand-
point of economic history in the same way as the other phenomena of
civilised life. It may be taken simply as the form into which substantive
relations crystallise, under the influence of economic conditions or of
other elementary social forces. And obviously such a view has its truth.
The social will, like the will of any one of us from day to day, is formed
not in vacuo, but as the focus of all the influences which penetrate our
being. It is a fair object of research to ascertain the economic or other
social meaning of the statutes which we find on the statute book; and it
is because they have so much meaning that they are excellent object-
lessons in the play of the social consciousness and sense of right. But
this focussing of social influences makes the laws not less acts of social
will, but more. To suppose the contrary would be like supposing that
nothing is a true act of will which embodies an individual’s distinctive
purposes in life.
I will explain by an illustration the relative value of sociological
analysis in dealing with the facts of positive law. I am indebted for it to
M. Durkheim, whose writings appear to me among the most original
and suggestive works of modern sociology. I regret that my immediateThe Philosophical Theory of the State/39
purpose does not justify me in stating and appreciating the whole very
interesting theory of repressive and contractual law from which the point
in question is selected.
An act is a crime,48 we are told, for the pure sociologist, when it
offends the strong and definite collective sentiments of society. This is
the strictly causal view of the matter. The act is a crime because it
offends; it does not offend because it is a crime. And the corollaries are
valuable. It is idle to distinguish, on such a basis, between the reforma-
tory, the retributive, and the deterrent views of the reaction which is
punishment.49 An offensive act is in itself at once an exhibition of char-
acter, an injury, and a menace. If a man assaults me in the street, and I
knock him down; how futile to ask if my action is meant to cure him of
his insolence, to punish him for having hit me, or to prevent him from
hitting me again! The real fact is that I am offended, and I react by way
of injury and negation against that which offends me. Now, this view, I
think, illuminates the subject. By going back to the simple operative
cause, as it may be supposed to exist especially in the minds of a tribe in
an early stage of development (M. Durkheim is chiefly referring to reli-
gious offences), we have got a plain type of mental reaction, easy to
imagine and to understand. In this type we see at once the unity of as-
pects which the forms of law, and legal or philosophical theory, tend
later to dissociate in a fictitious degree. And moreover we are reminded
that a law must have something behind it; some positive sentiment or
conviction, without which it would be unaccountable and unmeaning.
But when all this is said, it must not be supposed that penal law has
been reduced to the level of a strong and definite collective sentiment, or
a crime to the level of an annoyance. The simplest penal law of a self-
existent social group is different from the anger of a crowd or mob.
There is in it some sense of permanence, and permanence means respon-
sibility and generality—a distinction of right and wrong. The fact of
formally constituting a crime, i.e., of announcing a law, implies that
mere distaste is no ground of punishment. The law means that there is
something worth maintaining, and that this is recognised, and that to
violate this recognition is not merely to be unpopular, but to sin against
the common good, and to break an obligation. With less than this there
is no true crime.
Thus, if I am right, the relation of pure “sociological” causation to
juristic facts is the well-known relation of the more abstract to the more
concrete sciences, usually illustrated in logic by the relation of the physical40/Bernard Bosanquet
and the musical account of musical sound. For the pure physicist, a
harmony and a discord are only two different combinations of shakings.
For the musician they are not only opposite effects, but are causes of
divergent consequences. So with the relation between a strong collective
sentiment and a true law. A strong sentiment, as such, is a mere fact, a
mere force; and as such the sociologist regards it. A law involves the
pretension to will what is just, and is therefore a sentiment and some-
thing more, viz., the point of view of social good. It aims at a right and
im- plies a wrong, and demands to be apprehended and judged on this
ground. A mere force cannot by its reaction constitute a crime; for that
a law is necessary. The ideal aspect of law as recognition of right is no
less actual, no less solid and verifiable, than the facts of sentiment or
necessity which may have suggested and sustained it. In this way the
relation of sociological causation to the facts of Jurisprudence is typical
of the whole relation of Sociology conceived as a natural science, to the
larger facts with which social theory has to deal.
v. But the ideas involved in mere legality, though they bear em-
phatic testimony to the conscious and artificial aspect of the social whole,
have always been regarded with some justice as the type of what is
empty and formal. To treat a law as a command with a penalty annexed,
or to enunciate the tendency of social progress as being from status to
contract, may convey important meanings, but is obviously very far
short of the whole truth. And, indeed, generalisations of this kind, though
characteristic of a certain class of reflective Jurisprudence, do not at all
represent the highest level which has been reached within the science of
right itself. But yet, as we pass beyond these everyday working concep-
tions, we are beginning to leave the central ground of Jurisprudence,
and to move towards a point of view which deals more completely with
life and culture. The need and occasion for such a point of view may be
measured by that revival of national individuality which was referred to
in the last chapter as constituting the true ground and occasion for the
rebirth of genuine political philosophy in modern times. Montesquieu’s
investiga- tion into the “spirit of laws,” and his treatment of a law as
something deeper than a command, following upon the similar endeavours
of Vico, was in fact a recognition of the fundamental unity of a national
civilisation, which, on its political side, even Hobbes and Locke had
already attempted to explain by help of the inadequate instruments fur-
nished to them by legal theory. Montesquieu’s and Vico’s conceptions
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characterised the latter part of the eighteenth century, following up the
problem which was enunciated in Rousseau’s paradox, that “law itself
must be created by the social spirit which it aims at creating.” To
recognise the social spirit of a people, as the central unity behind its law
and culture and politics, was the principle of the various. researches
dealing with formative art, poetry, language, religion, and the state, which
marked the close of the eighteenth century (compare Wolf’s theory of
Homer as the utterance of a racial mind), and laid the foundation of
nineteenth century idealism.
The true Greek renaissance, initiated in the age of Winckelmann,
forcing modern minds into contact with Hellenic ideas in their original
form, and no longer through Latin intermediaries, furnished a type and
focus for these researches by bringing before the thoughts of students
the brilliant individuality of the ancient city-state; the crude traditions
of which had already exercised the most powerful influence on Rousseau,
and through him on the Revolution. At the same time the organic sci-
ences were full of activity. The life-work of Goethe marks the parallel-
ism of the two movements. It is plain that the doctrines of Comte were
no more than a very one-sided attempt to formulate the significance of
the fermentation around him, and that deeply as he felt the unity of the
social being, his expression of it ignored half the lesson of the times.
Thus the generalities of Jurisprudence are vitalised and completed by
the work of the sciences of culture; and the conception of a national
mind and character takes its unquestioned place in modern social theory.
It may be well at this point also to call attention to the researches which
later historians have directed to what may be called “Comparative Poli-
tics”; the relations, that is, of communities under government with re-
spect to the mode in which they are governed.50 For this branch of in-
quiry once more, though narrow and empty by itself, yet does aid in
bringing to light the purposive and conscious character of society, and
in correcting the tendency to treat it altogether as a “natural” phenom-
enon.
vi. “And so the whirligig of Time brings about his revenges.” French
Sociology to-day is a psychological science, though its founder ban-
ished psychology from his sociological method. Nothing is more in-
structive than to watch the gradual pressure of the various points of
view which are emphasised by the various departments of social experi-
ence, as they reveal, under criticism, their tendency to complete them-
selves and one another by suggesting the only category which is ad-42/Bernard Bosanquet
equate to them as a whole. As every serious student of social matters
knows by his own experience, it is impossible to touch a physical fact,
or a statistical datum, or a legal enactment, in reference to its social
bearing, without its at once, so to speak, coming alive in his hands, and
attaching itself to. an underlying relation of mind as the only unity which
will make it intelligible, and correlate it with other experiences, by them-
selves no less fragmentary. In statistics, for example, you touch a mov-
ing creature, as if through the holes in a wall, at this point and the other,
and write down where you have touched him.51 But to see the creature
as he is, and combine your information of all kinds in a just and com-
plete idea, you must get him into the open. And that, when the question
is of a life, you can only do by reconstructing his mind, for even to see
a social unit with your eyes gives you a fragment only, and not a whole.
On Fridays, we are told, the passenger traffic returns of French rail-
ways, omnibuses, and steamers show a decline.52 What dumb fact is
this? People do not like to travel on Fridays, or prefer to travel upon
other days. What is this preference? The only unity that can really af-
ford an explanation, that can correlate this irregular fragment of fact
with the whole to which it belongs, is the living mind and will of the
society in which the phenomenon occurs. Explanation aims at referring
things to a whole; and there is no true whole but mind. Necessarily,
therefore, with widening experience and deepening criticism, mind has
become the centre of the experiences focussed by sociology.
We may note some significant points in this development, although,
indeed, the whole course of modern sociology is one single illustration
of what has just been said. Discussions of the problem in what the dif-
ferentia of society consists, no longer deal with organic or economic
conceptions, but with such ideas as the “Consciousness of kind,”53 the “
Mind of a Crowd,”54 “Imitation” and “Invention,”55 similarities and dif-
ferences in the social consciousness,56 “Social logic” and society con-
sidered as a syllogism,57 and the imitative and inventive person.58 The
work of M. Tarde in particular is typical of the whole movement, and
his phrases have largely been adopted whether in agreement or in con-
troversy. For him the one fact coextensive with the social character is
“Imitation”—the means by which ideas and practices spread through-
out groups and masses of intelligent beings. For the characteristic of
knowable phenomena, in his view, is Repetition, and Imitation is the
means and vehicle of Repetition in social matters. Here, however, we
have accounted only for generalisation, and differentiation needs a sepa-The Philosophical Theory of the State/43
rate origin. This will be supplied by the idea of “Invention;” Invention
and Imitation, therefore, are the general form of all social process, the
matter on the other hand being analysable as Belief and Desire. Every
institution is a belief,59 every activity is a want or desire. In the Logique
Sociale these conceptions of the general medium and process of social
life are pushed home into the actual formative operation of the social
mind and will. Society, we are told, may be compared not indeed to an
organism, but rather to a brain; it is a cooperative mind, a syllogism, in
which the principles held by one part are modified and applied by an-
other. M. Tarde’s extreme illustrative hypothesis corresponds strangely
with one thrown out by Mr. Sidgwick. Mr. Sidgwick60 has simplified an
ethical question by supposing only a single sentient conscious being in
the universe; for M. Tarde there is, we might say, no single being at all;
the typical social man is a hypnotical creature, a somnambulist acting
under suggestions from others, though he does not know it, and is under
the illusion that he is himself.61 Nothing could be of higher interest than
to see the necessities of social science thus working themselves out, on
slippery and unfamiliar ground, by the sheer force of facts and experi-
ence. That a science of man must be a science of mind seems no longer
disputable.
On the substance of this development there is one observation which
inevitably suggests itself to any critic who approaches the problem from
the philosophical side.
Necessarily, as the relation of the individual to society is the root of
every social problem, psychological sociology consists to a great extent
in exercises upon the theme of identity and difference. These exercises
have hitherto been for the most part unconscious and involuntary. And
the high degree of substantial truth which is attained by inquirers who
have not thought the logic of identity worthy of a single glance, is the
strongest possible confirmation of the common experience that it is safer
to neglect theory than to be careless of facts. Nevertheless, it has now
become apparent, that a point has been attained at which logical criti-
cism is absolutely essential, or if not logical criticism, at least some
reference to the familiar and well-established results of ancient or mod-
ern social philosophy.
For it is a universal characteristic of the sociological movement
before us, that identity and difference are referred to different spheres,
and the “one” and the are regarded as reciprocally exclusive atoms.62
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have the contagious common feeling of a crowd63 taken as the true type
of a collective mind, obviously because it is not understood how an
identical structure can include the differences, the rational distinctions
and relations, which really constitute the working mind of any society.
So again we have one type of law marked off as corresponding to social
similitude,64 while a different type corresponds to the social division of
labour; simply because the category of resemblance has been substi-
tuted for that of identity, and is treated as exclusive of differentiation;
with the result of a really terrible distortion of facts in the attempt to
separate the whole sphere of penal enactment from that which deals
with industrial organisation. So with the entire set of notions of “Imita-
tion,” “Repetition” and “Invention.”65 The separation of Imitation and
Invention is simply the popular exclusion of Difference from Identity;
while the treatment of Repetition as the characteristic of knowable phe-
nomena and the mode of utterance of. social Imitation means the restric-
tion of rational Identity to its barest form, and the exclusion from social
theory of absolutely every case of true cooperative structure. For true
cooperative structure is never characterised by repetition, but always
by identity in difference; it is the relation not of a screw to an exactly
similar screw, but of the screw to the nut into which it fastens.
In the discussions of Egoism and Altruism66 the difficulty comes to
a head. Some writers think Egoism prior to Altruism; others—the more
wary and enlightened—incline to treat Altruism as a phase earlier than
Egoism; M. Durkheim, whose eye for a fact is very keen, seeing the
absurdity of both these suppositions, is determined to include the two
characters in question from the very beginning in the human conscious-
ness,67 but, of course, as contents belonging to different spheres and
consisting of contrasted elements. The conception of a whole held to-
gether by its differences, its identity consisting in and being measured
by their very profoundness and individuality, is not at the command of
any of these writers, although the greater part of M. Durkheim’s theory
seems imperatively to demand such a conception.
vii. Before considering, in conclusion, the relation of Sociology as
influenced by the above-mentioned sources and points of view, to social
philosophy proper, it will be well to devote a few words to emphasising
the way in which these sources ought to be regarded.
Every “source” of sociological science is at once a category, or
point of view, and also a certain group of actual social conditions. This
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is such as to invite a thorough con- spectus of its life from top to bottom
of the social growth and underlying conditions. I repeat that the history
and life of ancient Greece, a singularly complete working model of soci-
ety on a very small scale, analysed with remarkable thoroughness, and
individual throughout, is the prerogative example of such a treatment;
but next to this, or in addition to it, a thoroughly careful study of local
history, life, and conditions, in a limited region,68 with which we are
familiar from top to toe, is an essential propaedeutic to true social theory.
To focus a number of groups of fact, and coordinate the points of view
which they substantiate, into the conception of a living being, with its
individual character and spiritual utterance, needs more than a merely
literary or statistical study. But by making this effort we shall learn, as
no economic charts or general scientific works can teach us, what a
social life is, and in what sense it is true that all partial facts and expe-
riences within it de- mand ultimate coordination in the category of mind.
It is not meant that consciousness can make the weather hold up, but it
is meant that no fact has a true social bearing except in as far as, sooner
or later, it comes to form part of the world which a being capable of
sociality and therefore intelligent, presents to himself as his theatre of
action.
3. Thus it may seem that by mere force of facts a necessary solution
has been arrived at, and that psychological sociology must be one and
the same science with social philosophy.
But this is not quite the case. Up to the present time these two sci-
ences continue to approach their object-matter, as it were, from differ-
ent ends, and whether the two views will ultimately amalgamate is per-
haps mainly a problem of the personal division of labour. But a question
of principle, with reference to the true nature of psychology, is indi-
rectly involved. Only there seems no reason why two kinds of psychol-
ogy should not exist.
Psychology, as at present conceived by its best working representa-
tives, is a positive, though not a physical science. “For (the psycholo-
gist) the crude superstitions of Australian aborigines have as much in-
terest and value as the developed and accurate knowledge of a Newton
or a Faraday.”69 Its aim is “the establishment of continuity among ob-
served facts, by interpolating among them intermediate links which elude
observation.”70 If not a “physical” science, then, it is, in a common
sense of the term, a “natural” science. It has the impartiality, and uses
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science. And like every impartial science, to which process and genesis
are watchwords, it tends to explain the higher by the lower. This springs
from no malice aforethought, but from the conditions of the case. The
lower is simpler, and usually comes first in time. It is naturally dwelt
upon, as that into which it is hoped to resolve the more complex, and the
explanation which is more adequate for the simple, is less adequate for
the complex. No difference of higher and lower is recognised by the
impartial science, and its ideal, as a science, is inevitably the expression
of the complex in terms of the simple; while, as far as genesis in time is
insisted on, the bias towards temporal causation is pretty sure to operate
by attaching a quasi-causal significance to the earlier phases.
In all these characteristics psychology is at one with sociology. And,
therefore, though it is a gain that other points of view should be resolved
into the point of view of mind, yet the positive bias of sociology is not
transcended simply by this resolution.
Philosophy starts, we have said, as it were, from the other end. It is
critical throughout; it desires to establish degrees of value, degrees of
reality, degrees of completeness and coherence. Its purpose might be
termed “Ethical,” but for the extreme narrowness of the meaning of that
term. Society, for it, is an achievement or utterance of human nature—
of course not divorced from nature in general—having a certain degree
of solidity, so to speak; that is to say, being able, up to a certain point, to
endure the tests and answer the questionings which are suggested by the
scrutiny of human life from the point of view of value and complete-
ness. Is the social life the best, or the only life for a human soul? In what
way through society, and in what characteristics of society, does the
soul lay hold upon its truest self, or become, in short, the most that it has
in it to be? How does the social life at its best compare with the life of
art, of knowledge, or of religion, and can the same principle be shown to
be active in all of them? And what have they in common, or peculiar to
each, which has an imperative claim on the mind of man?
Now it was hinted above that there might be two kinds of psychol-
ogy, or two tendencies within it. And if psychology were to be impelled,
as it has been more than once in the past, by the recognition that where
there is more of its object—of mind—its interest is greater and the rank
of its object-matter is higher, then there would not be much to choose
between the temper of psychology and that of philosophy. And as soci-
ology has found itself driven forward into the territory of social “logic,”
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may well be that sociological psychology will not remain wholly “posi-
tive” and impartial, but will assume, as in the hands of Professor
Giddings, for example, it seems inclined to, at least a teleological atti-
tude, testing social phenomena by the quantity and quality of life which
they display.
But, at any rate, the points of view of sociology, and of social phi-
losophy as above described, will continue to supplement each other.
Philosophy gives a significance to sociology; sociology vitalises phi-
losophy. The idea of mind is deepened and extended by the unity and
continuity which sociological analysis, throughout all its many-sided
sources, vindicates for the principle of growth and order down to the
roots and in all the fibres of the world. Every natural resource and con-
dition must be thought of as drawing forth or constituting some new
element in the mind which is the universal focus; just as every shape and
colour of the trees in the landscape or every note of a melody finds its
definite and individual response in the contemplative consciousness. The
error lies, not in identifying the mind and the environment, but in first
uncritically separating them, and then substituting not merely the one
for the other, but wretched fragments of the one for the whole in which
alone either can be complete.
Philosophy, on the other hand, in treating of society, has to deal
with the problems which arise out of the nature of a whole and its parts,
the relation of the individual to the universal, and the transformation by
which the particular self is lost, to be found again in a more individual,
and yet more universal form. In all these respects its view is what might
be called teleological; that is to say, it recognises a difference of level or
of degree in the completeness and reality of life, and endeavours to point
out when and how, and how far by social aid, the human soul attains the
most and best that it has in it to become. As long as these two points of
view are clearly recognised, it is a matter of the mere personal division
of labour whether they are brought to bear by the same thinkers and
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Chapter III.
The Paradox of Political Obligation: Self-
government.
1. To every-day common sense there is something paradoxical in the
phenomena of political obligation; however it may acquiesce in what,
although not satisfactorily explicable, is plainly seen to be necessary.
Where, indeed, we meet with any form of absolutely despotic govern-
ment, we have not so much a paradox as a defect; for, although govern-
ment may exist in such a shape, it is open to question how far true
political obligation can be said to arise under such a system. In as far as
it does so, we shall find that the fact is due to unacknowledged condi-
tions and relations, which we shall more easily analyse as they appear in
free or constitutional states. It would then be easy to show, if we were
interested in doing so, that the principles which will have been recognised
as operative in the freest states known to history, are and have been, in
various degrees, at the root of the common life of every state or commu-
nity which has held together effectively enough to be treated as in any
sense a political whole. But this would be a historical investigation,
unnecessary for the purpose of pure social theory. In this we may fairly
start from the highest form of political experience, in which, as we shall
see, the mere defects of political immaturity being outgrown, the para-
dox of political obligation emerges with intensified emphasis.
Let us take as our starting point, then, the conception of “self-gov-
ernment,” to which, it will be admitted on all hands, the thought and
feeling: of mature communities has clung both in ancient and modern
times, as in some way containing the true root and ground of political
obligation. We shall find in it a striking illustration of the strength and
weakness of wide-spread popular notions. A universal popular nation
cannot but have a hold of some essential truth, otherwise it could not
survive and spread, and form a working theory  immense area of expe-
rience. On the other hand, a popular notion, as such, cannot be critical
of itself and aware of its own foundations; and so in defending and
applying itself it is pretty sure to plunge deep into fallacy. “Self-govern-
ment” is an idea which will be found, as has been said, to contain the
true ground and nature of political obligation. But the rough and ready
application of it which,. for example, represents the individual as sim-
ply one with the community, and the community therefore as infallible
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justly characterised as a confusion pretending to be a synthesis. Of this
idea as of so many we must say that those who have pronounced it to be
self-contradictory have understood it much better than most of those
who accept it as self-evident.
In the conception of self-government then we have the paradox of
obligation in its purest form. As applied to the individual himself, it
gives the paradox of Ethical Obligation. As applied to the individuals
who compose a society, it gives the paradox of Political Obligation.
This must be the preliminary distinction by which we approach the sub-
ject; but we shall find that the two problems and the two cases cannot be
ultimately separated, although they are to be distinguished in a certain
respect.
The paradox of Ethical Obligation starts from what is accepted as a
“self,”’ and asks how it can exercise authority or coercion over itself;
how, in short, a metaphor drawn from the relations of some persons to
others can find application within what we take to be the limits of an
individual mind.
The paradox of Political Obligation starts from what is accepted as
authority or social coercion, and asks in what way the term “self,” de-
rived from the “individual” mind, can be applicable at once to the agent
and patient in such coercion, exercised prima facie by some persons
over others. Both relations and their connection have been pointed out
by Plato.71
Our object in. the present chapter is to enforce the reality of the
difficulties which attach to the idea of political self-government, so long
as current assumptions as to the union of individuals in society are main-
tained. And for this purpose we are to examine the views of some very
distinguished philosophers to whom the paradox has appeared irrecon-
cilable, and law or government has seemed essentially antagonistic to
the self or true individuality of man; while the term self, if applied to the
collective group by or within which government is undoubtedly exer-
cised, appears to them an empty and misleading expression. The curi-
ous and significant point, to which we shall call attention, is, in brief,
that while maintaining law and government to be in their nature antago-
nistic to the self of man— whether as pain to pleasure or as fetters to
individuality—they nevertheless admit with one voice that a certain
minimum of this antagonistic element is necessary to the development
of the sentient or rational self. We have here a dualism which challenges
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2. The attitude towards law and government which Bentham adopted
(1748–1832) was in a great degree that of the philanthropic reformer.
His principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is said72 to
have been derived from Beccaria, whose work on “Crimes and Penal-
ties” had great influence throughout Europe. And Howard, “the philan-
thropist,” who was just twenty-two years Bentham’s senior (1726–1790),
represented a revolt against the abuses of the treatment of criminals at
that time, by which Bentham, who eulogised him as “a martyr and
apostle,” was strongly affected. The movement which Bentham led was,
in short, markedly hostile to the existing system of law, and to the rea-
sonings of its advocates. And substantial as his knowledge and con-
structive genius proved to be, it never lost the character which the direc-
tion of his approach to the subject had marked upon it, a character of
suspicion and antagonism, which is expressed in his description of law
as a necessary evil, and government as a choice of evils.73
Pain being the ultimate evil, it is clear why, on Bentham’s prin-
ciples, every law is an evil. For every law, for him, is contrary to liberty;
and every infraction of liberty is followed by a natural sentiment of
pain.74 Against those who would deny the proposition that every law is
contrary to liberty he brings a charge of perversion of language, in that
they restrict liberty to the right of doing what is not injurious to others.
They give the term, that is to say, a partly positive implication. For him
then liberty has the simplest and apparently widest meaning,75 which
includes liberty to do evil, and is defined, we must suppose, purely as
the absence of restraint. And he therefore has no doubt whatever that
the citizen can acquire rights only by sacrificing part of his liberty. And
in this there is an appearance of truth, if we forget that in saying that a
part of one’s liberty is sacrificed it is implied that one had, to begin with,
a certain area of liberty, of which a portion is abandoned to save the
rest. But the idea of any such antecedent liberty is just such a fiction as
Bentham himself delighted to expose. It is true, however, that some de-
gree of restraint on what we can now easily imagine ourselves free to
do, is involved in political society. The point on which we have to fix
our attention, for the purposes of social theory, is the remarkable repre-
sentation of this state of things under the figure, as it were, of an amount
of general liberty, which is increased by subtraction, or which can only
attain its maximum by the conversion of a certain edge or border of it,
so to speak, into constraint. This border of constraint is implied to be
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possible individual initiative; a relation which, being at first sight con-
tradictory, demands further analysis. For it would appear that if the
sacrifice of some liberty is to be instrumental to the increase of the
whole amount, that whole can hardly he a homogeneous, given quantity,
like, for instance, a piece of land; for such a one must surely be dimin-
ished by the subtraction of any part of it. It must, one would infer, be
something which has a complex nature like that of a living plant, such
that certain restrictions or negations which are essential to its prosperity
are dictated by its individual characteristics (which must be positive),
and express. the same principle with them; and therefore are wholly
relative to the positive type and phase of the plant to be cultivated. Only
in some such sense can it be intelligible how constraint is instrumental
to effective self-assertion.
But if this is so, the restrictive influences of law and government,
which are the measure of the constraint imposed, cannot be alien to the
human nature which they restrict, and ought not to be set down as in
their own nature antagonistic to liberty or to the making the most of the
human self. The root of the difficulty obviously lies in  assuming that
the pressure of the claims of “others” in society is a mere general cur-
tailment of the liberty of the “one,” while acknowledging, not contrary
to fact, but contrary to the hypothesis of that curtailment, that the one,
so far from surrendering some of his capacity for life through his fel-
lowship with others, acquires and extends that capacity wholly in and
through such fellowship. On the above assumption the terms of the para-
dox of self-government become irreconcilable, and government is made
an evil of which it is impossible to explain how it ministers to the self
which stands for the good. So long as to every individual, taken as the
true self, the restraint enforced by the impact of others is alien and a
diminution of the self this result is inevitable.
It is instructive, therefore, to note Bentham’s uncompromising hos-
tility to all the theories of philosophical jurists. The common point of all
their theories, from Hobbes and Grotius to Montesquieu and Rousseau,
not to mention Kant and his successors, has lain in the fact that their
authors divined under the forms of power and command, exercised by
some over others, a substantive and general element of positive human
nature, which they attempted to drag to light by one analogy after an-
other. But neither Montesquieu’s “eternal relations,” nor the “Social
Contract,” nor “General Will,” nor “Natural Rights” of other thinkers
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fallacy. He can understand nothing in law but the character of a com-
mand; he can see no positive relation of it to human nature beyond the
degree in which it dispenses with the pain of restraint while increasing
the pleasure of liberty.
To describe the magnificent success which attended the use of this
rule of thumb in the practical work of reform does not fall within our
immediate subject. Our purpose was merely to illustrate the paradox
implied in the conception of self-government, by pointing out how fun-
damentally hostile to one another Bentham took its constituent elements
to be.
3. The same point may be further insisted on by examining the main
ideas of Mill’s “Liberty,” without by any means professing to give a full
account of Mill’s opinions on the relation of individuals to society. What
indeed is instructive in his position, for our immediate purpose, is that,
having so deep a sense, as he has, of social solidarity, he nevertheless
treats the central life of the individual as something to be carefully fenced
round against the impact of social forces.
i. Mill’s idea of Individuality is plainly biassed by the Benthamite
tradition that law is an evil. It is to be remembered that Anarchism of a
speculative kind, the inevitable complement of a hide-bound Conserva-
tism, was current in the beginning of this century, as in Godwin and
Shelley. Thus we find concentrated in a few pages of the “Liberty” all
those ideas on the nature of Individuality, Originality, and Eccentricity,
which are most opposed to the teaching derived by later generations in
England from the revival of philosophy and criticism. It is worth while,
after reading Mill’s observations upon the relation of individuality to
the Calvinistic theory of life, to a turn to the estimate expressed by
Mark Pattison76 of the force of individual character generated by the
rule of Calvin at Geneva. That the individuality, or genius, the fulness
of life and completeness of development which Mill so justly appreci-
ates, is not nourished and evoked by the varied play of relations and
obligations in society, but lies in a sort of inner self, to be cherished by
enclosing it, as it were, in an impervious globe, is a notion which neither
modern logic nor modern art criticism will admit. In the same way, the
connection of originality and eccentricity, on which Mill insists, ap-
pears to us to-day to be a fallacious track of thought; and in general, in
all these matters, we tend to accept the principle that, in order to go
beyond a point of progress, it is necessary to have reached it; and in
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is the heart of the point on which we are insisting. If individuality and
originality mean or depend upon the absence of law and of obligation; if
eccentricity is the type of the fully developed self, and if the community,
penetrated by a sense of universal relations, is therefore a prey to mo-
notony and uniformity, then it needs no further words to show that law
is a curtailment of human nature, the necessity of which remains inex-
plicable, so that self-government is a contradiction in terms.
ii. How then does Mill bring the two terms into relation? How does
he represent the phenomenon that, in the life of every society, the factors
of self and of government have to be reconciled, or at any rate to coex-
ist?
To find the answer to this question, the whole of the chapter, “Of
the limits of the authority of society over the individual,”77 should be
carefully studied. A few characteristic sentences may be quoted here.
“What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual
over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of
human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to soci-
ety?
“Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more
particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life
in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part
which chiefly interests society.” — Every one who lives in society, he
continues in effect, is bound not to interfere with certain interests of
others (explicitly or implicitly constituted as “rights”), and is bound to
take his fair share of the sacrifices incurred for the defence of society
and its members. These conditions society may enforce, at all costs to
recalcitrants. Further, it may punish by opinion, though not by law, acts
hurtful to others, but not going so far as to violate their rights. But acts
which affect only the agent, or need not affect others unless they like,
may be punished, we are given to understand, neither by law nor by
opinion. Mill expects his conclusions to be disputed, and the following
is the conclusion of the passage in which he explains and re-affirms it:
“. . . when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding,
from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the
public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished
simply for being drunk; but a soldier or policeman should be punished
for being drunk on duty. Wherever, in short, there is a definite damage,
or a definite risk of damage either to an individual or to the public, the
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or law.”
It will probably occur at once to the reader that, considered as a
practical rule, the view here maintained would by no means curtail un-
duly the province of social interference. We should rather anticipate that
it would leave an easy opening for a transition from administrative ni-
hilism to administrative absolutism; and some such transition seems to
have taken place in Mill’s later views. This tendency to a complete
bouleversement is the characteristic of all conceptions which proceed
by assigning different areas to the several factors of an inseparable whole,
which then reasserts itself in its wholeness within the area of either fac-
tor to which we may happen to attend. Indeed, even in the passage be-
fore us, the defence of individuality has already well-nigh turned round
into its annihilation. Every act that carries a definite to any other person
belongs to the sphere of law, and every act that can be supposed likely
cause such a damage, to that of morality; and individuality has what is
left. The extraordinary demarcation between the sphere of morality and
that of liberty is to be accounted for, no doubt, by the Benthamite tradi-
tion which identified the moral and social sanctions; so that in this usage
the sphere of morality means much the same as what, in the first pas-
sage referred to, was indicated as the sphere of opinion.
Now, it is obvious that the distinction which Mill is attempting to
describe and explain is one practically recognised by every society. The
question is whether it can be rightly described  and explained by a de-
marcation which, if strictly pressed, excludes individuality from every
act of life that has an important social bearing; while, owing to the two-
sided nature of all action, it becomes perfectly arbitrary in its practical
working as a criterion. For every act of mine affects both myself and
others; and it is a matter of mood and momentary urgency which aspect
may be pronounced characteristic and essential. It may safely be said
that no demarcation between self-regarding and other-regarding action
can possibly hold good. What may hold good, and what Mill’s examples
show to be present to his mind, is a distinction between the moral and
the “external” aspects of action, on the ground of their respective acces-
sibility to the means of coercion which are at the disposal of society.
The peculiar sense in which the term “external” is here employed will
explain itself below.78
For our present purpose, however, what we have to observe is merely
that the demarcation between individuality and society, contrived in de-
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once more how overwhelming is the prima facie appearance that, in the
idea of self-government, the factors of self and government are alien
and opposed; and yet how hopeless it remains to explain the part played
by these factors in actual society, so long as we aim at a demarcation
between them as opposites, rather than at a relative distinction between
them as manifestations of the same principle in different media.
iii. A few words may here be said on the applications by which Mill
illustrates his doctrine, in order to point out what confusion results from
relying on a demarcation which cannot strictly be made.
It will be noted in the first place that he objects altogether to the
attempt to prevent by punishment either immorality or irreligion as such.79
This objection a sound social theory must uphold. But if we look at
Mill’s reason for it, we find it simply to be that such an attempt in-
fringes liberty, by interfering with action which is purely self-regarding.
Without entering further upon the endless argument whether this or any
action is indeed purely self-regarding, we may observe that by taking
such ground, Mill causes the above objection, which is substantially
sound, to appear as on all fours with others which are at any rate very
much more doubtful. Such is the objection on principle to all restric-
tions imposed upon trade with a distinct view to protecting the con-
sumer, not from fraud, but from opportunities of consumption injurious
to himself. The regulation or prohibition of the traffic in alcoholic li-
quors is of course the main question here at issue; and it may be admit-
ted that Mill’s discussion, with the many distinctions which he lays down,
is full of shrewdness and suggestiveness. But the ultimate ground which
he takes, as above stated, is quite different from the genuine reasons
which exist against attempting to enforce morality by law and penalty,
and introduces confusion into the whole question of State interference
by ranking the two objections together. Closely analogous are his objec-
tions to the statutes respecting unlawful games,1 which, whether wise
or unwise, are quite a different thing from an attempt to punish personal
immorality as such. And lastly, the same principle is illustrated by his
whole attitude to the strong feeling and the various legal obligations
which determine and support the monogamous family. In maintaining
the general indissolubility of marriage, and supporting the parental power,
the State is interfering, for him, with the freedom of parties to a con-
tract, and conferring power over individuals, the children, who have a
right to be separately considered. Such interference is for him ipso facto
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it is or is not an external condition of good life, which the State is able
effectively to maintain, is a question which he does not discuss. Through-
out all these objections to authoritative interference we trace the pecu-
liar prejudice that the criterion of its justifiability lies in the boundary
line between self and others, rather than in the nature of what coercive
authority is and is not able to do towards the promotion of good life. On
many points indeed, when the simple protection of “others” is concerned,
Mill’s doctrine leads to sound conclusions. Such, for example, is the
problem of legislation after the pattern of the Factory Acts. But yet a
strange nemesis attaches to grounds 1 P. 59. alleged with insufficient
discrimination. Just as, by ranking inner morality and outer action alike
under the name of freedom, Mill is led to object to interference which
may be perfectly justified and effectual; so by the same confusion he is
led to advocate coercive treatment in impossibly stringent forms, and in
cases where it runs extreme risk of thwarting a true moral development.
We are amazed when he strongly implies, in respect to the education of
children and the prospect of supporting a family, that the existence of a
moral obligation’ to an act is a sufficient ground for enforcing the act by
law. The proposal of universal State-enacted examinations by way of
enforcing the parental duty of educating children, to the exclusion of the
task of providing education by public authority, in which Mill sees dan-
ger to individuality, opens a prospect of a Chinese type of society, from
which, happily, the good sense of Englishmen has recoiled. And just the
reverse of his proposal has come to pass under the influence of the logic
of experience. The State has taken care that the external conditions of
an elementary education are provided, and, while doing this, has no
doubt exercised compulsion in order that these conditions may be a re-
ality. But the individual inquisition by examination is tending to drop
out of the system; and the practical working of the public education is
more and more coming to be that the State sees to it that certain condi-
tions are maintained, of which the parents’ interest and public spirit
leads them to take advantage. Sheer compulsion is not the way to en-
force a moral obligation.
Still more startling is the suggestion that it might be just to interdict
marriage to those unable to show the means of supporting a family, on
the ground of possible evil both to the children themselves through pov-
erty, and to others through over-population. This is a case in which
authoritative interference (except on account of very definite physical
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ers can gauge the latent powers to meet and deal with a future indefinite
responsibility; and the result of scrupulous timidity, in view of such
responsibilities, is seen in the tendency to depopulation which affects
that very country from which Mill probably drew his argument. To leave
the responsibility as fully as possible where it has been assumed is the
best that law can do, and appeals to a spring of energy deeper than
compulsion can reach.
Thus we have seen that by discriminating the spheres of non-inter-
ference and interference, according to a supposed demarcation between
the sphere of “self” and of “others,” a hopelessly confused classifica-
tion has been introduced. Sometimes the maintenance of external condi-
tions of good life, well within the power of the State, is forbidden on the
same grounds as the direct promotion of morality, which is impossible
to it. In other cases the enforcement of moral obligations is taken to lie
within the functions of the State, although not only is the enforcement of
moral obligations per se a contradiction in terms, but almost always, as
in the cases in question, the attempt to effect it is sure to frustrate itself,
by destroying the springs on which moral action depends.
It is worth noticing, in conclusion, that in two examples, the one
trivial, the other, that of slavery, both theoretically and practically very
important, Mill recognises a principle wholly at variance with his own.
Here he is aware that it may be right, according to the principle of
liberty, to restrain a man, for reasons affecting himself alone, from do-
ing what at the moment he proposes to do. For we are entitled to argue
from the essential nature of freedom to what freedom really demands, as
opposed to what the man momentarily seems to wish. “It is not freedom
to be allowed to alienate his freedom,” as it is not freedom to be allowed
to walk over a bridge which is certain to break down and cause his
death. Here we have in germ the doctrine of the “real” will, and a con-
ception analogous to that of Rousseau when he speaks of a man “being
forced to be free.
4. Before referring to Mill’s explicit utterances on the problem of
self-government, which are of the same general character as those of
Mr. Herbert Spencer, it will be well to note some instructive points in
the views of the latter thinker. The study of Mr. Spencer’s writings, and
more especially of those which appear most directly opposed to the popu-
lar conceptions of the day, cannot be too strongly urged upon the socio-
logical student. And this for two reasons. In the first place, no other
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lective governmental stupidity. That in practice these possibilities are
continually tending to become facts, just as in theory they are repre-
sented by recurrent fallacies,80 is a proof of the extreme arduousness of
the demands made by the task of self-government upon the people which
undertakes it. And no theorist is fitted to discuss the problem of social
unity who has not realised the arduousness of these demands in all its
intensity. And, in the second place, the student will observe an instruc-
tive meeting of extremes between elements of Mr. Spencer’s ideas and
popular social theories of an opposite cast. The revival of doctrines of
the natural rights of man on a biological foundation81 is a case in point.
An uncriticised individualism is always in danger of transformation into
an uncritical collectivism. The basis of the two is in fact the same.
i. A comparison of the conception of “right” as entertained by
Bentham and by Herbert Spencer forms a striking commentary on ideas
in which “government is antagonistic to “self.” Bentham, seeing clearly
that the claims of the actual individual, taken as he happens to be, are
casual and unregulated, fulminates against the idea of natural right as
representing those claims. Right is for him a creation of the State, and
there can be no right which is not constituted by law. And the truth of
the contention seems obvious. How, in fact, could individual claims or
wishes constitute a right, except as in some way ratified by a more
general recognition?
But to Mr. Herbert Spencer the contrary proposition is absolutely
convincing, and, indeed, on their common premises, with equal rea-
son.82 It is ridiculous, he points out, to think of a people as creating
rights, which it had not before, by the process of creating a government
in order to create them. It is absurd to treat an individual as having a
share of rights qua member of the people, while in his private capacity
he has no rights at all.
We need not labour this point further. It is obvious that Mr. Herbert
Spencer is simply preferring the opposite extreme, in the antithesis of
“self” and “government,” to that which commended itself to Bentham.
If it is a plain fact that “a right” can only be recognised by a society, it
is no less plain that it can only be real in an individual. If individual
claims, apart from social adjustment, are arbitrary, yet social recogni-
tions, apart from individual qualities and relations, are meaningless. As
long as the self and the law are alien and hostile, it is hopeless to do
more than choose at random in which of the two we are to locate the
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ii. And how alien and hostile the self and the law may seem we see
even more crudely enunciated in Herbert Spencer than in Bentham or
Mill, as the fundamental principle of the tradition has worked itself more
definitely to the front. “The liberty83 which a citizen enjoys is to be
measured, not by the nature of the governmental machinery he lives
under, whether representative or other, but by the relative paucity of the
restraints it imposes on him.” And so we are astounded to find it main-
tained that the positive and active element in the right to carry on self-
sustaining activities is of a non-social character, depending only on the
laws of life,84 and if the matter were pushed home, would have to be
identified, one must suppose, with the more strictly animal element of
the mind; while only the negative element arises from social aggrega-
tion, and it is this negative element alone which gives ethical character
to the right to live. Though these distinctions apply primarily to the
ground of the right to live, yet it appears inevitable that they represent
the point of view from which the active self or individuality must be
regarded on the principle we are pursuing. The ground of the right to
live, as here stated, is simply the recognition that life is a good; and if
the positive element of this good is non-social and only the negative is of
social origin, and this alone is ethical, it seems clearly to follow that the
making the most of life—its positive expansion and intensification—is
excluded from the ethical aspects of individuality, and, indeed, that in-
dividuality has no ethical aspect at all. Here is the ultimate result of
accepting as irreducible the distinction between the self and govern-
ment, or the negative relation of individuality and law. Liberty and self
are divorced from the moral end, a tendency which we noted even in
Mill. Selves in society are regarded as if they were bees building their
cells, and their ethical character becomes comparable to the absence of
encroachment by which the workers maintain the hexagonal outline due
to their equal impact on each other as they progress evenly from equi-
distant centres. The self, which has ranked throughout these views as
the end, to whose liberty all is to be sacrificed, turns out to be the non-
ethical element of life.
Thus, when Professor Huxley speaks of “self-restraint as the es-
sence of the ethical process,”85 while “natural liberty’s consists in “the
free play of self-assertion,” we see how the whole method of approach-
ing social and ethical phenomena is turned upside down unless the para-
dox of self-government is conquered once for all. The idea that asser-
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possible and real in and through society, and that affirmation and not
negation is its main characteristic ; these fundamental conceptions of
genuine social philosophy86 can only be reached through a destructive
criticism of the assumptions which erect that paradox into an insoluble
contradiction.
5. We may now restate the essence of the problem of self-govern-
ment as it presents itself to the thinkers whom we have been reviewing.
On the assumptions which they accept, the annihilating criticism of self-
government in the first chapter of Mill’s Liberty is indeed irresistible.
He begins by pointing out that in times of political immaturity, the con-
ception of political liberty consisted in setting limits to the power which
the ruler, considered as an independent force opposed in interest87 to his
subjects, should be suffered to exercise over the community. But as it
was found possible, in a greater and greater degree, to make the ruling
power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, “some persons
began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limi-
tation of the power itself. That, it might seem, was a resource against
rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people.
What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identifled with the
people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the
nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will.
There was no fear of its tyrannising over itself.” Rousseau in some
moods is the victim of this fallacy, and it is widely triumphant to-day.
But with the success of the democratic principle, “elective and re-
sponsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms
which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now observed that such
phrases as ‘self-government,’ and ‘the power of the people over them-
selves,’ do not express the true state of the case. The ‘people’ who exer-
cise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it
is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the government
of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people,
moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most
active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making
themselves accepted as the majority and precautions are as much needed
against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, there-
fore, of the power of government loses none of its importance when the
holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to
the strongest party therein.... In political speculations, ‘the tyranny of
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society requires to be on its guard.”
The paradox of self-government then, so far from being theoreti-
cally solved by the development of political institutions to their highest
known maturity, is simply intensified by this development. When the
arbitrary and irrational powers of classes or of individuals have been
swept away, we are left face to face, it would seem, with the coercion of
some by others as a necessity in the nature of things. And, indeed, how-
ever perfectly “self-government” has been substituted for despotism, it
is flying in the face of experience to suggest that the average individual
self, as he exists in you or me, is ipso facto satisfied, and at home, in all
the acts of the public power which is supposed to represent him. If he
were so, the paradox of self-government would be resolved by the anni-
hilation of one of its factors. The self would remain, but “government”
would be superfluous; or else “government’s would be everything, and
the self annihilated. If, on the other hand, we understand the “self” in
“self-government” to stand for the whole sovereign group or commu-
nity, which is usually called a “self-governing” as opposed to a subject,
state, then we have before us the task of showing that this self is a
reality in any sense which justifies the acceptance of what is done by the
public power as an act of the whole community. But on the ground
where we stand in the theories reviewed in the present chapter, no such
self can be shown. Government, in fact and in principle, reveals itself as
coercion exercised by “the others” over “the one.” And so long as this is
the case, and as the government is alien to the self, not only do the rights
of majorities remain without explanation, but no less is it impossible to
say on what rational ground an entire community can apply coercion to
a single recalcitrant member. We have seen that Mill would solve the
problem by a demarcation, according to which the aim and ground of
government is to protect the self from the impact of others, and leave it
in its isolated purity. Herbert Spencer, it may be noted,88 has recourse to
one of those hypotheses of tacit consent which would reduce a commu-
nity to the level of a joint-stock company,89 minus a written instrument
of association; which in the case of the State has to be replaced by Mr.
Spencer’s estimate of purposes, which would probably be accepted with
unanimity if the question were asked! Bentham alone, founding himself
on the actual nature of social life, genially overrides the whole question
of individual right, and while maintaining law to be a necessary evil,
and pouring scorn on all attempts to exhibit a positive unity throughout
the selves which compose a society, makes the promotion of a free and62/Bernard Bosanquet
happy life the sole criterion of governmental interference.
On the basis of every-day reflection, then, we are brought to an
absolute deadlock in the theory of political obligation. If, as popular
instinct maintains, and as common sense seems somehow to insist, there
is a theory and a justification of social coercion latent in the term “self-
government,” we cannot find a clue to it in the reasoning of our most
recent and popular political thinkers. Nor should we find a comprehen-
sive theory, though we might find suggestions towards one, if we re-
curred to our more philosophical teachers, such as Hobbes and Locke,
who are further from popular modes of thought. If there is anything
satisfactory in the conception of self-government, every interpretation
of it is at once condemned which does not give the fullest force to both
terms of the paradox, at the same time that it exhibits their reconcilia-
tion. What this fullest force is, and the antagonism which it involves, we
have seen in the present chapter. We must start from an actual self,
which is capable of rebelling against law and government; and from an
actual “government,” which is capable of tyrannising over the individual
self. We must not treat the self as ipso facto annihilated by government;
nor must we treat government as a pale reflection, pliable to all the
vagaries of the actual self. Nor, again, must we divide the inseparable
content of life, and endeavour to assign part to the assertion of the indi-
vidual as belonging to self, and part to his impact on others, as belong-
ing to government. We must take the two factors of the working idea of
self-government in their full antagonism, and exhibit, through and be-
cause of this, the fundamental unity at their root, and the necessity and
conditions of their coherence. We must show, in short, how man, the
actual man of flesh and blood, demands to be governed; and how a
government, which puts real force upon him, is essential, as. he is aware,
to his becoming what he has it in him to be. And if we fail to destroy the
assumptions which hinder us from doing this, we shall have to admit
that the maturity of democratic institutions has only liberated us from
arbitrary despotism to subject us to necessary tyranny; and though, in
spite of such a failure, we might still acquiesce in “counting heads to
save breaking them,” we should have to agree that this may indeed be
the shrewdest device of political expediency, but that the difference be-
tween the two processes corresponds to no real capacity of the human
individual for partaking, by the exercise of will and intelligence, in a
peacefully organised and yet effectually governed whole. We shall then,
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“self-government” and “the general will” are meaningless phantoms,
combinations of hostile factors, incapable of being united in a real expe-
rience.
Chapter IV.
The Problem of Political Obligation More
Radically Treated.
1. The reader will no doubt have observed that the theory dealt with in
the last chapter belongs to the general type of what is currently known
as Individualism. For several reasons I have preferred not to make use
of this hackneyed word. In the first place, it is very hackneyed; and the
employment of such terms takes all life and expressiveness out of phi-
losophy. And, in the next place, Individualism may mean many things,
and in its fullest, which is surely, for the student of philosophy, its truest
meaning, it is far too good for the theories under discussion. An “Indi-
vidual” may be “individual” or indivisible because he has so little in
him, that you cannot imagine it possible to break him up into lesser
parts; or because, however full and great his nature, it is so thoroughly
one, so vital and so true to itself that, like a work of art, the whole of his
being cannot be separated into parts without ceasing to be what it essen-
tially is. In the former case the “individual’s is an “atom”; in the latter
he is “a great individuality.”90 The sense in which we shall make use of
the notion of the individual, so far as we use it at all, will be the latter
and not the former. And, therefore, we shall as far as possible discard
the hackneyed term “Individualism,” which embodies the former mean-
ing only.
If then we are to coin an expression which will indicate the common
features of the theories outlined in the previous chapter, we may venture
upon some such phrase as “prima facie theories,” or “theories of the
first look.” By this I do not mean that they stand in the same rank with
the views of the Greek thinkers, who, undisturbed by previous specula-
tion, saw the great facts of social experience with a freshness and whole-
ness of vision with which they can never be seen again. The “first look”
of our own day is of a different kind. It is the first look of the man in the
street or of the traveller, struggling at a railway station, to whom the
compact self-containedness and self-direction of the swarming human
beings before him seems an obvious fact, while the social logic and
spiritual history which lie behind the scene fail to impress themselves on64/Bernard Bosanquet
his perceptive imagination.
We see then that these theories of the first appearance are mainly
guided by this impression of the natural separateness of the human unit.
For this reason, as we noted, the experience of self-government is to
them an enigma, with which they have to compromise in various ways.
And because their explanations of it are not true explanations but only
compromises, they rest on no principle, and dictate no consistent atti-
tude. For Bentham all solid right is actually in the State, though con-
ceived by himself as a means to individual ends; for Mill, it is divided
between the State and the individual, by a boundary which cannot be
traced and therefore cannot be respected; for Herbert Spencer all right
is in the individual, and the State has become little more than a record
office of his contracts and consents.
The assumption common to the theories in question is dictated by
their very nature. It is not precisely, as is often supposed to be the case,
that the individual is the end to which Society is a means. Such a defini-
tion fails to assign a character which is distinctive for any social theo-
ries whatever. For since Society is, at the lowest rate, a plurality of
individuals, whatever we say of “the individual” may be construed as
true of Society and vice versa, so long as all individuals are understood
as differing only in number from one. Thus the “means” and the “ends”
are liable to change places, as, for practical purposes, we saw that they
did in Bentham.91 The ethical term “altruism” illustrates this principle.
It shows that by taking “the individual” as the “end,” nothing is deter-
mined as to the relation between each individual and all, and it remains
a matter of chance how far it is required of “each” individual, in the
name of the welfare of “the individual,” to sacrifice himself to “all.”
The fact is that the decisive issue is not whether we call the “indi-
vidual” or “society” the “end”; but what we take to be the nature at once
of individuals and of society. This is the question of principle; and views
which are at one in this have nothing which can in principle keep them
apart, although they may diverge to the seemingly opposite poles of the
liberty of each and the welfare of all. We have observed this sliding
from one narrowness to its opposite, as between Bentham, Mill, and
Herbert Spencer.
The root idea then, of the views which we have been discussing, is
simply that the individual or society—it makes no difference which we
take—is what it prima facie appears to be. This is why we have called
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long story to explain how a first look can be possible in the eighteenth or
nineteenth century A.D. But in brief, the history of thought shows cer-
tain leaps or breaks in culture; when the human mind seems to open its
eyes afresh, or to emerge on a new platform, from which new point of
view all its adjustments have to be re-made and its perceptions re-
analysed. In these new stages a great advance is involved; but the ad-
vance is potential, and the possible insight has to be paid for by an
initial blindness.
Such an occasion it was on which the legislator or economist or
natural philosopher of the modern world turned his gaze upon man in
society. He saw him as “one of millions enjoying the protection of the
law,”92 and society as the millions of which he is one. Such an onlooker
inevitably proceeds to treat the social whole as composed of units A, B,
C, etc., who, as they stand; and lust as they seem to us when we rub
against them in daily intercourse, are taken to be the organs and centres
of human life. From this assumption all the rest follows. Each of us, A,
B, C, and all the others, seems to be, and to a great extent in the routine
of life actually is, self-complete, self-satisfied, and self-willed. To each
of us, A, B, or C, all the rest are “others.” They are “like” him; they are
“repetitions” of him, but they are not himself. He knows that they are
something to himself; but this “something” is still “something else,” and
even in ethical reflection he is apt to call his recognition of it “altruism
“—an indefinite claim and feeling, touching his being at its margin of
contact with neighbouring circles, the centres of which are isolated.
To the individual and society thus conceived —A, B, C, and the
rest—it is plain that government can be nothing but self-protection. It
is, in fact, a form of the impact of “others,” scientifically minimised,
and accepted because it is minimised. For this reason it is, as we saw
throughout, alien to the self, and incapable of being recognised as spring-
ing from a common root with the spontaneous life which we pretend to
be aware of only within our private magic circle. Then the forcible im-
pact of B and C upon the circle of A is a necessary evil, a diminution,
pro tanto, of A. And the more altruistic A is, the more he will recognise
this, as affecting not himself only, but B and C also.
It is for this reason that, on the views in question, all law and gov-
ernment necessarily remain formal and negative as compared with the
substantive and positive ends of the self. The maintenance of “liberty,”
of the circular or hexagonal’ fences round A, B, C, and the rest, is
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ends which the units pursue within their hexagons. If in any way the self
went beyond itself, and A recognised a positive end and nature which
peremptorily bound him to B and the others, it would be impossible to
keep this nature and end from reflecting themselves in the determinate
content of the conditions of association between them. The assumption
would be destroyed which keeps “government” alien to “self,” and it
would be possible to consider in what sense and for what reason the
nature of a spiritual animal turns against itself with the dualism which
the paradox of self-government embodies, and that in pursuit of its true
unity.
2. We will now discuss Rousseau’s treatment of the paradox of
“self-government.” And we discuss it, not because it is complete or self-
consistent, but rather because, while breaking through to the root of the
whole matter,it is as incomplete and as inconsistent as are the efforts of
our own minds to lay hold of any profound truth. It displays, in fact, on
the great stage of the history of philosophy, precisely the struggle which
each of us has to go through if he tries to pierce the surface of common-
place fiction and tradition which persistently weaves itself about social
facts. On almost every page there is relapse and vacillation. The fictions
which are being cast aside continually reassert themselves; the embodi-
ment of the principle which the author’s genius has discerned is sought
for in expedients essentially opposite to its nature, while the instruments
which it has developed for itself are contemptuously rejected.
We are going to examine the main thesis of Rousseau’s Contrat
Social. The reader who is surprised to find in our account little or noth-
ing of the “ return to nature,” “ natural equality,” and the “natural rights
of the individual,” may refer for these to Rousseau’s earlier essays on
theses propounded by the Academy of Dijon. The first of the theses
(1750) ran, “Whether the re-establishment of the sciences and the arts
contributed to purify morals”; and Rousseau’s discourse, which won
the prize, following the lead of the thesis, started from the later Renais-
sance, and dealt in general with the phenomena of decadence—a very
real problem. The notable feature of this brief essay is its constant vac-
illation between the attack on science, art, and education as such, and
the criticism, by no means an undiscerning criticism, of their abuses.
Rousseau’s head is full, not of primitive man, but of Socrates and Cato,
of Sparta and republican Rome. A writer who speaks of Newton and
Verulam as preceptors of the human race can hardly be hostile to true
intellectual achievement.93 It is noteworthy that his zeal for educationalThe Philosophical Theory of the State/67
reform is already apparent in this first published work.
The second essay (1754), a much longer and more serious piece, is
on the thesis, “What is the origin of Inequality among mankind, and is it
justified by natural law?” It was dedicated, with expressions of extrava-
gant laudation, to Rousseau’s native state, the Republic of Geneva. His
enthusiasm for this community, as for the ancient citystates, is a far
truer guide to his genuine social ideas than any of his paradoxes about
the state of nature and the bondage of social man. His genius, in fact, is
very much under-rated by those who suppose him at any time to have
believed the primitive state of nature, or earliest imaginable condition of
the human race, to be capable of furnishing an ideal of life. He is per-
fectly aware that a state of nature, which is to furnish an ideal, must be
selected at least from among the higher phases of man’s evolution, after
morality and the family have begun to form themselves, and language
and property have made some advance. Here, again, his vacillation is
strikingly observable, and we can see that it arises from his profound
insight. The vices of civilisation tend to force the desirable state of man
down the scale of evolution, but the value of morality and respect for
human nature tend to force it up, and Rousseau’s argument embodies
the struggle. For Rousseau is far too critical and clear-sighted to ascribe
true morality or strictly human nature to a state of animal innocence,
and he knows that virtue involves potential vice;94 and therefore it is
with hesitation and regret that he selects a middle state as representing
his ideal, fully aware that it has forfeited animal innocence, without
having attained human morality. Even the famous declamation against
the first founder of property in land seems to pass away in an admission
that this was an inevitable stage in the growth of human capacities,
which the author would not seriously desire to remain undeveloped.
Two further points may be noted; first, the fundamental contention that
men are by nature not equal but unequal, the evil of civilisation lying
just in the replacement of natural by political inequality. If this political
inequality were considered as modifiable, it is plain that the view would
point to an advantage in the way of equality95 possessed by society over
nature. Secondly, the view here taken of natural liberty in relation to the
social pact should be compared with that of the Contrat Social. In the
essay, “natural liberty” is on the whole preferred; in the Contrat, an-
other kind of liberty is held a truer good, although much of the tone and
language associated with the preference of natural liberty continues by
the side of the later view. It is plain that we are dealing, not with an68/Bernard Bosanquet
unconsidering fanatical enthusiasm for one or another state of man, but
with a struggling insight, which sees evil but also good in all, and, with
hesitation and reluctance, depresses the scale first in favour of the one,
and then in favour of the other condition of human beings.
3. The famous opening words of chap. i. of the Contrat Social (pub-
lished 1762) sound like the beginning of a tirade against civilisation and
the State. “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks
himself the master of others, who does not fail to be more of a slave than
they. Here we might well suppose ourselves to be reading the preface to
a demonstration that all social constraint is slavery, and that man, in a
state of nature, possessed a liberty which he has now lost. We expect
such an opening to be followed by a denunciation of the fetters of soci-
ety, and a panegyric on the pre-social life. And there can hardly be a
doubt that these sentences, along with a few similar phrases which stick
in the memory, are the ground of the popular idea of Rousseau, shared
by too many scholars.96 But how does Rousseau go on? Here are the
succeeding sentences. “How did this change take place? I do not know.
What can render it legitimate? I think I can tell.” Here, as previously in
the discourse on “Equality,” he (1) cuts himself loose in principle from
the historical fiction of a social pact succeeding a state of nature; and
(2) he promises to furnish a justification for the change (or, striking out
the quasi-historical term “change,” for the condition of man), which is
expressed by the words, “is everywhere in chains.”
This then is the task which he has set himself. The sentences last
cited show that his answer will, in some degree, turn its back on his
question, and that really man had little natural freedom to lose, and is
not everywhere in chains. But the fact that the problem first struck
Rousseau’s mind through a feeling of rebellion against social slavery,
and a loathing for the civilisation of his day, sets him at the very begin-
ning of the path which social theory has to traverse, and ensures that the
difficulties which we all feel at times will be met in their sharpest form.
He knows, in short, that something, which can look like utter bondage,
is a fact; and he knows that this fact has to be justified.
After some chapters devoted to clearing away inadequate solutions
of the problem, he re-states it as follows, in terms of that form of the
supposed social contract in which it was regarded as a compact of all
with all for the constitution of a ‘community:
“To find97 a form of association which shall defend and protect,
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ate, and “by which, each, uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey
only himself, and remain as free as before.”
4. Before proceeding to examine the true meaning of this formula
and its answer, we will briefly notice the conflict of ideas suggested by
it. Man’s freedom, it is implied, remains at the same level. Even his
power is not increased; it is only that individuals combine their forces,
previously isolated. These implications suit neither the view he starts
from, nor the view he arrives at. If man had a natural freedom, and then
submitted to society, though merely to increase his force of action, some
of his freedom must be lost, and he cannot remain as free as he was
before. But if man in society has a nature, which he could not have out
of society, such that his individuality is maximised by the organisation
of a social whole, then it is plain that he is not merely as free “as he was
before,” but very much more free; free, indeed, strictly speaking, under
social conditions alone. The notion which Rousseau started from, that
man has surrendered some part of a previous freedom in order to make
the most of the remainder, appears, as here, in the language of compro-
mise, frequently through the Contrat Social. But it is not effectively
relied on, for Rousseau is too acute to attempt a demarcation theory,
and while he assumes, for example, according to the literal notion of a
compact, that man only surrenders as much of his liberty as is necessary
to the community, he sees that the sovereign is sole judge of this propor-
tion and consequently is absolute.98 In the same way he first deduces the
sovereign’s right of inflicting capital punishment from the individual’s
pre-existing right to risk his life in order to save it, in virtue of which he
has transferred to the sovereign a right to demand his life when neces-
sary to the public safety, which includes his own. And then, feeling this
to be a fiction, he ekes it out by the precisely contrary suggestion that a
criminal has broken the social treaty, has ceased to be a member of the
community, and is dealt with as an enemy on terms of war.99 This supple-
mentation shows that Rousseau is aware of the weakness of his other
account of the matter, based on non-social individual right. His constant
failure, entire or partial, to free himself from the language of “first ap-
pearance theories,” as we have ventured to call them, is just what makes
him so instructive, in view of the similar inclination which besets us all.
5. We will now examine the real nature of his solution. For the
historical fiction of a social contract, he substitutes, in answer to the
problem formulated above (see section 3, end), the conditions which
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or “contract” which constitutes it—a survival of the language which
belongs to the fiction.100 But it is plain, even if he had not said so dis-
tinctly in the first chapter, that he is dealing not with an act in historical
time, but with the essential nature of a social body. The “clauses of the
contract,” he explains, are dependent on “the nature of the act”; they are
implicit and universal—that is to say, not capable of being affected by
any actual or supposed agreement in contravention of what the essence
of a body politic requires. He is, as he has clearly said in the previous
chapter, analysing the “act” “by which a people is a people,” i.e., the
conditions of political unity.
The “clauses of the contract” then reduce themselves to a single
one, “the total alienation of each associated member, with all his rights,
(the language is moulded by the fiction of an actual contract and pre-
social rights,) to the community as a whole.” The community as a whole
is therefore absolute. The subsequent passage, referred to above, in which
he speaks as if individual rights were retained, is a case of the vacilla-
tion on which we have remarked.
The essence of this “social pact” is further reducible to the follow-
ing formula: “Each of us puts into the common stock his person and his
entire powers under the supreme direction of the general will: and we
further receive each individual as an indivisible member of the whole.”
“Instantaneously, in place of the particular person of each contract-
ing party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body,
composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, which re-
ceives from this same act its unity, its common self (son moi commun),
its life, and its will. This public person which thus forms itself, by the
union of all the others, used to take the name of city,101 and now takes
that of republic or body politic, which is called by its members State
when it is passive, Sovereign when it is active, Power when comparing
it with others.”
In this passage the formula of association, and much of the com-
mentary upon it, imply the “contract” to have been an event in history.
Such is the bearing of the words “act of association,” “produces,” “re-
ceives,” “forms itself.” It is admitted that Rousseau’s thoughts are al-
ways more or less struggling with this conception, which, it must how-
ever be remembered, he explicitly refuses to rely on; and henceforward,
having sufficiently called attention to it, we shall not encumber our-
selves with observing upon it in every instance.
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that Rousseau considers himself to be analysing the essence of that act
or character “by which a people is a people,” we find in this passage
very far-reaching ideas. We find that the essence of human society con-
sists in a common self, a life and a will, which belong to and are exer-
cised by the society as such, or by the individuals in society as such; it
makes no difference which expression we choose. The reality of this
common self, in the action of the political whole, receives the name of
the “general will,” and we shall examine its nature and attributes in the
following chapter.
The primary point which it is necessary to make clear, however, is
whether the whole set of ideas is to be seriously pressed, or whether the
unity which they indicate is merely formal and superficial. For phrases
of the kind here employed may be found in many earlier writers. The
term “person,” for example, comes through Hobbes from the Roman
law. “Persona,” in Roman law, we are told,102 means either a complex
of rights or the possessor of those rights, whether an individual or a
corporate body. “Unus homo sustinet plures personas.” Thus a man
may devolve his “persona” on another man. A corporation has  single
“persona.” It is in this sense that for Hobbes, the State is a “real unity in
one person,” which person has been devolved by all the individuals of a
multitude upon one man or a definite assembly of men, whose acts there-
fore are, politically speaking, the acts of the whole multitude so united
in one “person.”
This use of the term “person” is one of the cases alluded to in ch. I,
where an abstraction of law has preserved the seed of a philosophical
idea of unity. How far the unity thus indicated is an empty fiction, or
how far it is grasped as something vital, into which the individual mind
goes out and in which it finds what its nature demands, is what we now
have to consider further.
6. Chapters vii, and viii, of book I of the Contrat Social show the
outcome of Rousseau s conflicting ideas in a very few remarkable propo-
sitions.
The question is whether the unity of a body politic is an arbitrary
abstraction or a fundamental force and reality.
Rousseau is discussing in chapter vii, the guarantees which exist
for a fulfilment of obligations by the sovereign (or whole) to its mem-
bers and by the members to the sovereign respectively. As regards the
obligation of the sovereign to its members, he runs straight into the
fallacy referred to in ch. I. He contends, that is to say, that the whole is72/Bernard Bosanquet
necessarily, by its constitution, that which it ought to be, and being
composed of all the individuals can have no interest opposite to theirs as
a whole, while, qua sovereign, it is debarred from any such special ac-
tion as might be hurtful to any single individual. This presupposes that
the whole always acts according to its idea as a whole, and neither is
“captured” by individual interests nor transgresses the limits set to its
action by restriction to true public concerns. But if this were so, the
State would be perfectly wise and good; and we do not need to be told
that a State, qua wise and good, could do no injustice to its members.
The whole is of course liable to vices correlative to those which Rousseau
is about to guard against when they arise in the individual.
And his view of individual disloyalty is decisive as to the vitality of
his conception of political unity.
“Indeed,” he says, “each individual may, as a man, have a particu-
lar will contrary to or unlike the general will which he has as citizen; his
particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common
interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him
regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution,
the loss of which would be less injurious to others than its payment is
burdensome to himself; and considering the moral person which consti-
tutes the State as an abstraction (être de raison), because it is not a
man, he would enjoy the rights of the citizen without consenting to fulfil
the duties of the subject—an injustice the progress of which would cause
the ruin of the body politic.”
“In order, then, that the social pact may not be a vain formula, it
tacitly includes the covenant, which alone can confer binding force on
the others, that whoever shall refuse to obey the general will shall be
constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing else than
that he will be forced to be free.”
In this passage Rousseau lays bare the very heart of what some
would call political faith, and others political superstition. This lies in
the conviction that the “moral person103 which constitutes the state” is a
reality, as opposed to the natural idea that it is an abstraction or fiction
of the reflective mind (an “ens rationis,” être de raison), because it is
not an actual individual human being. The theories of the first appear-
ance, as we have called them, are characterised by accepting as ultimate
“the absolute and naturally independent existence” of the physical indi-
vidual, and therefore regarding government as an encroachment on the
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the reality, it follows, as Rousseau points out, that force against the
physical individual may become a condition of freedom. We saw even in
Mill how extreme cases bring out the necessity for assuming a real will
at variance with the individual’s immediate desire.104 There is more to
be said, of course, as to the limits within which force can be so ap-
plied.105
It is worth while to cite here the whole of the short chapter viii.,
which draws out the consequences of the above conception of a social
pact and of sovereignty.
“Of the Civil Condition.—This passage from the state of nature to
the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change by replacing,
in his conduct, instinct by justice, and giving to his actions the morality
which they lacked before. It is then alone that, the voice of duty suc-
ceeding to physical impulse, and right to appetite, man, who till then
had only considered himself, sees himself compelled to act on other
principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.
Although he deprives himself in this state of several advantages which
he holds from nature, he gains such great ones in their place, his facul-
ties exercise and develop themselves, his ideas expand, his sentiments
are ennobled, his whole soul is exalted to such a degree, that, if the
abuses of his new condition did not often degrade him below that from
which he has emerged,106 it would be his duty to bless without ceasing
the happy instant which tore him from it for ever, and, from a stupid and
narrow animal, made him an intelligent being and human.
“Let us reduce these pros and cons to terms easy to compare. What
man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited
right to all which attracts him and which he can obtain; what he gains is
civil liberty and the property of what he possesses. To avoid error in
these reckonings we must carefully distinguish natural liberty, which
has no bounds but the powers of the individual, from the civil liberty
which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is only the
effect of force or the right of the first occupant, from property, which
can only be founded on a positive title.
“We might, in view of the preceding, add to the gains of the civil
state the moral freedom which alone makes man master of himself; for
the impulsion of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law which
we have prescribed to ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too
much on this head, and the philosophical sense of the word liberty is not
my subject here.”74/Bernard Bosanquet
Besides the terminology of the historical fiction this curious pas-
sage shows in the strongest light the struggle by which Rousseau passed
from the position of the “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality” to that
of the “Contrat Social.” The “hedging” of the sentence, “Although he
deprives himself,” etc., represents a loathing of the decadent society of
his day, which was deepseated in Rousseau’s mind, and which his life
enables us thoroughly to understand. The son of a Genevese artisan,
with a touch of vagabond impulses, and more than a touch of
Wordsworthian genius, he was the first, perhaps, of great modern writ-
ers to feel the true democratic passion,107 and  to see his artificial age as
Plato or as Ruskin might have seen it. It was no small feat of insight to
subdue his just repugnance so far as to estimate, in the language of the
chapter before us, the use, as distinct from the abuse, of law and society.
As a feature of this conflict of ideas, we may observe more espe-
cially the notion of original individual right, ascribed to a condition of
man in which, according to the previous paragraph, right could not ex-
ist. The phrase is merely taken up from previous writers, as is also the
so-called “right of the first occupant.” And the antithesis with true right
and property, recognised by the social mind, in which this chapter pre-
sents them, has the effect of a destructive analysis of these uncritical
conceptions.108
True right, then, begins with that social unity “by which a people is
a people,” figured by Rousseau under the image of the social compact.
This unity is one aspect of the rule of reason, the sense of duty, and the
essence of humanity. The quality of man is liberty,109 and we here see
that this fundamental principle which Rousseau has above laid down in
an undetermined sense, must, in the course of his reasoning, take on the
higher meaning demanded by the conceptions of this chapter.
And the import of the term “liberty” in this chapter is a measure of
the modification of ideas which has been brought about in the process of
“justifying” the “bondage” of man.110 The famous sentence, “Man is
born free, and everywhere he is in chains,” now turns out to mean, “Man
is born in natural liberty (which, if it refers to any actual condition at
all, implies, ‘in animal isolation’), and by subservience to social law, he
attains the civil liberty through which alone he becomes truly man.” Of
course, however, the phrase “born free” has the under current of mean-
ing, “is born for the truest freedom,” but in order that this import may
be elicited the rhetorical antithesis, “and everywhere is in chains,” must
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The final paragraph of chapter viii. makes it clear that Rousseau
considers the civil state as an embodiment of moral liberty, while he is
rightly anxious not to seem to cut the knot of his problem by appealing
to the merely ethical or philosophical sense of the term freedom. For this
latter conception, taken by itself, is apt to be understood as the estab-
lishment of unity in the self by the path of renunciation. Now, the free-
dom of the true civil state is, on the one hand, only a stage in the ascent
towards perfect ethical freedom or unity, for it involves rather the rec-
ognition of such freedom as the imperative end of social law, than the
actual attainment of it; and, on the other, hand, it is something broader
and more substantial than ethical freedom is apt to be conceived as
implying, because of that outgrowth of the self into an organised social
content which the civil condition involves. The distinction between the
civil state and ethical freedom is therefore a sound one, but yet does not
prevent their juxtaposition in this passage from throwing important light
on Rousseau’s conception of the former.
The expansion of old conceptions in Rousseau’s hands, and the di-
rection in which his views are advancing, are well illustrated by the
paragraph before us in comparison with Locke’s idea of consent. A
recent editor of the Contrat111 cites in illustration of the words, “Obedi-
ence to the law which we have prescribed to ourselves is liberty,” Locke’s
sentence, “The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legisla-
tive power but that established by consent in the commonwealth.”112
But Locke is speaking, according to his theory, of the actual or tacit
consent of individuals to the establishment of a governing power; a con-
sent which, for him, is conditional and revocable, and therefore fails to
meet the full difficulty of selfgovernment. Rousseau, borrowing very
likely his actual phrases from Locke, is speaking of something quite
different, viz., the recognition of a law and a will, with which one’s
everyday self may be at odds, as nevertheless one’s truer and fuller self,
and imperative as against the commonplace trivial moods which consti-
tute one’s inferior existence.
Thus far, then, we have seen how the problem of self-government is
transformed by a deeper insight. (a) The negative relation of the self to
other selves begins to dissolve away before the conception of the com-
mon self; and (6) the negative relation of the self to law and government
begins to disappear in the idea of a law which expresses our real will, as
opposed to our trivial and rebellious moods. The whole notion of man
as one among others tends to break down; and we begin to see some-76/Bernard Bosanquet
thing in the one which actually identifies him with the others, and at the
same time tends to make him what he admits that he ought to be. We
have now to follow these ideas to their application.
Chapter V.
The Conception of a “Real” Will.
1. We saw in the course of the last chapter that for Rousseau’s political
theory everything turns on the reality of the “moral person” which con-
stitutes the State. When active, this “moral” or “public person,” or com-
mon self, is called sovereign;113 and sovereignty for Rousseau consists
in the exercise of the General Will 114 and it is in this characteristic of
political society that he finds that justification for the use of force upon
individuals115 which he set out to seek. At the close of the last chapter
we noted the transformation in the problem of “self-government” which
such a conception tends to produce. In face of it, the opposition between
self and others, and between self and law or government, will have to be
interpreted altogether afresh. The present chapter will be devoted to
explaining the idea of a General Will with reference to Rousseau’s pre-
sentation of it, and the rest of the work will develop and apply it more
freely.
A few words may be said upon Rousseau s relation to Hobbes and
Locke, simply to illustrate the process by which deepening political ex-
perience awakened the ancient meaning within abstractions which had
preserved it in a latent form.
Both Hobbes and Locke use expressions, in treating of the govern-
ment and unity of a commonwealth, which closely resemble Rousseau’s
phrases respecting the General Will, the moral person, and the real unity.
Hobbes, for example, insisted that sovereignty must lie in a will,
and that this will must be real and must be taken as representing or
standing for the will of the community. “This is more than consent or
concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person.116
Only, interpreting “real” as implying inherence in tangible determinate
individuals, he in fact substituted the will (taking the word in its ordi-
nary sense) of a certain individual or certain individuals for the will of
the community or moral person as such. His temperament was emphati-
cally one of those described by Rousseau as treating the “moral person
as a fiction. But so far from abandoning for that reason all idea of actual
effective unity, he replaces the fictitious or abstract unity of the “per-
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group of human beings, to be taken as the unity of the Commonwealth
as such. Thus, for instance, with a logic which is irresistible on the basis
which he adopts, he denies all possibility of other representation of the
people where there is already a sovereign power. For the one and only
representative of the people is for him the sovereign, on whom the “per-
son” of the community is, by the very fact of his sovereignty, assumed
to be conferred. We may say then, in short, that Hobbes places the unity
of political society in a will, and that, in his sense, a real or actual will,
but emphatically not in a general will. He inherits the language which
enables him to predicate unity and personality of the State, but in his
mouth the terms have not recovered a true political meaning, and the
social right, which they are intended to account for, remains a mere
name.
Locke brings to bear a truer political experience, but a far less co-
herent logic. He feels that actual government is a trust, and that the
ultimate supreme power remains in the community as a whole. The dif-
ficulty in his case is to understand how the will or interest of the com-
munity as such obtains determinate expression. Generally, and apart
from particular causes of dissent, it is to be taken as one with the will of
the governing body to which, according to the constitution, the work of
government is given in trust. But the trust is conditional, and theoreti-
cally revocable; the ultimate supreme power is in the community at large,
which may withdraw the trust if its conditions are violated. Of course,
no determinate means of doing this in a lawful manner is, or can be,
suggested,117 and therefore the will of the people is not expressed by
Locke as a real or actual will. And so the right, which was to be dis-
played as social, remains a latent right in individuals to assent or to
dissent, and society is not represented as a genuine unity.
For Hobbes, then, we might venture to say, political unity lies in a
will which is actual, but not general; while for Locke it lies in a will
which is general, but not actual. If the two are pressed to extremes, the
former theory annihilates “self,” and the latter annihilates “government.”
For the former there is no true right, because the will of the state is
related as mere force to the actual individual will; for the latter there is
no true right, because the individual’s will remains a mere natural claim,
which is never thoroughly transformed by social recognition and adjust-
ment.
But if it were possible to inspire a logic as coherent as that of Hobbes,
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ground would be won. And this is what Rousseau has attempted in his
conception of a will at once actual and general; on the one hand, an
absolute and determinate adjustment and recognition of rights; on the
other hand, embodying in its recognitions all individual claims which
represent a true individuality. Here, if such a theory were workable, we
should have a genuine account of self-government, political obligation,
and social right. It may be admitted that the theory is not workable in
the form which Rousseau gave it. As Bentham contemptuously said, his
doctrine would make all laws invalid, excepting, perhaps, those of the
Republic of San Marino. But we shall see that these difficulties arise
just where Rousseau failed to be true to his own best insight; and we
shall find indications in his writings which suggest a different conclu-
sion.
2. What Rousseau means to indicate by his expression, “the Gen-
eral Will,” may seem to many persons, as he clearly saw, to have no
actual existence. It is of the nature of a principle operating among and
underneath a great variety of confusing and disguising factors, and can
only be defined by the help of an “as such” or “in so far as.” It is, we
might say, the will of the whole society “as such” or the wills of all
individuals “in so far as” they aim at the common good. It is expressed
in law, “in so far as” law is what it ought to be; and sovereignty, “as
such,” i.e. when truly itself because rightly acting for the common inter-
est, is the exercise of the General Will. In its idea, as the key to the
whole problem of self-government and freedom under law, it is that
identity between my particular will and the wills of all my associates in
the body politic which makes it possible to say that in all social co-
operation, and in submitting even to forcible constraint, when imposed
by society in the true common interest, I am obeying only myself, and
am actually attaining my freedom. It embodies indeed the same factors
as the conception of self-government, but in a shape which is a stage
nearer to reconciliation. It postulates a will which in some sense tran-
scends the individual whose will it is, and is directed upon an object of
wider concern. And in one way or other, we know that this may be, and
indeed always is the case, for our will is always directed to something
which we are not.
We may, perhaps, approach Rousseau’s thought more successfully
by starting from the idea of what is implied in the nature of will, as a
characteristic of an intelligent being. We may then find ground for con-
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daily life, does not fulfil all that it implies or suggests. It is narrow,
arbitrary, self-contradictory. It implies a “true” or “ real” or “rational”
will, which would be completely, or more completely, what ours at-
tempts to be, and fails. Thus, it has been said that what Rousseau really
aimed at, with his conception of the General Will, was the will “in it-
self,” or the will as it would be if it carried out what its nature implies
and demands.
We can see that some notion of this kind floats before Rousseau’s
mind from the predicates which he assigns to Sovereignty and the Gen-
eral Will, which are for him nearly convertible terms.
Sovereignty, for example, is inalienable and indivisible;118 that is to
say, it is a simple consequence of the nature of a body politic, “that by
which a people is a people.” You can no more alienate or break it into
parts than you can alienate or break into parts the use of your own
judgment. To be capable of sovereignty means to be a people “as such”
or “as a whole,” that is a living and choosing people. The people may of
course give general orders to subordinates to hold good till revoked, as
I may give a power of attorney for more or less specified purposes to
another man. But that is the delegation “of power, not of will.”
We see the author’s intention still more clearly when he maintains
that the General Will is always right,119 and is indestructible.120 Though
it is always right, as Will, yet the people may be misled in their knowl-
edge and judgment of details; though it is indestructible in the human
breast, yet a man may vote at the polling booth on another issue than
that which he would have before him if he consulted the General Will.
He may answer by his vote not the question, “Is this for the public
good?” but the question, “Is this for my private good?” If so, he does not
indeed extinguish the General Will in himself but he evades it. Or, as we
might say, the man does not altogether cease, however ignorant or inter-
ested, to possess a man’s leaning towards making the real best of him-
self, though his private interest may at times so master his mind as to
throw the higher or common good into the second place. Thus, the rela-
tion of the general will to a community is plainly apprehended by
Rousseau much in the spirit of the doctrine that man always aims at
something which he takes to be good. And so the General Will is as
much implied in the life of a society as some sort of will for good in the
life of an individual. The two, in fact; are not merely analogous but to a
great extent identical. The General Will seems to be, in the last resort,
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yond itself, in as far as that good takes the form of a common good.
Though this impulse may be mastered or cheated in a degree, yet, if it
were extinct, human life would have ceased.
We need not enter at length upon the question whether the good
which extends beyond oneself is adequately described as the good which
is general or common to oneself and others. It is plain that the unity of
myself with others in a common good is the same in principle as the
unity of myself with myself which I aim at in aiming at my own good.
Thought and language, we should bear in mind, unite me to myself just
as they unite me to others, and they expand my being by binding my
own life into a whole no less than by making intercourse possible be-
tween my fellow men and myself. Just so, the good at which I aim ex-
tends beyond my trivial or momentary self-—that is to say, is universal
as against myself as particular—in ways which are not prima facie
exhausted by saying that they include the good of others. But again, just
like thought and language, the good which enables me to enter deeper
into communion with myself or with the world must always have an
aspect of extending that communion to others; and therefore, for the
purposes of social philosophy, we may treat the universal good or self
as also in its nature a general or common good or self. It is that at least,
though it may be more, in accordance with the logical relation between
the rational universal, and the numerical generality.
This indestructible impulse towards the Good, which is necessarily
a common good, the substantial unity and filling of life by the interests
through which man is human, is what Rousseau plainly has before him
in his account of the General Will. But it has rightly been observed121
that he did not really distinguish this conception, analogous as it is to
what Plato or Aristotle might have said of the “divine reason which is
the source of the laws and discipline of the ideal polity,” from the legal
idea of the sovereign “in the sense of some power of which it could
reasonably be asked how it was established in the part where it resides,
when and by whom and in what way it is exercised.” We will point out,
however, the negative and positive indications which he furnishes as to
where it is not and where it is to be looked for. That he fails to emanci-
pate himself from the fallacies which he acutely indicates is a phenom-
enon for which the reader is, I trust, sufficiently prepared.
3. Rousseau develops his idea of a General Will by the contrast
which he draws between the General Will and the Will of All.122 The
General Will aims at a common interest; and it is this community ofThe Philosophical Theory of the State/81
interest, and not the number of votes in which it may find expression,
which in truth “generalises the will.”123 The Will of All aims at private
interest as such (“l’intérêt privé”), and is only a sum of particular wills.
Only, Rousseau fancies, if you let the particular wills fight it out freely,
their differences are likely to cancel each other, and the General Will to
make itself felt, like any pervading factor through a chaos of indefinite
variations.
The important point in the idea of the “Will of All” lies in its being
“a sum” of “particulars,” as opposed to something common or general
in its nature. Thus, in the limiting case, you may have a unanimous vote
in favour of a certain course of action, and yet the voters may severally
have been determined by aims and considerations which Rousseau would
not admit to be capable of entering at all into a determination of the
General Will. For a private affair as such is incapable in Rousseau ‘s
view of being made the subject of law, that is of an act of the General
Will. Such an act must be general, not only in the number of votes
(which, as we have seen, is the less important factor), but in the nature
of its subject-matter, which must be, as we should say, a question of
genuine public interest.124 Now, when men’s minds leave out of sight the
public or truly general aspect of a question, and are determined, each of
them severally, by the expected consequences to himself as a private
individual; then, though all may practically agree in the decision which
is arrived at, yet such a decision is founded on no view of truly public
interest, but is what Rousseau calls “a sum of particular wills.” The
distinction between such a sum of wills, and a will that aims at a truly
common interest or good, rests upon that fundamental contrast between
a mere aggregate and an organic unity, which is embodied in the oppos-
ing views of society which we have been discussing. Pushed to extremes,
it might raise a difficulty for those who are not familiar with the logical
distinction between a Judgment of Allness and a true Universal Judg-
ment. What harm can there be, it may be asked, in my voting according
to the effect a measure will have upon my affairs, if everyone else is
allowed to vote according to the effect it will have upon his affairs,
especially as in the extreme case suggested, the result is that we are all
agreed? What can be more for the general interest than a decision in
which every particular interest is satisfied? On the mere basis of com-
parative generality, as estimated by number, there is plainly no answer
to this objection. We meet here with another instance of the difficulties
which arise from working with the notion of society as “self and oth-82/Bernard Bosanquet
ers,” and of the good as an altruistic aim. For in the case supposed, the
others are all satisfied as much as myself; and so I should give weight to
no higher aim by considering their interest than by considering my own,
unless I considered it on different grounds from those which I admitted
in judging of my own advantage. But any different, higher, or deeper
grounds might just as well present themselves to me with reference to
my own advantage as with reference to theirs; and would differ from
motives of private interest, not by bringing about a more unanimous
adhesion, but by belonging to a deeper appreciation of the common
good, and therefore producing a less superficial unity of resolve. The
real difference between Allness and true Universality is that a “univer-
sal” characteristic goes more deeply into the nature of that which it
characterises than does a mark or attribute which, like the owner’s name
in the books of a library, simply happens to be attached ab extra to all
the objects in question. So here, the supposed accordant decisions of all
the voters, as guided each by his strictly private interest, are not really
or completely accordant. They happen to come together in one point
which has to be settled at the moment; but beyond that they express no
oneness of life or principle; still less can they give voice to any demand
of the greater or rational self in which the real common good resides.
This is what Rousseau means by saying that it is the community of the
interest or the nature of the object, and not the number of voices, which
distinguishes the General Will from the Will of All. It follows, there-
fore, that the private interest as such, which in the case supposed deter-
mines the individual voter, is not ultimately his true interest; and it may
be said, “But if each followed his own true interest the Will of All would
be right.” But a true interest, as opposed to an apparent interest, neces-
sarily has just the characters which the true Universal has as against the
collection of particulars. or the General Will against the Will of All. So
that to say, “If everyone pursued his own true private interest the Will of
All would be right,” is merely to say, “If everyone pursued his true
private interest he would pursue the common interest”; or, “The Will of
All, if directed to the common good, would be one with the General
Will.” The reason why it is necessary to insist upon the distinction be-
tween true and apparent interest, universal and aggregate of particulars,
General Will and Will of All, is just that a true interest generally re-
quires some degree of energy or effort, perhaps of self-sacrifice; while
the purely private or apparent interest, the interest of each of us in his
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and a whole community is only too likely to be guided. That is why it is
worth while to distinguish the Will of All from the General Will. Let us
suppose that Themistocles had been beaten in the Athenian Assembly
when he proposed that, instead of dividing the revenue from the silver
mines among all the citizens, they should devote this revenue annually
to building a fleet—the fleet which fought at Salamis. It is easy to see
that in such a case a relatively ideal end, demanding a certain self-de-
nial, might appear less attractive to all the individuals—each keeping
before himself his own separate share of profit— than the accustomed
distribution of money. And if such a view had gained the day, history
would never have told, and no free Europe would have existed to under-
stand, by what decision the true general will and common interest of
Athens might have transcended the aggregate private interests of all her
citizens. No doubt, it may be added, a true universal end is usually more
powerful than a limited interest even in the mere area of its operation;
and we may ultimately find, in the benefits conferred by Athens on the
world, a justification of her courage and self-denial, even by the rough
and unreliable standard of the number of individuals beneficially af-
fected.
If such a theory as that just stated were to be literally pressed, it
would lead to the conclusion that a law which was not really for the
general interest was not binding on the subjects of a state. For, by the
definition, such a law could not be a true act of sovereignty. No political
theorist, however visionary, could accept such a conclusion as this, and
Rousseau, seeing that the decision of the recognised sovereign must be
final, attempts to show how and when it comes nearest to a true General
Will.
The decisive point of his doctrine on this subject is his hostility to
representative government,125 and his consequent demand of a primary
assembly and a small community as the only guarantees for the genuine
expression of a will for the common good. “The English people,” ac-
cording to his well-known saying, “is only free during a general elec-
tion.” Further, it is a sign that the Will of All is, on the whole, coinciding
with the General Will, when unanimity prevails in the assembly. But
long discussions and the organisation of minor interests and associa-
tions within the state, in short, all the phenomena of mature political
life, are signs and conditions of failure to express the General Will,
which is most likely to make itself felt when particular wills neutralise
one another in the way explained above.84/Bernard Bosanquet
Now all this makes it clear that in endeavouring to point out the
signs of the General Will, Rousseau is really enthroning the Will of All.
He aims at eliciting a direct opinion, uncontaminated by external influ-
ence or interest, from each and every member of the citizen body. In this
aim, what is present to his mind is of course the popular idea of the
ancient City-State. But the actual working even of Athenian or of Ro-
man institutions was far more subtle and complex than this. And more
especially, the very core of the common good represented by the life of
a modern Nation-State is its profound and complex organisation, which
makes it greater than the conscious momentary will of any individual.
By reducing the machinery for the expression of the common good to
the isolated and unassisted judgment of the members of the whole body
of citizens, Rousseau is ensuring the exact reverse of what he professes
to aim at. He is appealing from the organised life, institutions, and se-
lected capacity of a nation to that nation regarded as an aggregate of
isolated individuals. And, therefore, he is enthroning as sovereign, not
the national mind, but that aggregate of private interests and ideas which
he has himself described as the Will of All. He is so far aware of this
that, as we have seen, he refuses to contemplate a great modern nation
as a political whole, because he fails to conceive how, for such a com-
munity, the General Will can satisfactorily find expression. But in as far
as he commits himself to the view that the sovereign, constituted as he
would have it, “necessarily is what it ought to be,” or “is incapable of
injustice to any of its members,” so far he has forgotten the dangers of
the Will of All, and has affirmed the absolute supremacy of the popular
will in the very sense against which his conception of the Will of All is
a protest. The notion of primary assemblies and of direct participation
in citizen life has no doubt a real lesson for the political theorist; but it
does not point to reducing the whole political system of a great state to
a model which never, perhaps, thoroughly fulfilled its idea except under
very special conditions.
4. The other and more fruitful direction of Rousseau’s speculations
upon the General Will is to be found in his remarks on the function of
the Legislator. We will approach them by help of a short restatement of
the problem as it now stands.
It was observed above that what Rousseau had before him in his
notion of the General Will might be described as the “Will in itself,” or
the Real Will. Any such conception involves a contrast between the
Real Will and the Actual Will, which may seem to be meaningless. HowThe Philosophical Theory of the State/85
can there be a Will which is no one’s Will? and how can anything be my
Will which I am not fully aware of, or which I am even averse to?
This question will be treated more fully on psychological grounds
in a later chapter. For the present, it is enough to call attention to the
plain fact that often when people do not know what they mean, they yet
mean something of very great importance; or that, as has commonly
been said, “what people demand is seldom what would satisfy them if
they got it.” We may recall the instances in which even Mill admitted
that it is legitimate to infer, from the inherent nature of will, that people
do not really “will” something which they desire to do at a given mo-
ment. The example of slavery is a striking one. A man may contract to
become a slave, but no civilised government will enforce his contract at
law, and the ultimate reason for the refusal is, as Mill in effect points
out, that man’s nature is to exercise will—to have liberty—and a reso-
lution to divest himself of this capacity must be taken as ipso facto void,
by contradicting the very essence of humanity.126
Now the contradiction, which here appears in an ultimate form,
pervades the “actual” will, which we exert from moment to moment as
conscious individuals, through and through. A comparison of our acts
of will through a month or a year is  enough to show that no one object
of action, as we conceive it when acting, exhausts all that our will de-
mands. Even the life which we wish to live, and which on the average
we do live, is never before us as a whole in the motive of any particular
volition. In order to obtain a full statement of what we will, what we
want at any moment must at least be corrected and amended by what we
want at all other moments; and this cannot be done without also correct-
ing and amending it so as to harmonise it with what others want, which
involves an application of the same process to them. But when any consid-
erable degree of such correction and amendment had been gone through,
our own will would return to us in a shape in which we should not know
it again, although every detail would be a necessary inference from the
whole of wishes and resolutions which we actually cherish. And if it
were to be supplemented and readjusted so as to stand not merely for the
life which on the whole we manage to live, but for a life ideally without
contradiction, it would appear to us quite remote from anything which
we know. Such a process of harmonising and readjusting a mass of data
to bring them into a rational shape is what is meant by criticism. And
criticism, when applied to our actual will, shows that it is not our real
will; or, in the plainest language, that what we really want is something86/Bernard Bosanquet
more and other than at any given moment we are aware that we will,
although the wants which we are aware of lead up to it at every point.
To obtain something which approximates to a real will, then, in-
volves a process of criticism and interpretation, which may be either
natural or intellectual; that is to say, it may proceed by “natural selec-
tion,” through the method of trial and error, or it may be rapidly ad-
vanced at favourable moments by the insight of a great mind. But some
forwardness in this criticism and interpretation, bringing with it some
deposit, so to speak, of objects of volition in which the private will, so
far as it is distinguished at all, finds harmony and expansion, must be
coeval with social life, and, in short, with humanity.
It is such a process of interpretation that Rousseau ascribes to the
legislator. He fathers on him the whole labour of history and social logic
in moulding the customs and institutions of mankind. And in agreement
with our general attitude to Rousseau’s historical imagination, we may
take what he says of legislation and the legislator as an expression of his
views on the function of customs and ordinances in the constitution of
will. It is very remarkable, considering the other aspects of his views,
that he should have conceived so distinctly, as the following passage
shows that he did, the immense contrast between a real will and any-
thing which could be presented as a whole in the momentary conscious-
ness of human beings.
Here is his statement of the problem.127 “Laws are, strictly speak-
ing, only the conditions of civil association. The people which submits
to the laws ought to be their author. Only the associates can have the
right to regulate the conditions of the society. But how are they to regu-
late them? Can it be done by a common agreement, by a sudden inspira-
tion? Has the body politic an organ for pronouncing its acts of will?
Who will give it the necessary foresight to form such acts and to publish
them before they are needed? Or how is it to pronounce them at the
moment when they are required? How is a blind multitude, which often
does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it,
to execute for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of
legislation? Of itself, the people always wills the good, but it does not
always see it. The general will is always right, but the judgment which
guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects such
as they are, and, sometimes, such as they ought to appear to it; it must
be shown the right road which it seeks, must be protected from the al-
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eyes, and the attractions of present and visible advantages counterbal-
anced by the danger of remote and latent evils. Private persons see the
good which they reject; the public wills the good which it does not see.
All alike need guidance. The former must be obliged to conform their
will to their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it wills.128
Then, from the public enlightenment there results the union of under-
standing and of will in the social body; and hence the precise co-opera-
tion of the parts and the greatest power of the whole. Hence springs the
necessity of a legislator.”
In the following chapter129 Rousseau touches the essence of laws
and institutions in a few words, which only embody a contradiction or a
miracle because he is thinking of the legislator’s work as a creation
accomplished at one blow. “In order that a people at its birth should
have the capacity to appreciate the sound maxims of policy and follow
the fundamental rules of political reason, it would be necessary for the
effect to become the cause; for the social spirit, which is meant to be the
work of the legislation, to preside over the legislation itself, and for men
to be, before laws are made, what they are meant to become by their
means.” The legislator then, in face of this contradiction, must have
recourse to supernatural sanctions.
But the paradox precisely expresses the fact. Laws and institutions
are only possible because man is already, what they gradually make
more and more explicit; because he has a general will, that is, because
the good which he presents to himself as his own is necessarily in some
degree a good which extends beyond himself, or a common good. The
criticism or interpretation which elicits the general will or actual social
spirit, by removal of contradictions, and embodiment in permanent form,
is essentially one with the work which Rousseau ascribes to the legisla-
tor. And his paradox is removed when we understand that the legislator
is merely one of the organs of the social spirit itself, as it carries out its
self-criticism and self-interpretation, in part by trial and error and in
part by conscious insight and adjustment. The habits and institutions of
any community are, so to speak, the standing interpretation of all the
private wills which compose it, and it is thus possible to assign to the
General Will an actual and concrete meaning as something different at
once from every private will, and from the vote of any given assembly,
and yet as standing, on the whole, for what both the one and the other
necessarily aim at sustaining as the framework of their life. It is need-
less to observe that such a representation of the Real Will is imperfect,88/Bernard Bosanquet
since every set of institutions is an incomplete embodiment of life; and
any given system of life is itself also incomplete. It is more important to
remember that, though always incomplete, just as the system of sci-
ences is an incomplete expression of truth, the complex of social institu-
tions is, as we have seen, very much more complete than the explicit
ideas which at any given instant move any individual mind in volition.
Chapter VI.
The Conception of Liberty, as Illustrated by the
Foregoing Suggestions.
1. We have now seen that the problem of Self-Government may be re-
garded from a point of view other than that which presented it as a
contradiction in terms. The contradiction depended on the absolute op-
position between self and others which was embodied in the prima facie
idea of society; the result of which was that all increase of individuality
and all assertion of self were at the first view hostile as regarded others,
and liberty, the condition of individuality, became a negative idea, pre-
scribing as it were a maximum of empty space, to be preserved against
all trespassers, round every unit of the social whole. We saw that no-
tions of this kind were pushed so far as to endanger the fundamental
principle, according to which selfaffirmation is the root of morality, and
it was maintained that the ethical attitude essentially lay in the negation
and limitation imposed by social life upon the natural tendency to self-
assertion. According to these ideas, the self in society is something less
than, if it could so exist, it would be out of society, and liberty is the
arrangement by which, at a sacrifice of some of its activities, it is en-
abled to disport itself in vacuo with the remainder.
But if we may give weight to the suggestions of the two previous
chapters, the assumptions which we work with are transformed. The
difference of principle is that the average individual, such as each of us
takes himself to be in his ordinary130 trivial moods, when he sees, or
thinks he sees, nothing in life but his own private interest and amuse-
ment, —this average individual is no longer accepted as the real self or
individuality. The centre of gravity of existence is thrown outside him.
Even his personality, his unique and personal being, the innermost shrine
of what he is and likes to be, is not admitted to lie where a careless
scrutiny, backed by theoretical prejudice, is apt to locate it. It is not in
the nooks and recesses of the sensitive self, when the man is most with-The Philosophical Theory of the State/89
drawn from things and persons and wrapped up in the intimacies of his
feeling, that he enjoys and asserts his individual self to the full. This
idea is a caricature of the genuine experience of individuality. It is true
that to feel your individuality is to feel something distinctive, which
gives you a hold and substance in yourself and a definite position among
others, and, it may be, against them. But on a careful consideration, it
will be found that this substance and position are always sustained by
some kind of determinate achievement or expansion on the part of the
self. It always comes from taking hold of the world in some definite
way; which, just because it is definite and affirmative, is at once a dis-
tinct assertion of the self, and a transition from the private self into the
great communion of reality. The simplest machine will show us that it is
the differences of the parts which enable them to make a whole. And so,
we are now suggesting, it is in the difference which contributes to the
whole that the self feels itself at home and possesses its individuality.
Following up such thoughts as these, we see that there is a meaning
in the suggestion that our real self or individuality may be something
which in one sense we are not, but which we recognise as imperative
upon us. As Rousseau has said of the social self, we say more generally
of the self or life which extends beyond our average private existence,
that it is more real than we are, and we only feel ourselves real in pro-
portion as we identify ourselves with it.
With such suggestions in our minds, we see the problem of liberty
in a new light. Liberty, no doubt, is as Rousseau has told us, so far
agreeing with Mill, the essential quality of human life. It is so, we un-
derstood, because it is the condition of our being ourselves. But now
that it has occurred to us that in order to be ourselves we must be always
becoming something which we are not, or in other words, we must al-
ways recognise that we are something more than we have become, lib-
erty, as the condition of our being ourselves, cannot simply be some-
thing which. we have, still less something which we have always had—
a s/a/us quo to be maintained. It must be a condition relevant to our
continued struggle to assert the control of something in us, which we
recognise as imperative upon us or as our real self, but which we only
obey in a very imperfect degree. Thus it is that we can speak, without a
contradiction, of being forced to be free.131 It is possible for us to acqui-
esce, as rational beings, in a law and order which on the whole makes
for the possibility of asserting our true. or universal selves, at the very
moment when this law and order is constraining our particular private90/Bernard Bosanquet
wills in a way which we resent, or even condemn. Such a law and order,
maintained by force, which we recognise as on the whole the instrument
of our greatest self-affirmation, is a system of rights; and our liberty, or
to use a good old expression, our liberties, may be identified with such
a system considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the
best that we have it in us to be, that is, of becoming ourselves. And
because such an order is the embodiment up to a certain point of a self
or system of will which we recognise as what ought to be, as against the
indolence, ignorance, or rebellion of our casual private selves, we may
rightly call it a system of self-government or free government; a system,
that is to say, in which ourselves, in one sense, govern ourselves in
another sense; not as Mill has said, by each one of us being subject to all
the “others” (taking “others” in the same sense in which each of us is
“one”), but by all of us, as casual private units, being subject to an order
which expresses, up to a certain point, the rational self or will which, as
rational beings, we may be assumed132 to recognise as imperative.
2. Before proceeding to develop the idea of liberty, we may consider
for a moment the closely analogous idea of “nature” and what is “natu-
ral.”
Like the notion of “liberty,” which is that of “being able to be your-
self,” the notion of nature, which is that of “coming to be of yourself, or
of itself,” has always, however imperfectly apprehended, exercised im-
mense power over the mind. It is felt that you have touch with reality
when you have found something which can grow of itself. But again,
like the notion of liberty, the notion of nature is apt to be apprehended in
a form so partial as to be practically negative, and in this form, to be
given a hostile bearing against what are, in fact, completer phases of the
same idea.
That which is natural, or by nature, in the most obvious sense—
what most plainly appears to have “come of itself”—is what comes first
in time, and what comes with the least putting together—the primitive
and the simple as against the late and the complex. And so in the theo-
retical inquiry after what is solid and can be relied upon, there con-
stantly recurs in all ages the tendency to story-telling; to the narration of
what is supposed to have come first, as the simple spontaneous begin-
ning out of which the world as we know it has emerged with greatly
altered attributes. The note of story-telling is unmistakable in this naive
theory, whether we find it in poets who portray the Golden Age, from
Hesiod downwards,133 or represented as a fallacy of social compact byThe Philosophical Theory of the State/91
Plato in the second book of the Republic,134 or adopted as a juristic
theory by Tacitus135 and the writers who relied on the idea of a “state of
nature,” down to Rousseau.
It may be observed at this point that the conception of a “law of
nature” made a very valuable middle term between the conception of a
purely primitive condition of the world and the ideal of a complete soci-
ety. The logical reason is plain. The instinct of getting at something
solid and permanent, which first reveals itself by going back to the sup-
posed original or simple, soon attaches itself also to what is generally
found to exist, understanding generality as a mark of that tendency to
come of itself which it feels to attach to what is real and able to stand in
its own right. But generality is a clue which leads a long way; and the
mind passes from saying “Fire burns136 by nature, for it burns every-
where; but law is variable”1 to observing that there are features of law
which have their own generality, and there thus appears to be a “natu-
ral” element in law, which may mean the right of the strongest,137 but
may again amount to a tendency to come out of the “state of nature.”
Just in the same way, the conception of Liberty has always drawn from
experience a certain positive tendency to progress, and has never per-
haps, even in the most fanatical theory, maintained the full demand for
isolation which its negative bearing might seem to imply.
But again, the instinct which, in looking for what has power to
grow or come of itself, lays hold of what is merely primitive or merely
general, has in all great epochs of thought been met by a deeper insight.
It is not merely what we are born as, or what the world begins with,
that comes of itself. The most ordinary conception of growth involves
maturity, and the term nature in Greek and Latin, as in English, can
indicate not only what we are born as, but what we are born for, our
true, or real, or complete. nature. Thus the great thinkers of every age
have been led to something like Aristotle’s conception, “what a thing is
when its growth is completed, that is what we call its nature138 (growth
or evolution)”; and so, if we are to think of “nature” as a whole, it will
not be, as when we speak of “natural” science, an outward world, whether
of atoms or of organisms, contrasted both with God and with Man, “for
nature in Aristotle is not the outward world of created things; it is the
creative force, the productive principle of the universe.”139 To us, in-
clined to contrast the natural at once with the human and the divine,
there is something startling in the vivid reality with which the Greek
thinkers hold the three ideas together. The creative activity of the divine92/Bernard Bosanquet
principle seems for Plato to be actually one with growth, or nature, or
evolution.140 It may be of interest to cite the great passage in which
Plato lays his finger on the common fallacy.141 “Many learned men say
that the elements and inorganic and organic world below man came by
nature and chance, but that law and justice and man’s works and social
institutions and religion are merely conventional, variable, and untrue.
But we must maintain that law and religion and man’s works exist by
nature, or are not lower than nature, being the products of mind accord-
ing to right reason.” . . . “For they give the name of nature to the origin
of the earliest things;142 but if really mind is earliest of all things, then it
may rightly be said to be superlatively natural.”
And so, as the universe is for the great thinkers at once natural and
divine, the same applies to human society. Not only in Aristotle’s tren-
chant expressions to the effect that the City State is a natural growth,
but in the whole of Plato’s careful analysis of moral and social life, we
find society depicted as a living and growing creature, in which mans
nature expands itself from more to more, having its own essence pro-
gressively communicated to it. And so we find that the peculiar natural-
ness of the primitive and the simple is only an illusion, caused by the
greater difficulty of recognising the larger individuality which comes
both of and to itself in the later and more complex phases of life. But
whatever it was that was real and that came of itself in the primitive and
simple is there to a greater degree—with more reality and as the same
self, only more complete—in the later and complex. The idea of a dimi-
nution of being as we pass from the simpler to the more developed self
is a fallacy of non-recognition.
Rousseau, as we saw, maintains in words the traditional opposition
between the natural and the civil or moral condition of man. From the
tendency of his views, however, we might have expected that in his
philosophy the wheel would come full circle, and the term “nature” would
revert to its Greek meaning. But this is not the case, though in Émile
there is a compromise which points in some such direction. Yet a re-
markable passage143 from Burlamaqui, a Genevese jurist, the earlier
contemporary of Rousseau, shows the reversion to the Greek view of
social nature completed in principle. “La liberté civile l’emporte de
beaucoup sur la liberté naturelle, et, par conséquent, l’état civil qui l’a
produit est de tous les états de l’homme le plus parfait, et, parler
exactement, le veritable état naturel de l’homme. L’établissement d’un
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l’observation des lois naturelles,144 et par conséquent dans la route de
bonheur, les fait rentrer dans leur état naturel, duquel ils étaient sortis
par le mauvais usage qu’ils faisaient de leur liberté.”
Upon this reversion to ancient usage there followed the movement
of the age of romantic genius and of organic science, and with Goethe’s
Erdgeist and Wordsworth’s religion of Nature the restriction of the natural
to the primitive and simple was destroyed. Nature still remains a point
of view under which we regard what relatively speaking “comes of it-
self,” but it has ceased to exist as a question-begging predicate, attached
to pre-social or extra-social conditions of man.
3. Liberty, as understood by the writers who were discussed in ch.
iii. of the present work, is related to the State much as Nature, in the
mouth of story-telling theory, is related to civilised society. We saw that
Seeley in his Introduction to Political Science145 lays it down that “per-
fect liberty is equivalent to total absence of government.” And this no
doubt fairly represents our first notion of the matter, when cleared of the
limitations imposed upon it by practical life, which limitations—really
a first hint of the truth—we are apt to mistake for mere sophistications
and imperfections. We noted in Rousseau the surviving contrast be-
tween natural liberty on the one hand and civil or moral liberty on the
other, and we observed that the expanding idea of what was natural
could not be prevented from covering the ground of the civil or moral
life. The thread of connection, or rather the ferment of expansion, we
found to be, in the case of nature, the idea of self-origination. That was
natural which came of itself.
(a) In the simple ideal of liberty, as equivalent to the absence of all
government—for we must not forget that it is an ideal, obtained by
neglecting the facts of life which run counter to it—there is clearly em-
bodied a claim which commands our respect. The claim is so self-evi-
dent and so convincing to average human feeling—Mr. Spencer would
indeed say, with some truth, to animal feeling in general—that its pre-
cise nature is seldom stated in distinct language. We have assumed above
that the root of it lies in the claim to be ourselves. But it is safer to take
it in the shape which it actually has for the average consciousness, and
this is the negative shape, as a claim to be free from constraint.146 If we
ask, “What is constraint?” the answer is founded on the current distinc-
tion between myself and others as different minds attached to different
bodies. It is constraint when my mind is interfered with in its control of
my body either by actual or by threatening physical violence under the94/Bernard Bosanquet
direction of another mind. A permanent and settled condition of such
constraint, by which I become in effect the instrument of another mind,
is slavery. And it will not lead us far wrong if we assume that the value
put upon liberty and its erection into something like an ideal comes from
the contrast with slavery. The ideal of positive political freedom presup-
poses more complex experiences. But Homer already knows that “ Zeus
deprives a man of half his manhood when he becomes a slave.”
This, then, we may take as the practical starting point in the notion
of freedom. It is what, with reference to a formed society, we may call a
status; the position of a freeman as opposed to a slave; that is, of one
who, whatever oppression he may meet with de facto from time to time,
or whatever specified services he may be bound to render, normally
regards himself and is regarded by others as, on the whole, at his own
disposal, and not the mere instrument of another mind.
Thus the juristic meaning of the term liberty, based on the normal
distinction between one selfdetermining person and another, we may set
down as its literal meaning, and so far the English writers, of whom
Seeley is the latest type, are on solid ground when they define liberty as
the absence of restraint, or perfect liberty as the absence of all govern-
ment (in the sense of habitual constraint by others).
(b) It is obvious that the above definition would be wholly inad-
equate to the simplest facts respecting the demands which have through
all history been asserted and achieved under the name of political lib-
erty. A man may be a long way more than a slave and yet a long way
less than a citizen. If, as Seeley says, the English writer of the verses,
“Ah, Freedom is a noble thing,” only meant by Freedom, being out of
prison, it is certain that he meant much less than the Greek historian
who two thousand years before used almost the same words. “The right
of equal speech,” he wrote, “demonstrates itself in every way as a noble
thing.”147 By this, as his words and their occasion make plain, he meant
a certain determinate security for the positive exercise of activities af-
fecting the welfare of the social whole, and some such security is always
understood to be involved in the notion of political liberty. But we will
content ourselves at this point with noting the distinction and connection
between the negative or juristic, and the varyingly positive or political
conception of liberty. For the latter is, in its degree, a case of that fuller
freedom which we are about to trace to its embodiment in the state; and
the phenomena of political liberty are covered, of course, by the point of
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condition of the fuller liberty.
(c) The connection, we said, between juristic and political liberty
should be observed at this point. It is merely an example of what we
shall find throughout, that the apparently negative has its roots and its
meaning in the positive, and, in proportion as its true nature becomes
evident, its positive aspects become explicit. There is no true security
for juristic liberty apart from political liberty; and it has constantly been
the infraction of juristic liberty that has been the origin of the demand
for a share in highly positive political duties and functions. Mere pro-
tection for person and property may seem an easy thing to define and
maintain with just a little goodwill; but the questions when, how, and in
what sense it is to be maintained involve the positive character of the
political system, and there is no ultimate security unless that system is
moulded by the whole compass of individuality which society contains.
(d) Recurring then to the literal or elementary sense of liberty, as the
absence of constraint exercised by one upon others, we may admit that,
in going beyond it, we are more or less making use of a metaphor.148 We
are passing from the idea of non-constraint pure and simple to the idea
of more or less moulding and selection within the powers and activities
of the self. It is true, indeed, and must be maintained as a fundamental
principle, that the “higher” liberty is also in fact the “larger” liberty,
presenting the greater area to activity and the more extensive choice to
self-determination.149 But this larger development remains within a posi-
tive general character, and if more alternatives are open, there are also,
by that very fact, more which are closed. We cannot wholly exhaust the
new meaning of liberty as applied to the law-abiding’ and moral life of
a conscientious citizen even by changing the negative into the positive,
and saying that, whereas mere juristic freedom was only freedom from
constraint, political freedom means freedom to act. The higher sense of
liberty, like the lower, involves freedom from some things as well as
freedom to others. And that which we are freed from is, in this case, not
the constraint of those whom we commonly regard as others, but the
constraint of what we commonly regard as a part of ourself. Here is the
reason for saying that, when we speak of liberty in the higher sense, we
must be admitted to be speaking metaphorically.
In the straightforward sense of the word, we saw, I am free when I
am not made the instrument of another person’s will through physical
violence or the threat of it. The subtle questions which may arise with
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instrument of another’s mind, with more or less willingness on the part
of my own, are here disregarded. I am assumed to be acting freely so
long as I follow the inclination of my mind, apart from any painful
conflict forced upon it by the prospect of physical interference with its
belongings.
But from the earliest ages of ethical reflection, a further sense has
been ascribed to the term liberty. It has been pointed out by moralists
and philosophers—first, perhaps by Socrates and Plato— that the con-
dition of man as to being himself is fundamentally affected not only by
the power to do what he likes without constraint, but by the nature of
that which he likes to do. The human ‘But see below, p. 145. mind, it is
explained, is never wholly at one with itself, and the common phrases
“self-mastery” or “self-control” are adduced by way of presenting what
we spoke of above as the ethical paradox of self-government. The mind,
then, is treated by a metaphor as if it were two or more persons; and the
term liberty, which applies prima facie to the non-constraint of one per-
son by another, is applied to the non-constraint of something within an
individual mind by something else within it. Now, apart from further
scrutiny, it does not appear why the term liberty, when thus applied,
should mean anything of ethical value. As Plato observed, in a pas-
sage150 from which the current use of all these phrases is probably de-
rived, it seems absurd at first sight to speak of self-control as a distinc-
tive predicate of certain states of mind. For surely, within the mind, that
which is controlled must be of the nature of self no less than that which
controls it, so that, in saying that I have self-control, I am saying that I
am self-indulgent; in saying that my mind is free, I am at the same time
saying that it is a slave. Within certain limits this paradox represents a
truth, and the ethical rank of the elements which coerce and are coerced
may be quite oppositely estimated. We may think fit to call ourselves
free either when love conquers reason or when reason triumphs over
love. Still, as Plato proceeds to point out, the general adoption of the
metaphor, the fact that we think and call ourselves “free” or “self-con-
trolled” or “fully ourselves” in some cases and not in others; and that we
do not in each of these cases regard the opposite attribution “slave,”
“self-indulgent,” “not ourselves” as equally true with the former, indi-
cates that some substantial fact is forcing itself upon us through the
metaphor in question. It is the same problem as that which Professor
James has wittily stated when he points out that “the sluggard, the drunk-
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quering’ their impulses and temptations) or say they resist their energy,
overcome their sobriety, conquer their courage, and so forth.”151
It is most important, we may venture to observe in passing, not to
understand the substantive fact, or Plato’s presentation of it, as if it lay
in an alternative between two psychological factors, say intelligence
and desire, the one of which was to be preferred and the other to be
repudiated, through some quasi-ethical conception of rank, such as the
supposed affinity of the one factor with divine or of the other with ani-
mal life. We are speaking of the sense in which it can be asserted that the
human self is, comparatively speaking, free in one kind of life and un-
free in another, both being assumed to be chosen, in the absence of
constraint by an external will. It is plain that the only ground on which
such an assertion can really be sustained is that the one life more than
the other gives effect to the self as a whole, or removes its contradictions
and so makes it most fully what it is able to be, or what, by the implied
nature of each and all of its wants, it may be said really to want to be.
The claims of intelligence and desire in their various phases must be
criticised according to this principle, and not advocated upon presuppo-
sitions drawn from external comparisons.
But our question at the present moment is not as to the deeper na-
ture of that which we call the self par excellence, but as to the bearing
of the metaphor by which the assertion of such a self is identified with
liberty or absence of constraint. And the point is plainly this;152 that in
the conflict between that which stands for the self par excellence and
that which, at any time, stands opposed to it, we have the clear experi-
ence that we are capable of being determined by a will within our minds
which nevertheless we repudiate and disown,153 and therefore we feel
ourselves to be like a slave as compared with a freeman if we yield, but
like a freeman compared with a slave if we conquer. We may be deter-
mined by something which not only is not ourself—for in the greatest
moments of life, when our being touches its maximum, we, in a sense,
feel an impulse which is not ourself—but it is not ourself as something
which has got hold of us by force, and operates upon us by conflict and
violence, without having the kind of power needed to carry us away and
sweep our whole self harmoniously into its current. That we can be
determined by a will in us which neither is ourself nor represents it at a
higher level, and which we loathe and disown, is the experience on which
the metaphor of freedom and slavery is based, when applied to the life
of man considered apart from external constraint.15498/Bernard Bosanquet
(e) The metaphorical application of the term Liberty to a state of the
individual mind has both its danger and its justification. The state of
mind in question, we repeat, is that in which the impulse towards self-
satisfaction sets itself upon an object which represents the nature of the
self as a whole, as free from contradiction or as at its maximum of
being, and triumphs over the alien and partial will, the tendency to nar-
rower tracks of indulgence, when entangled in which it feels itself op-
pressed and constrained by a foreign influence. When the mind does
what, as a whole, it wills, as Plato implies,155 it feels free. When it
cannot be said to will anything as a whole, but is distracted among aims
which cannot satisfy it, then there is no sense in which it can be said to
do what it wills, and it feels itself under constraint and a slave.
The metaphor has this danger. The contrast between whole and part
is too readily transformed, in popular theory, into the contrast between
an empty generality and everything in particular. The claim to be free
then involves the separation between mind as a general faculty of voli-
tion, and every particular object. Mind is then said to be free as an
undetermined faculty, but as filled and moulded by any object or idea,
(the passive participles “filled” and “moulded” imply a relation which is
not real, but, as assumed, is the ground of the fallacy in question) it has
lost its freedom and become a slave. But if we retain the conception that
mind has reality only as a whole of determinate character, self-deter-
mined through its power of being a self, but not through any power of
creating particulars out of nothing, we shall avoid this caricature of the
higher freedom.
But it is far more important to note the justification of the metaphor.
We saw that, from Homer downwards, the conviction has been ineradi-
cable that liberty is the true nature of man. And we now observe that the
metaphor, through which the deepest sense of this quality has expressed
itself, depends upon the same principle as the literal usage from which it
is drawn. In the case of Liberty, conceived as a condition of the mind,
just as in the case of Liberty, conceived as the absence of physical men-
ace or coercion on the part of other persons, the root of the matter is tbe
claim to be determined only by ourself. But, in the literal case, what we
mean by ourself is the given self, the group of will and wishes, of feel-
ings and ideas, associated from time to time with my particular body; in
short, the actual uncriticised “mind,” as we experience it all day and
every day. In the metaphorical case, we have made so much progress in
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lem. We know that the given self, the mind from day to day, is not
satisfactory; and we throw the centre of gravity outside it, and place the
true self in something which we rather want to be than actually are;
although, at the same time, it is clear that to some extent we are this
something or we should not want to be it. We realise, indeed, that to be
ourselves is a principle at once of distinction or position among others,
and of thorough transition into and unity with the life which is at the
root of theirs. And it is for this reason that we feel so confident, in
proportion as we at all lay hold upon a life which can thus distinguish
and identify us, that we have here the grasp of what is in its nature our
true self. Here then, as in the literal case of liberty from personal con-
straint, we are putting in act the principle of “being determined only by
ourself.”
And thus Liberty as understood by “theorists of the first look,” or
by those who in all ages have resisted arbitrary tyranny, belongs after
all to the same principle with the civil or moral liberty of the philoso-
pher. The claim to obey only yourself is a claim essential to humanity;
and the further significance of it rests upon what you mean by “your-
self.” Now if it is true that resistance to arbitrary aggression is a condi-
tion of obeying only ourselves, it is more deeply true, when man is in
any degree civilised, that, in order to obey yourself as you want to be,
you must obey something very different from yourself as you are. And it
has been well pointed out156 that the consciousness of civilised peoples
is deeply alive to this significance of liberty, so that any work of self-
improvement may be most effectively presented to a popular audience
as an effort to attain freedom by breaking the bondage of drink, for
example, or of ignorance, or of pauperism. In spite of the objection that
Freedom as thus represented is a mere metaphor, “the feeling157 of op-
pression, which always goes with the consciousness of unfulfilled pos-
sibilities, will always give meaning to the representation of the effort
after any kind of self-improvement as a demand for ‘freedom.’”
We have followed the usual course of English thought, and the ex-
ample of a writer whose caution equalled his enthusiasm, in admitting
that the lower sense of the term Liberty is the literal sense, and that the
deeper meaning may be treated as metaphorical. It is worth while to
observe that the justice of this way of looking at the matter is very
doubtful. It is because we know, however indefinitely, that our self has
a reach beyond its daily needs, that arbitrary oppression becomes a
thing to be resisted at the price of life itself. Herbert Spencer draws100/Bernard Bosanquet
attention to the struggles of an animal which we try to confine, as a
proof of the innate feeling of liberty. But the domesticated animal is the
highest animal, or at anyrate not the lowest; while the man domesticated
on similar terms is what we call a slave, because he has sold his liberty
for his life. It is therefore in truth the sense of the higher liberty—the
greatness and unity of life—that has communicated uncontrollable force
to the claim for the lower; and if the fuller meaning is the reality and the
lesser the symbol, it would be nearer the truth to say that the reality is
the liberty of a moral being whose will finds adequate expression in its
life, of which liberty the absence of external constraint is only an el-
ementary type or symbol. The claim of the dictionary-maker that the
earliest or the average meaning is also the truest or the “proper” mean-
ing of words has no foundation.158
4. Liberty, then, throughout, is the being ourselves, and the fullest
condition of liberty is that in which we are ourselves most completely.
The ideal thus implied may be further explained by help of the philo-
sophical expression, “The free will is the will that wills itself.” We have
already seen, by implication, the meaning of this. If we are asked, “But
does not our will always will itself?” we have the answer ready, that in
one sense it does, but in another it does not. We always want what we
will, but what we will is not always what would satisfy our want. A will
that willed itself woull be a will that in willing had before it an object
that would satisfy its whole want, and nothing but its want. Its desires
would not be narrow and partial desires, in the fulfilment of which a
man feels choked and oppressed like one lost in a blind alley which
grows narrower and narrower. They would not be artificial desires stimu-
lated and elaborated into a tyranny of the machinery of life by the self
which gropes for more and cannot find the “more” which it needs. That
is to say, the volitions of the self would have undergone a process just
such as is undergone by a casual sensuous observation as it passes into
a great scientific theory. As the observation stands it is inadequate to
itself; for it poses as a truth, and is manifestly a false connection. So it
is supplemented on the one hand and purged away on the other; condi-
tions and qualifications are inserted into it to harmonise it with other
knowledge, until it makes some approach to being an expression of ex-
perience fit to occupy a permanent place in man s conception of the
world. This, the adjustment of a partial element to unity with the whole,
is the essence of criticism. And it is just such another process by which
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casual volition. That is to say, the nature of the process may be repre-
sented by considering it as having an effect of this kind on an
unharmonised will; and relatively at any given moment such a process
is in some degree going on. But we must bear in mind that we are not to
think of the sensuous individual as totally prior in time to the social
consciousness, and as a pre-existing matter, upon which such an effect
is to be thought of as super-induced. That would be precisely the fallacy
with which Rousseau struggles so hard, and the escape from which we
are attempting to illustrate; none the worse, perhaps, if our own lan-
guage betrays how very difficult it is to throw it off altogether. We really
know the sensuous individual as such, the will in its impure and
uncriticised form, only in our experience, constant as that is, of failure,
error, and forgetfulness, in adhering to the rational life, which, on the
whole, is inherent in the very nature of our rational being, and which we
only desert in the same way and to the same extent as we make mistakes
in intellectual matters. We go wrong by narrowness and confusion, by
erroneous abstractions out of the whole, in a way only possible for a
social and intellectual being, and not prior to our entire social and intel-
lectual character.
Understanding then that we are dealing with narrowness and confu-
sion and their opposites within a social intelligence already existing and
predominant on the whole, we may note the sort of relation in which the
more adequate will is analogous to the more adequate piece of knowl-
edge.
Take, as we said above, the actual casual will of any individual at
any given moment, especially if it is of a nature which, within the con-
text of civilised life, we commonly pronounce to be wrong. Let it be, for
example, an impulse of sensual passion. It is a commonplace that in
such impulses the self can find no abiding satisfaction. They pass and
leave him empty. They bring with them no opening out of fresh possi-
bilities, no greater stability to the mind. Yet they have their meaning,
and belong to human nature. They imply a need for union, and an at-
traction outside the immediate self. If we compare them with the objects
and affections of a happy and devoted family, we see the difference
between a less adequate and a more adequate will. The impulse, in pass-
ing into family affection, has become both less and more. It is both
disciplined and expanded. The object presented to the will is transformed
in character. Lawlessness is excluded; but, in place of a passing plea-
sure, a whole world of affections and interests, extending beyond the102/Bernard Bosanquet
individual life, is offered as a purpose and a stimulus to the self. In
short—for it is idle to expatiate upon what everybody recognises at
once—you can make a life out of the one, and you cannot out of the
other. In the family at its best the will has an object which is real and
stable, and which corresponds to a great part of its own possibilities and
capacities. In willing this object, it is, relatively speaking, willing itself.
We might compare in the same way the mere will to earn our daily
bread, with the horizon of a great intellectual profession; or the routine
of an industry or profession vacantly and formally pursued with the
very same routine conscientiously followed in a spirit of enlightenment.
In every case we are led up to the contrast of the actual indolent or
selfish will, and the will, in as far as it comes to be what its nature
implies, namely, that which we have spoken of as the real or rational
will, embodied in objects which have power to make a life worth living
for the self that wills them.
Now, our nature as rational beings implies the imperative claim
upon us of a will which is thus real or rational. Recognised or
unrecognised, it is rooted in our own wills, as the claim to be true is
rooted in our assertions. Any system of institutions which represents to
us, on the whole, the conditions essential to affirming such a will, in
objects of action such as to constitute a tolerably complete life, has an
imperative claim upon our loyalty and obedience as the embodiment of
our liberty. The only question that can arise is whether the system is that
which it pretends to be. But even if rebellion is a duty, it can only be so
because the imperative obligation, as we recognise it, is irreconcilable
with the particular system which claims our obedience in its name. The
imperative claim of the will that wills itself is our own inmost nature,
and we cannot throw it off. This is the ultimate root of political obliga-
tion.
5. It is such a “real” or rational will that thinkers after Rousseau
have identified with the State. In this theory they are following the prin-
ciples of Plato and Aristotle, no less than the indications which Rousseau
furnished by his theory of the general will in connection with the work
of the legislator. The State, when thus regarded, is to the general life of
the individual much as we saw the family to be with regard to certain of
his impulses. The idea is that in it, or by its help, we find at once disci-
pline and expansion, the transfiguration of partial impulses, and some-
thing to do and to care for, such as the nature of a human self demands.
If, that is to say, you start with a human being as he is in fact, and try toThe Philosophical Theory of the State/103
devise what will furnish him with an outlet and a stable purpose capable
of doing justice to his capacities—a satisfying object of life—you will
be driven on by the necessity of the facts at least as far as the State, and
perhaps further. Two points may be insisted on to make this conception
less paradoxical to the English mind.
(a) The State, as thus conceived, is not merely the political fabric.
The term State accents indeed the political aspect of the whole, and is
opposed to the notion of an anarchical society. But it includes the entire
hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to
the trade, and from the trade to the Church and the University. It in-
cludes all of them, not as the mere collection of the growths of the coun-
try, but as the structure which gives life and meaning to the political
whole, while receiving from it mutual adjustment, and therefore expan-
sion and a more liberal air. The State, it might be said, is thus conceived
as the operative criticism of all institutions—the modification and ad-
justment by which they are capable of playing a rational part in the
object of human will. And criticism, in this sense, is the life of institu-
tions. As exclusive objects, they are a prey to stagnation and disease —
think of the temper which lives solely for the family or solely for the
Church; it is only as taken up into the movement and circulation of the
State that they are living spiritual beings. It follows that the State, in
this sense, is, above all things, not a number of persons, but a working
conception of life. It is, as Plato has taught us, the conception by the
guidance of which every living member of the commonwealth is enabled
to perform his function. If we ask whether this means that a complete
conception of the aims and possibilities of the common life exists even
in the minds of statesmen, not to speak of ordinary citizens, the question
answers itself in the negative. And yet the State can only live and work
in as far as such a conception, in however fragmentary, one-sided shapes,
pervades the general mind. It is not there mostly in reflective shape; and
in so far as it is in reflective shape it is according to ultimate standards
contradictory and incomplete. But everyone who has a fair judgment of
what his own place demands from him, has, at his own angle, so to
speak, a working insight into the end of the State; and, of course, prac-
tical contradictions would be fewer if such conceptions were completer
and more covered by each other. But a complete reflective conception of
the end of the State, comprehensive and free from contradiction, would
mean a complete idea of the realisation of all human capacity, without
waste or failure. Such a conception is impossible owing to the gradual104/Bernard Bosanquet
character of the process by which the end of life, the nature of the good,
is determined for man. The Real Will, as represented by the State, is
only a partial embodiment of it.
(b) The State, as the operative criticism of all institutions, is neces-
sarily force; and in the last resort, it is the only recognised and justified
force. It seems important to observe that force is inherent in the State,
and no true ideal points in the direction of destroying it. For the force of
the State proceeds essentially from its character of being our own mind
extended, so to speak, beyond our immediate consciousness. Not only is
the conduct of life as a whole beyond the powers of the average indi-
vidual at his average level, but it is beyond the powers of all the average
individuals in a society taken together at their average level. We make a
great mistake in thinking of the force exercised by the State as limited to
the restraint of disorderly persons by the police and the punishment of
intentional lawbreakers. The State is the fly-wheel of our life. Its system
is constantly reminding us of duties, from sanitation to the incidents of
trusteeship, which we have not the least desire to neglect, but which we
are either too ignorant or too indolent to carry out apart from instruction
and authoritative suggestion. We profit at every turn by institutions,
rules, traditions, researches, made by minds at their best, which, through
State action, are now in a form to operate as extensions of our own
minds. It is not merely the contrast between the limited activity of one
individual and the greater achievement of millions put together. It is the
contrast between individuals working in the order and armed with the
laws, customs, writings, and institutions devised by ages, and the same
individuals considered as their daily average selves, with a varying but
always limited range of immediate consciousness. For at any given
moment, no judge knows all the law; no author knows all his own books,
not to mention those of others; no official of an institution has the whole
logic and meaning of the institution before his mind. All individuals are
continually reinforced and carried on, beyond their average immediate
consciousness, by the knowledge, resources, and energy which surround
them in the social order, with its inheritance, of which the order itself is
the greatest part. And the return of this greater self, forming a system
adjusted to unity, upon their isolated minds,, as an expansion and stimu-
lus to them, necessarily takes the shape of force, in as far as their minds
are inert. And this must always be the case, not merely so long as wills
are straightforwardly rebellious against the common good, but so long
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on its own initiative and out of its own resources, with all possible con-
junctions in which necessary conditions of the common good are to be
maintained. In other words, there must be inertia to overcome, as long
as the limitations of our animal nature159 exist at all. The State is, as
Plato told us, the individual mind writ large, or, as we have said, our
mind reinforced by capacities which are of its own nature, but which
supplement its defects. And this being so, the less complete must clearly
submit to find itself in the more complete, and be carried along with it so
far as the latter is able to advance. It is very important to note, however,
that our mind at its best is very different from our mind at its average;
and it has understood and approved, when at its best, a great deal which
in its average moments comes upon it as force or custom from the out-
side. Thus, there is no abrupt division between our conscious mind and
the social system of suggestion, custom, and force, which supports and
extends and amends it. The two are related much as the focus of con-
sciousness is related to the sub-conscious and automatic habits by which
daily life is rendered possible. It is no more conceivable that social life
should go on without force and authoritative custom, because the end of
social life is reflected in the varying intelligence of individuals, than that
individual life should go on without sub-consciousness and automa-
tism, because it is ultimately relative to the ends which appear as ideas
in the shifting focus of the mind. The inherent limitations of State action
will be dealt with in a later chapter. We have thus far been attempting to
make clear what is meant by the identification of the State with the Real
Will of the Individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational
being; in which identification we find the only true account of political
obligation.
Chapter VII.
Psychological Illustration of the Idea of a Real or
General Will.
1. The object of the present chapter is to assist the reader in bringing
together the conception of the State or the Community on the one hand,
and that of an actual personal will, existing in an individual mind, on the
other. We have seen that Self-Government can only be explained if the
centre of gravity of the self is thrown outside what we are continually
tempted to reckon as our individuality, and if we recognise as our real
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but slightly represented in our explicit consciousness, at its ordinary
level. We have seen that all sound theory and all good practice are founded
on the insight or on the faith160 that the common self or moral person of
society is more real than the apparent individual; and we have followed
Rousseau’s clue in criticising as defective and contradictory the actual
will of given persons, and in looking for its interpretation and comple-
tion in law and institutions as the embodiment of the social spirit.
But Society and the State present themselves at first sight as indefi-
nite multitudes of persons. Institutions are many-sided facts; and an
unreflective citizen could hardly say of what he takes them to be com-
posed. And though law and custom approach more nearly to what we
commonly understand by a “will,” yet they again are apt to be regarded
as a sort of dead external weight with which the living volition of the
ordinary man has little or nothing to do.
Our purpose, therefore, is to explain what is meant by saying that
“a will” can be embodied in the State, in society, in law and institutions;
and how it is possible for the individual, as we know him, to be in an
identity with this will, such as continually to vary, but never wholly to
disappear. How can a man’s real self lie in a great degree outside his
normal self, and be something which he only now and then gets hold of
distinctly, and never completely?
2. We will begin (1) by pointing out the analogy between the groups
or systems of which our intelligence is composed, and the groups or
systems which make up the fabric of society, and we will then go on (2)
to exhibit them as up to a certain point aspects of the same fact.
(1) We may note two degrees of connection between the members of
a whole, which we may call “Association” and “Organisation.”
(i.) When two individuals are so connected that where you find the
one you expect to find the other, they may be called associates. And any
kind of habitual grouping, from a gang of thieves to a scientific or phil-
anthropic institution, may be called an Association. Owing probably to
the verbal force which it borrows from the verb “to associate,” the term
“association” implies the intentional coming together of units which have
been separate, and which may become separate again. The word “Soci-
ety,” on the other hand, has not this verbal force, and although an “asso-
ciation” may call itself “a society,” yet “Society” as such is not spoken
of as an “Association.” When we speak of “Society” we do not emphasise
the aspect of being put together out of elements which exist apart, and
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at any rate, we do not normally think of as purposely put together and
liable to be dissolved again. When the State is treated as an Association,
a definite theory of its nature is implied, such as is involved in Herbert
Spencer’s comparison between it and a joint stock company.
Now this same term “Association” is the most familiar expression
for a connection between elements of mind, analogous to that between
persons who are called associates. If two elements of mind are so con-
nected that, where we find the one we expect to find the other, they are
said to be “associated.” If the engine’s whistle makes me think the train
is going to start, then it would be said that the idea “train starting” is
associated in my mind with the idea “engine whistling.” They have be-
fore entered into the same mental group or whole, and so, where we find
the one, we expect to find the other, just as, where my friend X is, his
comrade Y is probably not far off.
We may here note the analogy between these two modes of associa-
tion—that of persons and that of mental elements. In both cases, ac-
cording to the plain man’s view of the matter, we are dealing with wholly
casual conjunctions of units naturally independent. The associates in
either case need no better reason for now being together than that they
had been together before. Their connection expresses nothing intimate
or essential in their natures, and, if they fall apart again, they will not be
seriously affected by the separation.
Now, of course, this idea of mere conjunction is not strictly true
even of the connections between the most casual associates. Every asso-
ciation, whether of comrades or of ideas, is a connection between quali-
ties, and therefore a general connection between the natures of the re-
lated terms. People are not really companions for no reason at all; and
ideas are not really units or atoms which stick together by mere juxtapo-
sition, so that when one is pulled up out of the Hades of oblivion it drags
the other with it. Both the association of companions and the associa-
tion of ideas are tendencies in which some general connection of quali-
ties is at work, and expresses itself through the detail of the actual sur-
roundings, so far as an opening is left to it. When the association is
made explicit by both members being present together, there is an outlet
or utterance of the nature of the associates which there is not when they
are separated.
But though all this is true, and can be detected in cases of associa-
tion by careful analysis, it is, relatively speaking, the fact that common-
place association depends upon qualities which are so superficial that108/Bernard Bosanquet
they may set up a tendency to connection between any units which are
members of the same world. And, therefore, as compared with any more
thorough-going kind of connection, such association may be set down
as casual, and as determined by the mere chance of juxtaposition.
(ii.) Let us compare the kind of connection just described as asso-
ciation with that which we have agreed to call organisation.
Associates,161 we saw, were together, as might roughly be said, sim-
ply because they found themselves together. That is to say, they were,
after their association, what they were before it, and would not be seri-
ously affected if they were to be separated. Connections of this kind are
essentially between unit and unit. They fall short of the nature of a plan
which determines a great range of elements, variously but with refer-
ence to an identical operation.
Beginning, as before, with the connection between persons, we may
illustrate the difference by the comparison between a crowd and an army.
The mind of a crowd has indeed been taken as the type of a true social
mind. But it is really something quite different. It is merely the superfi-
cial connection between unit and unit on an extended and intensified
scale. As unit joins unit in the street, each determines his immediate
neighbours, and is determined by them through the contagion of excite-
ment, and with reference to the most passing ideas and emotions. What
acts upon them in common is necessarily what there is in common be-
tween persons meeting, as it were, for no reason and not knowing what
they share beyond what they immediately see and feel. The crowd may
indeed “act as one man”; but if it does so, its level of intelligence and
responsibility will, as a rule, be extraordinarily low. It has nothing in
common beyond what unit can infect unit with in a moment. Concerted
action, much more reasoning and criticism, are out of the question. The
doing or thinking of by each unit with reference to a single end is impos-
sible. The crowd moves as a mere mass, because its parts are connected
merely as unit with unit. Any form of connection which could effect an
organisation in the whole would make a demand on the nature of every
unit, which, where their conjunction is merely casual, could not possi-
bly be met.
An army,162 no less than a crowd, consists of a multitude of men,
who are associated, unit to unit. Influences must pass and repass be-
tween every one of the men and those men with whom he is standing in
the ranks, or with whom he passes his leisure time. We may note, by the
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than those which pass between members of a crowd, and that they must
necessarily be modified by that other connection of which we are about
to speak. For the links of “association” between man and man are not
the determining force in the operations of the army as such. The army is
a machine, or an organisation, which is bound together by operative
ideas embodied on the one hand in the officers, and on the other hand in
the habit of obedience and the trained capacity which make every unit
willing and able to be determined not by the impulse of his neighbours,
but by the orders of his officers. What the army does is determined by
the general’s plan, and not by influences communicating themselves from
man to man, as in a crowd. In other words, every unit moves with refer-
ence to the movements of a great whole, with most parts of which he is
not in direct touch at all. He is not determined by simple reference to the
movements of his immediate neighbours. The army, that is, is a system
or organised group, the nature of which, or the predominant idea em-
bodied in its structure, determines the movements and relations of its
parts or members. The difference of the two modes of determination is
plainly visible on a review day, if we first watch the compact regiments
marching off the ground, and then the crowd streaming away irregu-
larly in search of rest or refreshment. By organisation then, as opposed
to association, we mean determination of particulars by the scheme or
general nature of a systematic group to which they belong, as opposed
to their determination by immediate links uniting them with what, rela-
tively speaking, are other particulars in casual juxtaposition with them.163
In the working and composition of mind the same difference is ob-
servable between association and organisation. Mere association means
that any perception or idea may suggest absolutely any mental element
whatever with which it has developed a connection by entering into the
same mental whole. A study of the purely associative mind is sometimes
said to be found in the character of Miss Bates in “Emma.” Perhaps, as
really uncontrolled association can hardly be found in a sane intellect,
we may say that the character in question is something more subtle and
more true to nature; and that is, a study of the tendency to pure associa-
tion continually breaking out, and as continually repressed, or “herded
back” to the main subject, to use the expression which Walter Scott
applies to the way in which just such an associative talker164 is brought
back to his point by his hearer.
In mind, as in the external world, the higher stage of association is
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scheme165 as opposed to influence by juxtaposition of units. The zigzag
course of thought which is represented in such a character as Miss Bates
is due to the absence of control by any general scheme. Every idea—
every significant word—has practically innumerable connections in the
mind. If the course of thought has no general direction impressed upon
it, no selective control operative within it, it may change its line alto-
gether at every principal word.166 The possibilities of the ideas at our
command make them like a complex of railways, wholly consisting of
turn-tables, so that, on any one of these component parts, the train may
swing round and go off in a wholly new direction. This is notably illus-
trated by the sense of context in interpretation. For anyone who has no
such sense, possible errors are endless, beyond the hope of correction.
The opposite of such a zigzag course is a train of thought such as an
argument. In a train of thought, one general idea prescribes the direc-
tion, or forms the “subject,” or limits what has been called the universe
of discourse. Attention is wholly guided by the general idea, and refuses
to be distracted by any interest or suggestion which does not bear upon
it. Let the general idea be, for example, the relation of wealth to the best
life. Experience shows that it is most difficult to resist the varied inter-
ests and distractions which present themselves in the attempt to keep
this relation in view. Easy and attractive modes of acquisition, easy and
attractive modes of expenditure, force themselves upon the mind as iso-
lated suggestions, and divert it from the question: “Shall I, or will any
one else, be the better for it, as I understand ‘better’?” The effort of
control, needed to keep in view the general nature of our conception of
what is best in life, and to attend to suggestions which offer themselves
as to acquisition and expenditure, only in so far as they seem likely to
promote that conception, means the predominance of a scheme or gen-
eral idea through all the varied circumstances of economicpossibility. It
makes no difference whether we are speaking of reasoning or of prac-
tice. The nature of the control which insists on relevancy, and of the
intellectual system in which it exhibits itself, is the same in both cases.
Every mind, in fact, is more or less organised under the control of domi-
nant ideas, which belong to its habitual preoccupations and determine
the constant bias of its thoughts. There is a well-known story how a
traveller in a railway carriage undertook to detect the vocation of each
of his fellow travellers from their respective answers to a single ques-
tion. The question was: “What is that which destroys what it has itself
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answer, “vital force,” a soldier replied “war,” a scholar “Kronos,” a
journalist “revolution,” and a farmer “a boar.”167 Each answer was deter-
mined by the dominant bias or idea which selected out of the possible
answers to the riddle that which would harmonise with the general men-
tal system under its control. Selection, it must be remembered, is at the
same time creation. In every situation, theoretical or practical, the sur-
roundings as a whole are new, and the rule or scheme has to assert itself
in conditions which are not precisely repeated from any former case. In
so asserting itself it does not simply reproduce something old, any more
than a batsman recalls a former movement when he plays a ball, but it
produces that thought or deed which expresses its nature with reference
to the new surroundings in which it has to act.168 For it is a universal
tendency, a scheme partly defined, and in process of further defining
itself by moulding the material presented to it.
There is one more essential point. A mind has its dominant nature,
but is no single system equally organised throughout. It is rather a con-
struction of such systems, which may be in all degrees of alliance, indif-
ference, and opposition to one another. Each of such systems, or groups
of ideas and experiences, has its own dominant scheme, and its own
tendency in controlling thought or action. And, as a general rule, in
proportion as one system is active, all the others are quiescent ; in pro-
portion as we are intent or engaged upon one train of thought or one
pursuit, we are not alive to suggestions belonging to any other. Every
system, or group of this kind, is called in psychology an “Appercipient
mass,” because it is a set of ideas, bound together by a common rule or
scheme, which dictates the point of view from which perception will
take place, so far as the system in question is active. And without some
“apperception,” some point of view in the mind which enables the new-
comer to be classed, there cannot be perception at all. The eye only sees
what it brings with it the power of seeing. Hence some of the most
striking instances of apperception are drawn from elementary cases in
which a really remote system is active in default of a better, just because
the action of some system is necessary and the nearest responds. A child
calls an orange “a ball”; a Polynesian calls a horse “a pig.” These are
the nearest “heads” or rules of apperception under which the new per-
ception can be brought. Every scientific idea we apply, every set of
relations in which we stand, and every pursuit with which the mind is
familiar, is a case of such an appercipient mass, or rule or scheme of
attention. And we know by common experience how entirely quiescent112/Bernard Bosanquet
is one such factor of the mind while we are absorbed in the activity of
another; how utterly, for example, we disregard the botanical character
of wild flowers when we are  clearing them out of the garden as weeds,
and how wholly we neglect the question whether they are “flowers” or
“weeds” when we are occupied in studying their botanical character.
And in the action of every appercipient mass, in as far as it determines
thoughtby the general nature of a systematic whole, rather than through
the isolated attraction exercised by unit upon unit, we have an example
of organisation as opposed to association; or, if we like, of systematic
connection or association between whole and part, as opposed to the
same principle operating casually and superficially between unit and
unit.
The scheme or systematic connection, it must be added, may work
unconsciously. Not all ideas which control our thought and action are
explicit ideas in abstract form; and perhaps the general nature and lim-
its of a man’s mind are something of which he can never be reflectively
conscious, though he is aware of what he takes to be his leading ideas. It
is well known that principles which are not presented to reflection may
be intellectually operative, and embodied in a train of results. Thus our
appercipient masses may have very different degrees of explicit system.
But their action is always systematic—the nature of the whole modify-
ing what it comes in contact with, and being modified by it.
With this conception of psychical systems before us, let us cast one
more glance at the organisation of society and the State. We refused to
take a crowd as a true type of society, and we looked to the example of
an army for the leading features of organisation as opposed to casual
“association.” The characteristic of an army on which we insisted was
the determination of every unit in it, not by the movements and impulses
of his immediate neighbours, but by the scheme or idea of the whole.
Now, on looking closer, we see that society as such is a vast tissue of
systems of this type, each of them a relatively, though not absolutely,
closed and self-complete organisation. There are wheels within wheels,
systems within systems, groups within groups. But, speaking generally,
the business and pleasure of society is carried on by persons arranged in
groups, which exhibit the characteristic of organisation that the capac-
ity of every person is determined by the general nature and principle of
the group considered as a whole, and not by his relations to the units
who happen to be next him. Such groups, for example, are the trades
and professions. Their structure may be very different. In some the work-The Philosophical Theory of the State/113
shop is again a subordinate selforganised group. In others the profes-
sional man works alone, and to all appearances goes his own way. It is
common to all of them, however, that they form groupings of members,
within each of which groupings all members are determined in a certain
way by the common nature of the group. Within his trade or profession,
a man acts, as it is said, in a definite “capacity.” He regards himself and
is regarded from a definite point of view, and all other points of view
tend to be neglected while and in so far as he is acting in the capacity
corresponding to his membership of a certain group.169
Prima facie, there may be, as with systems which compose the mind,
all degrees of alliance, indifference, or opposition between these group-
ings of persons; and the same person, belonging to many different groups,
may find his diverse “capacities” apparently at variance with one an-
other. A conscientious Trade Unionist may find his capacity as a mem-
ber of the Union, interpreted as binding him to do his utmost for the
amelioration of working class conditions in general, apparently at vari-
ance with his capacity as the head of a family bound to provide immedi-
ately for those whom he has brought into the world. Or a judge or mag-
istrate, obliged to enforce what he conceives to be a bad law, may find
his official capacity apparently at variance with his duty as a conscien-
tious citizen. It is plain that unless, on the whole, a working harmony
were maintained between the different groups which form society, life
could not go on. And it is for this reason that the State, as the widest
grouping whose members are effectively united by a common experi-
ence, is necessarily the one community which has absolute power to
ensure, by force, if need be, at least sufficient adjustment of the claims
of all other groupings to make life possible. Assuming, indeed, that all
the groupings are organs of a single pervading life, we find it incredible
that there should ultimately be irreconcilable opposition between them.
That they should contradict one another is not more nor less possible
than that human nature should be at variance with itself.
Thus, we have seen that the mind, and society or the State, are
identical in the characteristic of being organisations, each composed of
a system of organisations, every superior and subordinate grouping hav-
ing its own nature and principle which determines its members as such,
and every one, consequently, tending to impose upon its members a
peculiar capacity or point of view, which, in so far as a given system is
active, tends to put all other systems out of sight. The connection be-
tween these systems is of very different kinds, and very unequal in de-114/Bernard Bosanquet
gree; but in as far as the mind and the community are actual working
wholes, it is to be presumed that in each there is an ultimate or pervad-
ing adjustment which hinders contradiction from proceeding to destruc-
tive extremes. And neither the mind nor the community, as working
organisations, can be accounted for on the principle of mere associa-
tion.
(2) After pointing out the analogy between the organised structure
of minds and the organised structure of society, we now go on to show
that minds and society are really the same fabric regarded from different
points of view. The explanation may be divided into three parts.
(i.) Every social group is the external aspect of a set of correspond-
ing mental systems in individual minds.
(ii.) Every individual mind is a system of such systems correspond-
ing to the totality of social groups as seen from a particular position.
(iii.) The social whole, though implied in every mind, only has real-
ity in the totality of minds in a given community considered as an iden-
tical working system.
(i.) Society and the State and every institution present themselves to
us at first sight as a number of persons, together, perhaps, with certain
buildings and other external apparatus, and certain kinds of work car-
ried on and tangible results produced —so many children “educated,”
so many workmen “employed,” so many ships built or fields tilled.
But if we could bring before ourselves the complete reality of any
social group or institution, we should find ourselves considering a very
different order of facts. Let us think for a moment of a rate-supported
elementary school. We imagine it as a heap of buildings and a mass of
children with a percentage of teachers scattered among them. But in
what does its actual working really consist, and on what does it depend?
The actual reality of the school lies in the fact that certain living
minds are connected in a certain way. Teachers, pupils, managers, par-
ents, and the public must all of them have certain operative ideas, and
must be guided according to these ideas in certain portions of their lives,
if the school is to be a school. Now, the being guided by certain opera-
tive ideas is, in other words, the activity of certain appercipient masses
dictating a certain point of view, in so far as those particular masses are
awake. And it must be noted that the connection or identity in which the
school exists presupposes a different activity, that is, a different
appercipient system, in every mind, and more especially in every class
of mind concerned. It is the same as in our old example of the screw andThe Philosophical Theory of the State/115
the nut. No school could be made of teachers alone or of pupils alone;
nor, again, could a school be made with teachers who were all the same,
or with pupils who were all the same.
So, if we could visualise the reality of the school—the institution—
what we should see would be an identical connection running through a
number of minds, various and variously conditioned. But within each
mind the connection would take a particular shape, such as to play into
the connections with all other minds, as a cogwheel plays into the other
cogwheels of a machine. The pupil must be prepared to learn in his
particular way and the teacher to teach in his particular way. The par-
ents and the public also have their own relations to the work of teaching,
and whether for good or for evil they take up some attitude to it, and
their attitude modifies it. Thus the connection, as it is within any one
mind, is useless and meaningless if you take it wholly apart from what
corresponds to it in the others. It is like a wheel without an axle or a
pump handle without a pump. And it is because of this nature of the
elements which make up the institution that it is possible for the institu-
tion itself to be an identity, or connection, or meeting point, by which
many minds are bound together in a single system.
It may seem as if this way of analysing an institution was reducing
a solid fact into mere thoughts. But it is not really so. Taking the ideas
of all concerned as they really are, we have the facts in space and time—
buildings, appliances, hours of work and attendance, and so on—in-
cluded in them. It is impossible to state the idea fully and correctly
without including the environment on which it rests, and the activities in
which it is realised. We are not to omit the facts in space and time from
what we mean by an institution; the only thing is that we have not known
them as they really are till we have known them as bound into unity by
the mental systems of which they are the context or the expression. The
child and the teacher alike must think of their work with reference to
particular times and places, or they would not do it at those times and
places; and it is only in actually doing it at those times and places that
the idea, or point of view, which stands for the school in each of their
minds, is able to assert itself without frustration.
Thus we may fairly say that every social group, or institution, is the
aspect in space and time of a set of corresponding mental systems in
individual minds. We may draw corollaries from this conception, both
as to the nature of the individual will, or active mind, and as to the
nature of the social and political whole.116/Bernard Bosanquet
(ii.) Every individual mind, in so far as it thinks and acts in definite
schemes or contexts, is a structure of appercipient systems or organised
dispositions. Now, we do not suggest at present that all appercipient
systems can be represented as social groups, though there are few, if
any, such systems which do not involve some relations with persons
connected in time and space. But it is clear, from the explanations of the
last section, that every social group or institution involves a system of
appercipient systems, by which the minds that take part in it are kept in
correspondence. Every individual mind, then, so far as it takes part in
social groupings or institutions, is a structure of appercipient systems,
answering, each to each, to the different capacities in which it enters
into each grouping respectively. We have already remarked on the way
in which the distinction between different “capacities” answers to the
psychological tendency for the activity of one appercipient system to
obstruct the activity of all others. It is hardly necessary to point out that,
partly for this reason, though the mind must be an actual structure of
systems, it is very far from being a rational system of systems. The fact
that, when one system is active, all others, as a rule, are inert, conceals
the contradictions which underlie the entire fabric, and protects them
from criticism and correction.
But though the mind is thus implicitly selfcontradictory in various
degrees, this does not alter the fact that its general nature is to be a unity
of organised ideas answering to the actual set of parts which the indi-
vidual plays in the world of space and time. Thus each individual mind,
if we consider it as a whole, is an expression or reflection of society as
a whole from a point of view which is distinctive and unique. Every
social factor or relation, to which it in any way corresponds, or in which
it in any way plays its part, is represented in some feature of its apper
cipient organism. And probably, just as, in any man’s idea of London,
there is hardly any factor of London life which does not at least colour
the background, so, in every individual impression of the social whole,
there is no social feature that does not, in one way or another, contribute
to the total effect. In the dispositions of every mind the entire social
structure is reflected in a unique form, and it is on this reflection in
every mind, and on the uniqueness of the form in which it is reflected,
that the working of the social whole, by means of differences which play
into one another, depends. If, so to speak, we lay a mind on the dissect-
ing table, we find it to consist for the most part of a fabric of organised
dispositions, each disposition corresponding to a unique point of viewThe Philosophical Theory of the State/117
or special angle170 from which it plays a part in some human function.
About the precise relation of a human function to the fact that, as a rule,
it connects together a plurality of human beings, we shall have more to
say in the following chapter. It is enough for the present that whatever
does connect a plurality of human beings depends on the operation of
appercipient systems in their minds, and therefore every individual mind
is, as Plato has told us, so far as it goes, for good or evil, the true
effective reality of the social whole. And it is easy to see when we con-
sider the working of organised apperception, how it is possible actually
to will more or less of our own volitional system. There is first the
contrast between appercipient systems which are at any time active and
those which are not active, and then there is the contrast between our
actual volitional nature at its actual fullest, and the demands implied by
the nature of the whole, from which it is inseparable. These demands
are always appearing more or less in every act of willing our own will.
(iii.) The social whole, regarded from a corresponding point of view,
would be a whole consisting of psychical dispositions and their activi-
ties, answering to one another in determinate ways. It would therefore
be of the nature of a continuous or self-identical being, pervading a
system of differences and realised only in them. It differs from a ma-
chine, or from what is called an “organism pure and simple, by the
presence of the whole in every part, not merely for the inference of the
observer, but, in some degree, for the part itself, through the action of
consciousness. But it would be a mistake, we should observe at this
point, to identify the presence of the whole for the part by means of
consciousness, with the consciousness of the part that the whole is present
to it. The latter is a speculative idea, the former is a fact which embodies
this idea for the observing theorist, but not necessarily or usually for the
working consciousness itself. In the shape of our minds and their adjust-
ment to our work, of which we are unconscious, there is an irreducible
analogy between human society and the lower organisms. The conscious-
ness which guides our lives is a consciousness of something, but not as
a rule a consciousness of the place of that something in the whole of life.
We live in our objects, but we do not know how or how far our objects
identify us with the whole to which we ultimately belong.
It is plain that the social whole can, in practice, only be complete in
a plurality of individuals. We know that in the development of human
nature, which we take as the ultimate standard of life, no one individual
can cover the whole ground. As in the natural world in space and time,118/Bernard Bosanquet
so, in the world of human beings which on one side belongs to it, differ-
entiation implies dispersion into a plurality of centres. The same man,
according to what seems to be the limit of physical and psychical possi-
bility, could not be both Plato and Aristotle, nor both Greek and Jew,
not even both Spartan and Athenian, not to say both man and woman.
We are on less secure ground when we say that he could not, effectively
and as a rule, be both statesman and shoemaker, or soldier and clergy-
man. It is plain that in some cases capacities may be united which in
other cases are found apart. The same man may be a good architect and
a good workman, or again, the architect and the workman may be dif-
ferent persons, though suited to work together. We may reply, of course,
that whatever abilities lie within one personality, effective work demands
the division of labour. This is true, but is obviously a matter of degree.
The man who does only one thing does not always do it best, and it is
not easy to say what “one thing” means.
The point of these suggestions is to make it clear that, while plural-
ity of human beings is necessary to enable society to cover the ground,
as it were, which human nature is capable of covering, yet actual indi-
viduals are not ultimate or equal embodiments of the true particulars of
the social universal. We thus see once more that the given individual is
only in making, and that his reality may lie largely outside him. His will
is not a whole, but implies and rests upon a whole, which is therefore the
true nature of his will. We also gain some light on the unity of the social
mind. For it seems plain that one actual human being may cover the
ground, which, in other instances, it takes many men to occupy. And in
some such examples—not, or not obviously, in those where a high in-
tensity of genius is the essential quality— there seems little reason to
distinguish the correlation of dispositions within the one person from
the correlation of the same dispositions if dispersed among different
persons. If I am my own gardener, or my own critic, or my own doctor,
does the relation of the answering dispositions within my being differ
absolutely and altogether from what takes place when gardener and
master, critic and author, patient and doctor, are different persons? My
instructions to my gardener are conveyed in language, it will be said,
while I know my own wishes directly. And this is not the place to press
the problem home either psychologically or metaphysically. But, just to
induce reflection, it may be asked whether my instructions to myself are
not as a rule conveyed and remembered in language. If we consider my
unity with myself at different times as the limiting case, we shall find itThe Philosophical Theory of the State/119
very hard to establish a difference of principle between the unity of what
we call one mind and that of all the “minds” which enter into a single
social experience.
In any case, we have said enough to suggest that Society prima
facie exists in the correlated dispositions by which a plurality of indi-
vidual minds meets the need for covering the ground open to human
nature, by division of labour in the fullest sense. But we have further
pointed out that the true particularisation of the human universal does
not necessarily coincide with the distinction between different persons,
and that the correlation of differences and the identity which they con-
stitute remain much the same whether they chance to fall within a single
human being, or to be dispersed over several. The stress seems, there-
fore, to lie on the attainment of the true particularisation which does
justice to the maximum of human capacity, rather than on the mere
relations which arise between the members of a de facto plurality. Not
that the presence of human nature in any individual does not constitute
a claim that it shall be perfected in him, but that its perfecting must be
judged by a criticism addressed to determining real capacities, and not
by the accidental standard of a given plurality. We shall pursue these
ideas further in the following chapter.
Chapter VIII.
Nature of the End of the State and Consequent
Limit of State Action.
1. According to the course of thought which we have been pursuing, the
distinction between the individual on the one hand, and the social or
political whole on the other, is not relevant to the question where the
“end” of man in Society is to be sought. For the conceptions of Society
and the Individual are correlative conceptions through and through; at
whatever level, therefore, we take the one, we are bound to construe the
other as at the same level; so that, to distinguish the one element from
the other as superior from inferior, or as means from end, becomes a
contradiction in terms. If we begin by drawing boundaries round the
individual, the boundaries which we draw reproduce themselves in soci-
ety conceived as a total of such individuals, and the question of means
and end, as we saw in Bentham’s case, takes the form whether “each” is
the means to the welfare of “all,” or “all” to the welfare of “each”; the
distinction thus becoming purely verbal. While, if we set no limit to120/Bernard Bosanquet
individuality, accepting it as an end which may involve any degree of
self-completeness and therefore of comprehensiveness, we find it to be
actually one with, to consist in, a realisation of the stuff and content of
which social unity is made. Such apparent exceptions as art or religion,
which may be taken to be independent of the social medium, are really,
as we shall see, its quintessence,171 though at a stage where plurality of
persons becomes unimportant. They are therefore not truly to be con-
sidered as ends pertaining to the individual, in any sense in which the
individual is held to have an essence separable from that of society. This
antithesis is really, however, absurd. There are not two opposable sets
of contents concerned in the matter at all; but a single web of content
which in its totality is society and in its differentiations the individuals.
To make the totality the means to the differentiations or vice versa is
like making a drama the means to the characters, or the characters to the
drama. But the poet or the religious genius may be like a character that
concentrates in itself the significance of the entire drama, and so in some
degree transcends the dramatic form. Only, this is done by including the
essence of the whole plurality, not by being independent of it.172
The only way, then, in which the idea of means and end can be
applied to the social whole and its parts, is to take Society when at its
lower level, being dealt with under the aspect of mere plurality, as a
means to what it is at its higher level, when realised as a communion of
individualities at their best. But from this point of view we get no dis-
tinction of means and end as between Individuals and Society. What we
get is Individuals and Society alike, as understood and partly existing at
one level (that of commonplace Individualism and Collectivism), taken
as a means to both Individuals and Society at a higher level. As we have
seen, the only true explanation of self-government is to throw the reality
of the self outside what passes for its average nature, and in this sense
the average nature may be treated as a means to the truer or fuller self—
as something, that is to say, which is instrumental to the latter, and has
no rights against it.
2. For us, then, the ultimate end of Society and the State as of the
individual is the realisation of the best life. The difficulty of defining the
best life does not trouble us, because we rely throughout on the funda-
mental logic of human nature qua rational. We think ourselves no more
called upon to specify in advance what will be the details of the life
which satisfies an intelligent being as such, than we are called upon to
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isfies an intelligent being as such. Wherever a human being touches
practice, as wherever he touches theory, we find him driven on by his
intolerance of contradictions towards shaping his life as a whole. What
we mean by “good” and “truth” is practical and theoretical experience
in so far as the logic which underlies man’s whole nature permits him to
repose in it. And the best life is the life which has most of this general
character— the character which, so far as realised, satisfies the funda-
mental logic of man’s capacities.
Now, it is plain that this best life can only be realised in conscious-
ness, that being the medium of all satisfaction and the only true type of
a whole in experience. And all consciousness, as experienced by man, is
on one side particular, attached to bodies, and exclusive of
consciousnesses attached to other bodies. In a sense, it is true that no
one consciousness can partake of or actually enter into another. Thus, it
is apt to be held, as we have amply seen, that the essential danger of
State interference lies in the intrusion of something originated by “oth-
ers” upon a distinct particular consciousness, whose distinction and
particularity—its freedom—are thus impaired. It is all-important to our
point of view that this prejudice should be dispelled. Force or automatic
custom or authoritative tradition or “suggestion” are not hostile to one
individuality because they come from “others,” but because their nature
is contradictory to the nature of the highest selfassertion of mind, be-
cause they are, so to speak, in a medium incompatible with its medium.
They are just as hostile to this self-assertion, just as alien, if they ema-
nate, as they constantly do, from conflicting elements in our complex
private experience, as if they come to us, as we say, “from without.”
The question is of their “nature” and tendency, not of their centre of
origin. Individuals are limited and isolated in many ways. But their true
individuality does not lie in their isolation, but in that distinctive act or
service by which they pass into unique contributions to the universal.
True individuality, as we have said, is not in the minimisation which
forbids further subdivision, but in the maximisation which includes the
greatest possible being in an inviolable unity. It is not, therefore, the
intrusion upon isolation, as such, that interferes with individuality; it is
the intrusion, upon a growing unity of consciousness, of a medium hos-
tile to its growth.
But we have seen that force, automatism, and suggestion, are in
some ways necessary to the support and maintenance of the human con-
sciousness, owing to its animal limitations. They are, indeed, as is well122/Bernard Bosanquet
known, the condition of its progress. Therefore, in promoting the best
life, these aids must be employed by society as exercising absolute
power—viz., by the State. And the problem presented by their employ-
ment is not a question of the “interference of the State with the Indi-
vidual “—an antithesis which is meaningless so far as it implies that
society can be interfering with the individual, and not interfering with
itself; but it is a question how far and in what way the use of force and
the like by the State is a hindrance to the end for which the State, the
social power, itself exists. In other words, it is to be ascertained how far
the fullest self-assertion of the social universal in its differences——the
best life—can be promoted or is likely to be endangered by means which
are of a different order, and so in some circumstances opposed to it. The
point is not that I and some thousands more break in by force upon you
in particular and violate your isolation; but that such breaking in by
force, whoever does it and whoever suffers by it, and even if through
passion or obsession you do it to yourself and I to myself, is hostile
prima facie to the living logic of the will, which alone can create a unity
and realise a best. How then, and under what reservations, in the com-
plicated conflict of the fuller and narrower self, can this dangerous drug
of violence be administered, so to speak, as a counter-poison to tenden-
cies which would otherwise give no chance to the logical will? With this
difficulty in our minds, we will endeavour to determine the general prin-
ciple on which force and menace should be used by the State, and a
routine be mechanically maintained by it.
3. We have hitherto spoken of the State and Society as almost con-
vertible terms.173 And in fact it is part of our argument that the influ-
ences of Society differ only in degree from the powers of the State, and
that the explanation of both is ultimately the same. But on the other
hand, it is also part of our argument that the State as such is a necessary
factor in civilised life; and that no true ideal lies in the direction of
minimising its individuality or restricting its absolute power. By the
State, then, we mean Society as a unit, recognised as rightly exercising
control over its members through absolute physical power. The limits of
the unit are, of course, determined by what looks like historical acci-
dent; but there is logic underneath the apparent accident, and the most
tremendous political questions turn upon the delimitation of political
units. A principle, so to speak, of political parsimony—entia non suni
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, “two organisations will not sur-
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political unit. The limits of the common experience necessary for effec-
tive self-government are always operating to control this expansion. We
might therefore suggest, as a principle determining the area of states,
“the widest territorial area compatible with the unity of experience which
is demanded by effective self-government.” But the State de facto (which
is also de jure) is the Society which is recognised as exercising compul-
sory power over its members, and as presenting itself qua a single inde-
pendent corporation among other independent corporations. Without such
power, or where, if anywhere, it does not exist, there can be no ultimate
and effective adjustment of the claims of individuals, and of the various
social groups in which individuals are involved. It is the need for this
ultimate effective adjustment which constitutes the need that every indi-
vidual in civilised life should belong to one state, and to one only. Oth-
erwise conflicting adjustments might be imposed upon him by diverse
authorities having equal power and right to enforce his obedience. That
Society, then, is a State, which is habitually recognised as a unit law-
fully exercising force. We saw that the characteristics of Society pass
gradually into those of the State. It would not be true that Society is a
State only as actually exercising force; but it would perhaps be true to
say that State action as such, though far from being limited to the down-
right exercise of force, yet consists of all that side of social action which
depends on the character of ultimate arbiter and regulator, maintainer of
mechanical routine, and source of authoritative suggestion, a character
which is one with the right to exercise force in the last resort.
The end of the State, then, is the end of Society and of the Indi-
vidual—the best life, as determined by the fundamental logic of the will.
The means at its disposal, qua State, always partake of the nature of
force, though this does not exclude their having other aspects as well.
Taxation may have the most reasonable and even the most popular pur-
pose, yet the generality and justice of its incidence, and the certainty of
its productiveness, can only be secured by compulsion. No State could
undertake its work on the basis of voluntary contributions. A universal
end, we might say, is indeed not a mere general rule; but you cannot
carry out a universal end in a plurality of units—and a set of human
individuals is always in one aspect a plurality of units—without enforc-
ing general rules.
4. Here, then, we have our problem more closely determined than in
the previous chapters. There we saw, in general, that self-government
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do not always “actually” will. And we were led to look for a clue to our
real or implied will in the social spirit as incorporated in laws and insti-
tutions, that is to say in Society as a working whole reflected in the full
system of the consciousnesses which composed it.
We supposed ourselves prepared, then, it would seem, to do and
suffer anything which would promote the best life of the whole—that
maximisation of our being which, from the nature of our real will, we
saw to be imperative upon us—a demand implied in every volition and
from which we could never escape.
But now we are face to face with the question what we are called
upon to do or to suffer, as members of a State, in promotion of the best
life. We have here to renew, from another standpoint, the discussions of
chapter iii. The governing fact of the situation is that the means of ac-
tion at our disposal as members of a State are not, on their distinctive
side, in pari materia with the end. It is true that the State, as an intelli-
gent system, can appeal by reasoning and persuasion to the logical will
as such. It constantly does so in various forms, and a State which did
nothing of the kind either directly or indirectly would not possess the
recognition which is necessary to its very existence. So far its work is in
pari materia with the end, being a direct element in the expansion of
mind and character in their own spiritual medium of thought and will.
But this side of its work is not distinctive of the State, and, therefore, is
not that for which more particularly it exists. Its distinctive attribute is
to be ultimate arbiter and regulator of claims, the guarantor of life as at
least a workable system in the bodily world. It is in its ultimateness de
facto that the differentia lies which separates it from the innumerable
other groupings and associations which go to make up our complex life.
This is shown in the fact that each of us, as we have said, must belong to
a State, and can belong to one only. It is because the authority is ulti-
mate that it must be single. Now, authority which is to be ultimate in a
sphere including the world of bodily action, must be an authority which
can use force. And it is for this reason that, as we said, force is involved
in the distinctive attributes of the State.
But force is not in pari materia with the expansion of mind and
character in their spiritual medium. And, thus, there at once appears an
inadequacy of means to end as between the distinctive modus operandi
of the State and the end in virtue of which it claims to represent the
“real” will.
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State, in its distinctive capacity, can do towards promoting a form of
life which it recognises as desirable? Its direct power is limited to secur-
ing the performance of external actions.174 This does not mean merely
the performance of outward bodily movements, such as might be brought
to pass by actual physical force. It is remarkable that actual physical
force plays a very small part in the work of any decently ordered State.
When we say that the State can do no more than secure the performance
of external actions, we do not exclude from the action the intention to
act in a certain way. Without such an intention there is no action in the
sense of human action at all, but merely a muscular movement. It is
necessary for the State to attach importance to intention, which is in-
volved in the idea of human action, and is the only medium through
which the muscular movements of human beings can be determined with
any degree of certainty. The State, then, through its authority, backed
ultimately by physical force, can produce, with a fair degree of cer-
tainty, the intention to act in a certain way, and therefore the actions
themselves. Why do we call intentional actions, so produced, external
actions only?
It is because the State is unable to determine that the action shall be
done from the ground or motive which alone would give it immediate
value or durable certainty as an element in the best life. On the contrary,
in so far as the doing of the action is due to the distinctive mode of
operation which belongs to the State, due, that is to say, to the hope of
reward or the fear of punishment, its value as an element in the best life
is ipso facto destroyed, except in so far as its ulterior effects are con-
cerned. An action performed in this sense under compulsion is not a true
part of the will.175 It is an intention adopted from submissiveness or
selfishness, and lacks not only the moral value, but what is partly the
same thing, the reliable constancy of principle, displayed in an action
which arises out of the permanent purposes of a life.
The State, then, as such, can only secure the performance of exter-
nal actions. That is to say, it can only enforce as much intention176 as is
necessary to ensure, on the whole, compliance with requirements stated
in terms of movements affecting the outer world. So far from promoting
the performance of actions which enter into the best life, its operations,
where effective, must directly narrow the area of such actions by stimu-
lating lower motives as regards some portion of it.
5. The State, then, in its distinctive capacity, has no agency at its
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an external course of behaviour by the injunction or prohibition of ex-
ternal acts, in enforcing which acts the State will take note of intentions,
so far as it can infer them, because it is only through them that its influ-
ence can be exerted.
The relation of such a means to the imperative end, on which we
have seen that political obligation depends, must be in a certain sense
negative. The means is one which cannot directly promote the end, and
which even tends to narrow its sphere. What it can effect is to remove
obstacles, to destroy conditions hostile to the realisation of the end. This
brings us back to a principle laid down by Kant,177 and in its bare state-
ment strongly resembling Mill’s contention. When force is opposed to
freedom, a force that repels that force is right. Here, of course, all de-
pends upon what we mean by freedom, and in what sense we think that
force can hinder hindrances to it. If freedom meant for us the empty
hexagon round each individual, the principle would take us back to Mill’s
Liberty. If, on the other hand, we failed to grasp the discrepancy be-
tween force of any kind and the positive nature of the common good
which we take to be freedom, the principle would lead us straight to a
machine-made Utopia. For its negative character cannot restrain it from
some degree of positive action. It is only through positive operation that
a negation or opposition can find reality in the world. And the limits of
its positive action must depend on the precise bearings of the negation
which it puts in force.
Now, for us, after the explanations which have been given, the nega-
tive nature of our principle is to be seriously pressed, although its action
has to take positive form. The State is in its right when it forcibly hin-
ders hindrance to the best life or common good. In hindering such hin-
drances it will indeed do positive acts. It may try to hinder illiteracy and
intemperance by compelling education and by municipalising the liquor
traffic. Why not, it will be asked, hinder also unemployment by univer-
sal employment, over-crowding by universal house-building, and im-
morality by punishing immoral and rewarding moral actions? Here comes
the value of remembering that, according to our principle, State action
is negative in its immediate bearing, though positive both in its actual
doings and its ultimate purpose. On every problem the question must
recur, “Is the proposed measure bona fide confined to hindering a hin-
drance, or is it attempting direct promotion of the common good by
force?” For it is to be borne in mind throughout that whatever acts are
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life. The promotion of morality by force, for instance, is an absolute
self-contradiction.178 No general principle will tell us how in particular
to solve this subtle question, apart from common sense and special ex-
perience. But there is perhaps more to be learned from this principle, if
approached with bona fides,179 than from most generalities of philoso-
phy on social or ethical topics. It is well, I think, constantly to apply the
idea of removing hindrances, in criticism of our efforts to promote the
best life by means involving compulsion. We ought, as a rule, when we
propose action involving compulsion, to be able to show a definite ten-
dency to growth, or a definite reserve of capacity, which is frustrated by
a known impediment, the removal of which is a small matter compared
to the capacities to be set free.180 For it should be remarked that every
act done by the public power has one aspect of encroachment, however
slight, on the sphere of character and intelligence, if only by using funds
raised by taxation, or by introducing an automatic arrangement into
life. It can, therefore, only be justified if it liberates resources of charac-
ter and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment
which it involves. This relation is altogether perversely presented, as we
saw above, if it is treated as an encroachment of society upon individu-
als. All this is beside the mark. The serious point is, that it is an interfer-
ence, so far as compulsion operates in it, of one type of action with
another and higher type of action; of automatism, so to speak, with
intelligent volition. The higher type of action, the embodiment of the
common good in logical growth, is so far from being merely individual
as opposed to social, that it is the whole end and purpose in the name of
which allegiance to society can be demanded from any individual. As in
the private so in the general life, every encroachment of automatism
must be justified by opening new possibilities to self-conscious devel-
opment, if it is not to mean degeneration and senility.
It is the same principle in other words which Green lays down when
he says in effect181 that only such acts (or omissions) should be enforced
by the public power as it is better should take place from any motive
whatever than not take place at all. When, that is, we enforce an act (or
omission) by law, we should be prepared to say, “granting that this act,
which might conceivably have come to be done from a sense of duty,
now may come to be done for the most part from a fear of punishment,
or from a mechanical tendency to submit to external rules (attended by
the practical inconveniences of insensibility, half-heartedness, and eva-
sion which attach to acts so enforced), still so much depends, for the128/Bernard Bosanquet
higher life of the people, upon the external conditions at stake, that we
think it worth while to enforce the act (or omission) though our eyes are
fully open to the risk of extended automatism.”
Here we may have to meet our own arguments against Mill. “You
said it was a contradiction,” we shall be told, “to admit coercion as a
means to liberty. But here you are advocating coercion as a means to
something as incompatible with it, in so far as it is operative, as our
‘liberty,’ viz., a certain state of mind and will. If the area of coercion is
necessarily subtracted from the area of liberty, as you argued above, is
not the area of coercion necessarily subtracted from that to be occupied
by the desired growth of will and character?”
The answer depends, as we indicated in ch. iii., on the difference
between bare liberty and a determinate growth. If your liberty is wholly
indeterminate, then every restraint is a reduction of it. You cannot in-
crease a quantity which is all of one kind by taking away a part of it.
And, in fact, the idea that there was or could have been a previous
general liberty, of which a part was given up in exchange for more, is a
mere illusion. Liberty has grown up within the positive determinations
of life, as they have expanded and come to fit mankind better.
But if the quantity to be increased is a deterinmate growth, of a type
whose general character is known, the problem is transformed. It is the
commonest of experiences that hindrances can be removed and favourable
conditions maintained, if this has to be done, not with a view to every
conceivable and inconceivable development, but for a growth the gen-
eral line of which is known. In this case, as the whole expands, the
restraints and the liberty, the room for action, may even increase to-
gether.182 This is not only true in universal theory, but much more im-
portant than is always remembered in special theory or practice. The
possibility of promoting freedom or well-being by compulsion depends
very greatly indeed on the unity of habit and experience which binds
together a single community. The more the life has in common, the more
definite and automatic arrangements you may safely make in promotion
of it. The rules of my household, which inconvenience its members no
more than their clothes do, would produce a rebellion if they were en-
forced by law even throughout our village.
Thus, then, we may maintain our principle of the limits of distinc-
tive State action. The peculiarity of it is that it allows of positive acts
and interferences, motived by an ultimate positive pur. pose, but with a
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ever positive, as actual facts, are the conditions which it may become
advisable to maintain, they may always, on the side which is distinc-
tively due to State compulsion, be regarded as the hindrance of hin-
drances. And the bona fide application of this principle will really be,
when aided by special experience, in some degree a valuable clue to
what ought to be done. It is only putting in other words the rule of action
followed by all practical men in matters of which they have genuine
experience. We may think, for instance, of the problem involved in State
maintenance of universities. It is easy to vote money, to build buildings,
and to pass statutes. But none of these things will secure the objects of
a university. Money and buildings and statutes may throw open an arena,
so to speak, for the work of willing minds in learning and education. But
the work itself is in a different medium from anything which can be
produced by compulsion, and is so far less vital as it is conditioned by
the operation of force upon minds which demand no work of the kind.
But here we meet a difficulty of principle.183 Do we say that no
external conditions are more than hindrances of hindrances to the best
life? Do we deny that the best life can be positively promoted by exter-
nal conditions; or if we admit this, do we still deny that it can be posi-
tively promoted by the work of the State? The answer has already been
implied, but may be explicitly restated. We refused to separate mind
from its embodiment in material things, and so to be drawn into a purely
inward theory of morality. It would be exaggeration to call such exter-
nal conditions as, e.g., first-rate educational apparatus,184 mere nega-
tive conditions of the best life. But then, we are now asked, cannot the
State supply such external conditions by expenditure compulsorily pro-
vided for, and if so, is not our principle destroyed, viz., the limitation of
State action to the hindrance of hindrances?
The difficulty springs from the fact, that the State, as using compul-
sion, is only one side of Society, and its action is only one side of social
action. If first-rate educational apparatus is called into existence by a
State endowment, the firstrateness of the apparatus is not due to the
compulsion applied to taxpayers, which rather, so far, negatives the
action of intelligent will as such. But it must be due, in one way or
another, to the fact that first-rate ability in the way of devising appara-
tus was somewhere pressing for an outlet, which, by a stroke of the
pickaxe, so to speak, the public power was able to provide for it. We
must not confuse the element of compulsion, which is the side of social
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material results which liberated intelligence produces. When we say,
then, that the State as such can do nothing for the best life but hinder
hindrances to it, the principle applies in the strictest sense only to the
compulsory or automatic side of State action, which must, so to speak,
be reckoned against it in comparing its products with those which are
spontaneous social growths throughout. 185
But it is further true that material conditions which come close to
life, such as houses, wages, educational apparatus, do not wholly es-
cape our principle. They occupy a very interesting middle region be-
tween mere hindrances of hindrances and the actual stimulation of mind
and will. On the one side they are charged with mind and character, and
so far are actual elements in the best life. On the other side they depend
on external actions, and therefore seem accessible to State compulsion,
which extends to all external doings and omissions. But what we have to
observe is, and it is in practice most important, that, as charged with
mind and will, these material facts may not be accessible to State com-
pulsion, while, as accessible to State compulsion pure and simple, they
may forfeit their character of being charged with mind and will. This
shows itself in two ways. First, just because they are facts of a kind
which come so close to life (in other words depend so greatly upon
being charged with mind and will), State compulsion cannot with cer-
tainty secure even their apparent existence. They fail bodily, like human
beings, if there is no spirit to keep them alive. The relation of wages to
the standard of life illustrates this point. Secondly, supposing that for a
time, by herculean efforts of compulsion, which must call active intelli-
gence to its aid, such facts are made to present a satisfactory appear-
ance of existence, none the less, so far as they are characterised by
compulsion, they may lose their character as elements in the best life.
That is to say, they may fail to benefit those whom they are meant to
benefit. The fact may fail to be absorbed in the life.
The principle of the hindrance of hindrances is most valuable and
luminous when rightly grasped, just in these middle cases. A pretty and
healthy house, which its inhabitant is fond of, is an element in the best
life. Who could doubt it who knows what home-life is? But in order that
putting a family out of a bad house into a good one should give rise to
such an element of the best life, it is strictly and precisely necessary that
the case or policy should come under our principle. That is to say, un-
less there was a better life struggling to utter itself, and the deadlift of
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house will not be an element in a better life, and the encroachment on the
ground of volition will have been made without compensation—a fact
which may show itself in many fatal ways. If, on the other hand, the
struggling tendency to a better life has power187 to effect the change
without the deadlift from outside, then the result is certain and wholly to
the good.
Thus we may say that every law and institution, every external fact
maintained by the public power, must be judged by the degree in which
it sets at liberty a growth of mind and spirit. It is a problem partly of
removing obstacles to growth, and partly of the division of labour be-
tween consciousness and automatism.
It ought to occur to the reader that the ground here assigned for the
limitation of State action —that is, of social action through the public
power—is not prima facie in harmony with the account of political
obligation, according to which laws and institutions represented a real
self or general will, recognised by individuals as implied in the common
good which was imperative upon them. We spoke, for example, of being
forced to be free, and of the system of law and order as representing the
higher self. And yet we are now saying that, in as far as force is opera-
tive through compulsion and authoritative suggestion, it is a means which
can only reach its end through a negation.
But this prima facie contradiction is really a proof of the vitality of
our principle. It follows from the fact that we accept self-government in
the full strength of both its factors, and can deal with it on this basis.
The social system under which we live, taking it as one which does not
demand immediate revolution, represents the general will and higher
self as a whole to the community as a whole, and can only stand by
virtue of that representation being recognised. Our loyalty to it makes
us men and citizens, and is the main spiritualising force of our lives. But
something in all of us, and much in some of us, is recalcitrant through
rebellion, indolence, incompetence, or ignorance. And it is only on these
elements that the public power operates as power, through compulsion
or authoritative suggestion. Thus, the general will when it meets us as
force, and authority resting on force, and not as a social suggestion
which we spontaneously rise to accept, comes to us ex hypothesi as
something which claims to be ourself, but which, for the moment, we
more or less fail to recognise. And, according to the adjustment between
it and our complex and largely unintelligent self, it may abandon us to
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fuller life in us or remove hindrances to it. It seems worth while to
distinguish two main cases of the relation between the ordinary self and
the general will. One of these cases covers the whole of our every-day
law-abiding life, in its grades of active loyalty, acceptance of sugges-
tion, and automatic acquiescence; and consists of the relation of our
ordinary self to the general system of rights maintained by the State as
ultimate regulator and arbiter. The other is confined to more exceptional
situations, and has to do with collision between the particular and the
general will, as treated in the theory of punishment. The subject of re-
ward may be mentioned at the same time, if only to show why it is
almost an empty heading in political theory. We will end this chapter,
therefore, with a general account of the system of rights and of reward
and punishment.
6. The idea of individual rights comes down to us from the doctrine
of natural right, and has generally been discussed with reference to it.
We need not now go back upon the illusions connected with the notion
of natural right. It is enough if we bear in mind that we inherit from it
the important idea of a positive law which is what it ought to be. A
right,188 then, has both a legal and a moral reference. It is a claim which
can be enforced at law, which no moral imperative can be; but it is also
recognised to be a claim which ought to be capable of enforcement at
law, and thus it has a moral aspect. The case in which positive enact-
ment and the moral “ought” appear to diverge will be considered below.
But a typical “right” unites the two sides. It both is, and ought to be,
capable of being enforced at law.
Its peculiar position follows from what we have seen to be the end
of the State, and the means at its disposal. The end of the State is a
moral purpose, imperative on its members. But its distinctive action is
restricted to removing hindrances to the end, that is, to lending its force
to overcome —both in mind and in externals essential to mind— ob-
stacles which otherwise would obstruct the realisation of the end. The
whole of the conditions thus enforced is the whole of “rights” attaching
to the selves, who, standing in definite relations, constitute the commu-
nity. For it is in these selves that the end of the State is real, and it is by
maintaining and regulating their claims to the removal of obstructions
that the State is able to promote the end for which it exists. Rights then
are claims recognised by the State, i.e., by Society acting as ultimate
authority, to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life.
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such, the answer is, in a simple phrase, that State action is coincident
with the maintenance of rights.
The system of rights which the State maintains may be regarded
from different points of view.
First, (a) from the point of view of the whole community, that is, as
the general result in the promotion of good life obtained by the working
of a free Society, as a statesman or outside critic might regard it. Thus
looked at, the system of rights may be described as “the organic whole
of the outward conditions necessary to the rational life,” or “that which
is really necessary to the maintenance of material conditions essential to
the existence and perfection of human personality.”189 This point of view
is essential as a full contradiction of that uncritical conception by which
rights are regarded as something with which the individual is invested in
his aspect of isolation, and independently of his relation to the end. It
forces us away from this false particularisation, and compels us to con-
sider the whole State-maintained order in its connectedness as a single
expression of a common good or will, in so far as such a good can find
utterance in a system of external acts and habits. And it enables us to
weigh the value which belongs to the maintenance of any tolerable so-
cial order, simply because it is an order, and so far enables life to be
lived, and a determinate, if limited, common good to be realised. From
other points of view we are apt to neglect this characteristic, and to
forget how great is the effect, for the possibilities of life throughout, of
the mere fact that a social order exists. Hegel observes that a man thinks
it a matter of course that he goes back to his house after night-fall in
security. He does not reflect to what he owes it. Yet this very natural-
ness, so to speak, of living in a social order is perhaps the most impor-
tant foundation which the State can furnish to the better life. “Si
monumentum quaeris, circumspice.” If we ask how it affects our will,
the answer is that it forms our world. Speaking broadly, the members of
a civilised community have seen nothing but order in their lives, and
could not accommodate their action to anything else.
It should be mentioned as a danger of this point of view that, fasci-
nated by the spectacle of the social fabric as a whole, we may fail to
distinguish what in it is the mere maintenance of rights, and what is the
growth which such maintenance can promote but cannot constitute. Thus
we may lose all idea of the true limits of State action.
(b) We may regard this complex of rights from the standpoint of the
selves or persons who compose the community. It is in these selves, as134/Bernard Bosanquet
we have seen, that the social good is actual, and it is to their differenti-
ated functions,190 which constitute their life and the end of the commu-
nity, that the subgroupings of rights, or conditions of good life, have to
be adjusted each to each like suits of clothes. The rights are, from this
point of view, primarily the external incidents, so far as maintained by
law—the authoritative vesture as it were—of a person’s position in the
world of his community. And we shall do well to regard the nature of
rights, as attaching to selves or persons, from this point of view of a
place or position in the order determined by law. It has been argued, I do
not know with what justice, that, in considering the relations of particles
in space, the proper course would be to regard their positions or dis-
tances from each other as the primary fact, and to treat attributions of
attractive and repulsive forces as modes of expressing the maintenance
of the necessary positions rather than as descriptive of real causes which
bring it about. At least, it appears to me, such a conception may well be
applied to the relative ideas of right and obligation. What comes first,
we may say, is the position, the place or places, function or functions,
determined by the nature of the best life as displayed in a certain com-
munity, and the capacity of the individual self for a unique contribution
to that best life. Such places and functions are imperative; they are the
fuller self in the particular person, and make up the particular person as
he passes into the fuller self. His hold on this is his true will, in other
words, his apprehension of the general will. Such a way of speaking
may seem unreally simplified when we look at the myriad relations of
modern life and the sort of abstraction by which the individual is apt to
become a rolling stone with no assignable place—indeed “gathering no
moss”—and to pass through his positions and relations as if they were
stations on a railway journey. But in truth it is only simplified and not
falsified. If we look with care we shall see that it, or nothing, is true of
all lives.
The Position, then, is the real fact—the vocation, place or function,
which is simply one reading of the person’s actual self and relations in
the world in which he lives. Having thoroughly grasped this primary
fact, we can readily deal with the points of view which present the posi-
tion or its incidents in the partial aspects of rights or obligations.
(i.) A right, we said, is a claim recognised by society and enforced
by the State. My place or position, then, and its incidents, so far as
sanctioned by the State, constitute my rights, when thought of as some-
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A right thus regarded is not anything primary. It is a way of looking at
certain conditions, which, by reason of their relation to the end of the
whole as manifested in me, are imperative alike for me and for others. It
is, further, the particular way of looking at these conditions which is in
question when I claim them or am presumed to claim them, as powers
secured to me with a view to an end which I accept as mine. I have the
rights no less in virtue of my presumed capacity for the end, if I am in
fact indifferent to the end. But, in this case, though attributed ab extra
as rights, they tend to pass into obligations.
(ii.) If rights are an imperative “position” or function, when looked
at as a group of Statesecured powers claimed by a person for a certain
end, obligations are the opposite aspect of such a position or group of
powers. That is to say, the conditions of a “position” are regarded as
obligations in as far as they are thought of as requiring enforcement,
and therefore, primarily, from the point of view of persons not directly
identified with the “position” or end to which they are instrumental.
Rights are claimed, obligations are owed. And prima facie rights are
claimed by a person, and obligations are owed to a person, being his
rights as regarded by those against whom they are enforceable.
Thus, the distinction of self and others, which we refused to take as
the basis of society, makes itself prominent in the region of compulsion.
The reason is that compulsion is confined to hindering or producing
external acts, and is excluded from producing an act in its relation to a
moral end, that is, the exercise of a right in its true sense; though it can
enforce an act which in fact favours the possibility of acting towards a
moral end—that is, an obligation. This is the same thing as saying that
normally a right is what I claim, and the obligation relative to it is what
you owe; as an obligation is that which can be enforced, and that is an
act or omission apart from the willing of an end; and a right involves
what cannot be enforced, viz., the relation of an act to an end in a person’s
will. But even here the distinction of self and others is hardly ultimate.
The obligation on me to maintain my parents becomes almost a right191
if I claim the task as a privilege. And many rights of my position may
actually be erected into, or more commonly may give rise to, obligations
incumbent on me for the sake of my position or function. If the exercise
of the franchise were made compulsory that would be a right treated
also as an obligation; but it might be urged that qua obligation it was
held due to the position of others, and only qua right to my own “posi-
tion.” But if the law interferes with my poisoning myself192 either by136/Bernard Bosanquet
drains or with alcohol, that, I presume, is the enforcement of an obliga-
tion arising out of my own position and function as a man and a citizen,
which makes reasonable care for my life imperative upon me.
(c) It is commonly said that every right implies a duty. This has two
meanings, which should be distinguished.
In the one case, (i.) for “duty” should be read “obligation,” i.e., a
demand enforceable by law. This simply means that every “position”
may be regarded as involving either powers secured or conditions en-
forced, which are one and the same thing differently looked at. Roughly
speaking, they are the same thing as differently looked at by one person,
and by other persons. My right to walk along the high road involves an
obligation upon all other persons not to obstruct me, and in the last
resort the State will send horse, foot and artillery rather than let me be
causelessly obstructed in walking along the high road.
It is also true that every position which can be the source of obliga-
tions enforceable in favour of my rights is likewise a link with obliga-
tions enforceable on me in favour of the rights of others. By claiming a
right in virtue of my position I recognise and testify to the general sys-
tem of law according to which I am reciprocally under obligation to
respect the rights, or rather the function and position, of others. My
rights then imply obligations both in others, and perhaps in myself, cor-
relative to these rights, and in me correlative to the rights of others. But
it cannot strictly be said that the obligations are the source of the rights,
or the rights of the obligations. Both are the varied external conditions
of “positions” as regarded from different points of view.
But (ii.) there is a different sense in which every right implies a
duty. And this, the true meaning of the phrase, is involved in what we
have said of the nature of a “position.” All rights, as claims which both
are and ought to be enforceable by law, derive their imperative authority
from their relation to an end which enters into the better life. All rights,
then, are powers instrumental to making the best of human capacities,
and can only be recognised or exercised upon this ground.
In this sense, the duty is the purpose with a view to which the right
is secured, and not merely a corresponding obligation equally derived
from a common ground; and the right and duty are not distinguished as
something claimed by self and something owed to others, but the duty as
an imperative purpose, and the right as a power secured because instru-
mental to it.
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which by the State is merely the climax of their recognition by society.
Why do we thus demand recognition for rights? If we deny that there
can be unrecognised rights, do we not surrender human freedom to des-
potism or to popular caprice?
(i.) In dealing with the general question why recognition is demanded
as an essential of rights, we must remember what we took to be the
nature of society and the source of obligation. We conceived a society to
be a structure of intelligences so related as to co-operate with and to
imply one another. We took the source of obligation to lie in the fact that
the logic of the whole is operative in every part, and consequently that
every part has a reality which goes beyond its average self, and identi-
fies it with the whole, making demands upon it in doing so.
Now, we are said to “recognise” anything when it comes to us with
a consciousness of familiarity, as something in which we feel at home.
And this is our general attitude to the demands which the logic of the
whole, implied in our every act, is continuously making upon us. It is
involved in the interdependence of minds, which has been explained to
constitute the mind of which the visible community is the body. A
teacher’s behaviour towards his pupils, for example, implies a certain
special kind of interdependence between their minds. What he can do
for them is conditioned by what they expect of him and are ready to do
for him, and vice versa. The relation of each to the other is a special
form of “recognition.” That is to say, the mind of each has a definite and
positive attitude towards that of the other, which is based on, or rather,
so far as it goes, simply is, the relation of their “positions” to each other.
Thus, social positions or vocations actually have their being in the me-
dium of recognition. They are the attitudes of minds towards one an-
other, through which their several distinct characteristics are instrumen-
tal to a common good.
Thus, then, a right, being a power secured in order to fill a position,
is simply a part of the fact that such a position is recognised as instru-
mental to the common good. It is impossible to argue that the position
may exist, and not be recognised. For we are speaking of a relation of
minds, and, in so far as minds are united into a single system by their
attitudes .towards each other, their “positions” and the recognition of
them are one and the same thing. Their attitude, receptive, co-operative,
tolerant, and the like, is so far a recognition, though not necessarily a
reflective recognition. Probably this is what is intended by those who
speak of imitation or other analogous principles as the ultimate social138/Bernard Bosanquet
fact. They do not mean the repetition of another person s conduct, though
that may enter in part into the relation of interdependence. They mean
the conscious adoption193 of an attitude towards others, embodying the
relations between the “positions” which social logic assigns to each.
(ii.) But then the question presses upon us—“If we deny that there
can be unrecognised rights, do we not surrender human freedom to des-
potism or to popular caprice?”
The sting of this suggestion is taken out when we thoroughly grasp
the idea that recognition is a matter of logic, working on and through
experience, and not of choice or fancy. If my mind has no attitude to
yours, there is no interdependence and I cannot be a party to securing
you rights. You are not, for me, a sharer in a capacity for a common
good, which each of us inevitably respects. A dog or a tree may be an
instrument to the good life, and it may therefore be right to treat it in a
certain way, but it cannot be a subject of rights. If my mind has an
attitude to yours, then there is certainly a recognition between us, and
the nature of that recognition and what it involves are matters for rea-
soning and for the appeal to experience. It is idle for me, for instance, to
communicate with you by language or to buy and sell with you, perhaps
even idle to go to war with you,194 and still to say that I recognise no
capacity in you for a common good. My behaviour is then inconsistent
with itself, and the question takes the form what rights are involved in
the recognition of you which experience demonstrates. No person and
no society is consistent with itself, and the proof and amendment of their
inconsistency is always possible. And, one inconsistency being amended,
the path is opened to progress by the emergence of another. If slaves
come to be recognised as free but not as citizens, this of itself opens a
road by which the new freeman may make good his claim that it is an
inconsistency not to recognise him as a citizen.
But no right can be founded on my mere desire to do what I like.195
The wish for this is the sting of the claim to unrecognised rights, and
this wish is to be met, as the fear that our view might lead to despotism
was met. The matter is one of fact and logic, not of fancies and wishes.
If I desire to assert an unrecognised right, I must show what “position”
involves it, and how that position asserts itself in the system of recogni-
tions which is the social mind, and my point can only be established
universally with regard to a certain type of position, and not merely for
myself as a particular A or B. In other words, I must show that the
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and, further, that it does not demand a sacrifice of capacities now being
realised, out of proportion to the capacities which it would enable to
assert themselves. I must show, in short, that in so far as the claim in
question is not secured by the State, Society is inconsistent with itself,
and falls short of being what it professes to be, an organ of good life.
And all my showing gives no right, till it has modified the law. To main-
tain a right against the State by force or disobedience is rebellion, and,
in considering the duty of rebellion, we have to set the whole value of
the existence of social order against the importance of the matter in
which we think Society defective. There can hardly be a duty to rebel-
lion in a State in which law can be altered by constitutional process.
The State-maintained system of rights, then, in its relation to the
normal self and will of ordinary citizens with their varying moods of
enthusiasm and indolence, may be compared to the automatic action of
a human body. Automatic actions are such as we perform in walking,
eating, dressing, playing the piano or riding the bicycle. They have been
formed by consciousness, and are of a character subservient to its pur-
poses, and obedient to its signals. As a rule, they demand no effort of
attention, and in this way attention is economised and enabled to devote
itself to problems which demand its intenser efforts. They are relegated
to automatism because they are uniform, necessary, and external—“ex-
ternal” in the sense explained above, that the way in which they are
required makes it enough if they are done, whatever their motives, or
with no motives at all.
By far the greater bulk of the system of rights is related in this way
to normal consciousness. We may pay taxes, abstain from fraud and
assault, use the roads and the post-office, and enjoy our general secu-
rity, without knowing that we are doing or enjoying anything that de-
mands special attention. Partly, of course, attention is being given by
other consciousnesses to maintaining the securities and facilities of our
life. Even so, the arrangement is automatic in so far as there is no reason
for arousing the general attention in respect to it; but to a varying extent
it is automatic throughout, and engrained in the system and habits of the
whole people. We are all supposed to know the whole law. Not even a
judge has it all in his knowledge at any one time; but the meaning is that
it roughly expresses our habits, and we live according to it without great
difficulty, and expect each other to do so. This automatism is not harm-
ful, but absolutely right and necessary, so long as we relegate to it only
“external” matters; i.e., such as are necessary to be done, motive or no140/Bernard Bosanquet
motive, in some way which can be generally laid down. Thus used, it is
an indispensable condition of progress. It represents the ground won
and settled by our civilisation, and leaves us free to think and will such
matters as have their value in and through being thought and willed
rightly. If we try to relegate these to automatism, then moral and intel-
lectual death has set in.
But if the system of rights is automatic, how can it rest on recogni-
tion? Automatic actions, we must remember, are still of a texture, so to
speak, continuous with consciousness. “Recognition” expresses very
fairly our habitual attitude towards them in ourselves and others. We
might think, for example, of the system of habits and expectations which
forms our household routine. We go through it for the most part auto-
matically, while “recognising” the “position” of those who share it with
us, and respecting the life which is its end. At points here and there in
which it affects the deeper possibilities of our being, our attention be-
comes active, and we assert our position with enthusiasm and conscien-
tiousness. Our attitude to the social system of rights is something like
this. The whole order has our habitual recognition; we are aware of and
respect more or less the imperative end on which it rests—the claim of a
common good upon us all. Within the framework of this order there is
room for all degrees of laxity and conscientiousness; but, in any case, it
is only at certain points, which either concern our special capacity or
demand readjustment in the general interest, that intense active attention
is possible or desirable.
The view here taken of automatism and attention in the social whole
impairs neither the unity of intelligence throughout society nor the
individual’s recognition of this unity as a self liable to be opposed to his
usual self. As to the former point, every individual mind shows exactly
the same phenomena, of a continuum largely automatic, and thoroughly
alive only in certain regions, connected, but not thoroughly coherent. As
to the latter point, permeation of the individual by the habits of social
automatism does not prevent, but rather gives material for, his tendency
to abstract himself from the whole, and to frame an attitude for himself
inconsistent with his true “position,” against which tendency the im-
perative recognition of his true self has constantly to be exerted.
7. We have finally to deal with the actual application by the State of
its ultimate resource for the maintenance of rights, viz., force. Superior
force may be exercised upon human nature both by rewards and by
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ally within the lines of automatism; that is to say, it would be a case of
the promotion of an end by means other than the influence of an idea of
that end upon the will. But, owing to the subtle continuity of human
nature throughout all its phases, we shall find that there is something
more than this to be said, and that the idea of the end is operative in a
peculiar way just where the agencies that promote it appear to be most
alien and mechanical. In so far as this is the case, the general theory of
the negative character of State action has to be modified, as we foresaw,
by the theory of punishment. Prima facie, however, it is true that re-
ward and punishment belong to the automatic element of social life.
They arise in no direct relation of the will to the end. They are a reaction
of the automatic system, instrumental to the end, against a friction or
obstacle which intrudes upon it, or (in the case of rewards) upon the
opposite of a friction or obstacle. There is no object in pressing a com-
parison into every detail; but perhaps, as social and individual automa-
tism do really bear the same kind of relation to consciousness, it may be
pointed out that reward and punishment correspond in some degree to
the pleasures and pains of a high-class secondary automatism, say of
riding or of reading, i.e., of something specially conducive to enhanced
life. Such activities bring pleasure when unimpeded, and pain when
sharply interrupted by a start or blunder which jars upon us. Putting
this latter case in language which carries out the analogy to punishment,
we might say that the formed habit of action, unconsciously or semi-
consciously relevant to the end or fuller life, is obstructed by some par-
tial start of mind, and their conflict is accompanied with recognition,
pain, and vexation. “What a fool I was,” we exclaim, “to ride carelessly
at that corner,” or “to let that plan for a holiday interrupt me in my
morning’s reading.”
It may seem remarkable that reward plays a small and apparently
decreasing part in the self-management of society by the public power.
To the naïve Athenian,196 it seemed a natural instrument for the encour-
agement of public spirit, probably rather by a want of discrimination
between motives than by a real belief in political selfishness. In Euro-
pean countries honours still appear to play a considerable part, but on
analysis it would be found less than it seems. Partly they are recogni-
tions of important functions, and thus conditions rather than rewards.
To a great extent, again, they recognise existing facts, and are rather
consequences of the respect which society feels for certain types of life
(with very curious results in regions where the general mind is inexperi-142/Bernard Bosanquet
enced, e.g., in fine art) than means employed to regulate the conduct of
citizens. We should think a soldier mean whose aim was a peerage, still
more a poet or an artist. I hardly know that rewards adjudged by the
State, as distinct from compensations, exist in the United States of
America.197 Rewards then fill no place correlative to that of punish-
ments, and the reason seems plain. Punishment corresponds much bet-
ter to the negative method which alone is open to the State for the main-
tenance of rights. For Punishment proclaims its negative character, and
no one can suppose it laudable simply to be deterred from wrong-doing
by fear of punishment. But though precisely the same principle applies
to meritorious actions done with a view to reward, an illusion is almost
certain to arise which will hide the principle in this case. For, if reward
is largely used as an inducement to actions conducive to the best life, it
is almost certain that it will be used as an inducement to actions, the
value and certainty of which depend on the state of will to which they
are due. And then the distinction between getting them done, motive or
no motive, which is the true region of State action, and their being done
with a certain motive, which is necessary to give them either the highest
practical or any moral value, is pretty sure to be obliterated, and the
range of the moral will trenched upon in its higher portion and with a
constant tendency to self-deception.198 It is the same truth in other words
when we point out that taking reward and punishment, as interferences,
only to deal with exceptional cases, reward would deal with the excep-
tionally good. Therefore, again, reward must either make an impossible
attempt to deal with all the normal as good, which involves the danger
of de-moralising the whole of normal life, or must take the line of spe-
cially promoting what is exceptionally conducive to good life; in which
case confusion is certain to arise from interference with the delicate
middle class of external actions analysed above. And thus it is only
what we should expect when we find that States having no damnosa
hereditas of a craving for personal honours are hardly acquainted with
the bestowal of rewards by the public power.
It will be sufficient, then, to complete the account of State action in
maintenance of rights by some account of the nature and principles of
punishment.
And we may profitably begin by recalling M. Durkheim’s sugges-
tion, which was mentioned in a former chapter. Punishment, he observes,
from the simplest and most actual point of view, includes in itself all
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essence, simply the reaction of a strong and determinate collective sen-
timent against an act which offends it. It is idle to include such a reac-
tion entirely under the head either of reformation, or of retaliation, or of
prevention. An aggression is ipso facto a sign of character, an injury,
and a menace; and the reaction against it is equally ipso facto an at-
tempt to affect character, a retaliation against an injury, and a deterrent
or preventive against a menace. When we fire up at aggression it is
pretty much a chance whehter we say “I am going to teach him better
manners,” or “I am going to serve him out,” or “ I am going to see that
he doesn’t do that again.” A consideration of each of these aspects is
necessary to do justice both to the theories and to the facts.
i. An obvious point of view, and the first perhaps to appear in phi-
losophy, though strongly opposed to early law, is that the aim of punish-
ment is to make the offender good. As test of the adequacy of this doc-
trine by itself, the question may be put, “If pleasures would cure the
offender, ought he to be given pleasures?” The doctrine, however, does
not, by any means, altogether incline to leniency. For it carries as a
corollary the extirpation of the incurable, which Plato proposes in a
passage of singularly modern quality, when he suggests the co-opera-
tion of judges and physicians in maintaining the moral and physical
health of society.199
The first comment that occurs to us is, that by a mere medical treat-
ment of the offender, including or consisting of pleasant conditions, if
helpful to his cure, the interest of society seems to be disregarded. What
is to become of the maintenance of rights, if aggressors have to antici-
pate a pleasant or lenient “cure”? It may be true that brutal punishments
stimulate a criminal temper in the people rather than check it; but it is a
long way from this to laying down that there is no need for terror to be
associated with crime. To suppose that pleasures may simply act through-
out as pains, is playing with words and throws no light on the question.
If we leave words their meaning, we must say that punishment must be
deterrent for others, as well as reformatory for the offender, and there-
fore in some degree painful. It is true, however, that the offender, as a
human being, and presumably capable of a common good, has, as Green
puts it, “reversionary rights” of humanity, and these, punishment must
so far as possible respect.
But there is a deeper difficulty. If the reformation theory is to be
seriously distinguished from the other theories of punishment, it has a
meaning which is unjust to the offender himself. It implies that his of-144/Bernard Bosanquet
fence is a merely natural evil, like disease, and can be cured by thera-
peutic treatment directed to removing its causes. But this is to treat him
not as a human being; to treat him as a “patient,” not as an agent; to
exclude him from the general recognition that makes us men. (If the
therapeutic treatment includes a recognition and chastisement of the
offender’s bad will200—the form of which chastisement may, of course,
be very variously modified—then there is no longer anything to distin-
guish the reformatory theory from other theories of punishment.) It has
been lately pointed out201 what a confusion is involved in the claim that
beings, who are irresponsible and so incapable of guilt, are therefore in
the strict sense innocent. Here are the true objects for a pure reforma-
tory theory. Here that may freely be done, as to creatures incapable of
rights, which is kindest for them and safest for society, from quasi-
medical treatment to extirpation. There is no guilt in them to demand
punishment, but there is no human will in them to have the rights of
innocence.
But, applied to responsible human beings, such a theory, if really
kept to its distinctive contention, is an insult. It leads to the notion that
the State may take hold of any man, whose life or ideas are thought
capable of improvement, and set to work to ameliorate them by forcible
treatment. There is no true punishment except where one is an offender
against a system of rights which he shares, and therefore against him-
self. And such an offender has a right to the recognition of his hostile
will; it is inhuman to treat him as a wild animal or a child, whom we
simply mould to our aims. Without such a recognition, to be punished is
not, according to the old Scotch phrase, to be “justified.”
ii. The idea of retaliation or retribution, though in history the oldest
conception of punishment,202 may be taken in theory as a protest against
the conception that punishment is only a means for making a man better.
Its strong point is its definite idea of the offender. The offender is a
responsible person, belonging to a certain order which he recognises as
entering into him and as entered into by him, and he has made actual an
intention hostile to this order. He has, as Plato’s Socrates insists in the
Crito, destroyed the order so far as in him lies. In other words, he has
violated the system of rights which the State exists to maintain, and by
which alone he and others are secured in the exercise of any capacity for
good, this security consisting in their reciprocal respect for the system.
His hostile will stands up and defies the right, in so far as his personality
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necessary, then, that the power which maintains the system of rights
should not merely, if possible, undo the external harm which has been
done, but should strike down the hostile will which has defied the right
by doing that harm. The end or true self is in the medium of mind and
will, and is contradicted and nullified so far as a hostile will is permitted
to triumph.
It is obvious, however, that the means by which the hostile will can
be negatived fall prima facie within the region of automatism. The re-
calcitrant element of consciousness is not susceptible to the end as an
idea, or it would not be recalcitrant. The end can here assert itself, agree-
ably to the general principle of State action, only through external ac-
tion the mental effects of which cannot be precisely estimated. It might,
therefore, seem that the pain produced by the reaction of the automatic
system on the aberrant consciousness — the punishment — was simply
a natural pain, which might act as a deterrent from aberration, but had
no visible connection with the true whole or end for the mind of the
offender. We shall speak below of the sense in which punishment is
deterrent or preventive. But it is to be noted at this point that a high-
class secondary automatism, with which all along we have compared
the system of rights as engrained in the habits of a people, retains a very
close connection with consciousness. We do not indeed will every step
that we walk, but we only walk while we will to walk, and so with the
whole system of routine automatism which is the method and organ of
our daily life. At any interruption, any hindrance or failure, conscious-
ness starts up, and the end of the whole routine comes sharply back
upon us through our aberration.
So it is with punishment. Primarily, no doubt, chastisement by pain,
and the appeal to fear and to submissiveness, is effective through our
lower nature, and, in as far as operative, substitutes selfish motives for
the will that wills the good, and so narrows its sphere. But there is more
behind. The automatic system is pulsing with the vitality of the end to
which it is instrumental; and when we kick against the pricks, and it
reacts upon us in pain, this pain has subtle connections thoughout the
whole of our being. It brings us to our senses, as we say; that is, it
suggests, more or less, a consciousness of what the habitual system
means, and of what we have committed in offending against it. When
one stumbles and hurts his foot, he may look up and see that he is off the
path. If a man is told that the way he works his factory or keeps his
tenement houses is rendering him liable to fine or imprisonment, then, if146/Bernard Bosanquet
he is an ordinary, careless, but respectable citizen, he will feel some-
thing of a shock, and recognise that he was getting too neglectful of the
rights of others, and that, in being pulled up, he is brought back to
himself. His citizen honour will be touched. He will not like to be below
the average which the common conscience had embodied in law.
When we come to the actual criminal consciousness, the form which
the recognition may take in fact may vary greatly; and as an extreme
there may be a furious hostility against the whole recognised system of
law, either involving self-outlawry through a despair of reconciliation,
or arising through some sort of habitual conspiracy in which the man
finds his chosen law and order as against that recognised by the State.203
But after all, we are dealing with a question of social logic and not of
empirical psychology. And it must be laid down that, in as far as any
sane man fails altogether to recognise in any form the assertion of some-
thing which he normally respects in the law which punishes him (put-
ting aside what he takes to be miscarriage of justice), he is outlawed by
himself and the essentials of citizenship are not in him. Doubtless, if an
uneducated man were told, in theoretical language, that in being pun-
ished for an assault he was realising his own will, he would think it cruel
nonsense. But this is a mere question of language, and has really noth-
ing to do with the essential state of his consciousness. He would under-
stand perfectly well that he was being served as he would say anyone
should be served, whom he saw acting as he had done, in a case where
his. own passions were not engaged. And this recognition, in whatever
form it is admitted, carries the consequence which we affirm.
In short, then, compulsion through punishment and the fear of it,
though primarily acting on the lower self, does tend, when the condi-
tions of true punishment exist (i.e., the reaction of a system of rights
violated by one who shares in it), to a recognition of the end by the
person punished, and may so far be regarded as his own will, implied in
the maintenance of a system to which he is a party, returning upon him-
self in the form of pain. And this is the theory of punishment as retribu-
tive. The test doctrine of the theory may be found in Kant’s saying that,
even though a society were about to be dissolved by agreement, the last
murderer in prison must be executed before it breaks up. The punish-
ment is, so to speak, his right, of which he must not be defrauded.
There are two natural perversions of this theory.
The first is to confuse the necessary retribution or reaction of the
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vulgar form, when a brutal murder evokes a general desire to have the
offender served out,205 the general or social indignation is not the same
as the selfish desire for revenge. It is the offspring of a rough notion of
law and humanity, and of the feeling that a striking aggression upon
them demands to be strikingly put down. Such a sentiment is a part of
the consciousness which maintains the system of rights, and can hardly
be absent where that consciousness is strong.
The second perversion consists in the superstition that punishment
should be “equivalent” to offence. In a sense, we have seen, it is identi-
cal; i.e., it is a return of the offender’s act upon himself by a connection
inevitable in a moral organism. But as for equivalence of pain inflicted,
either with the pain caused by the offence or with its guilt, the State
knows nothing of it and has no means of securing it. It cannot estimate
either pain or moral guilt. Punishment cannot be adapted to factors which
cannot be known. And further, the attempt to punish for immorality has
evils of its own. The graduation of punishments must depend on wholly
different principles, which we will consider in speaking of punishment
as preventive or deterrent.
iii. The graduation of punishments must be almost entirely deter-
mined by experience of their operation as deterrents. It is to be borne in
mind, indeed, (i.) that the “reversionary rights” of humanity in the of-
fender are not to be needlessly sacrificed, and (ii.) that the true essence
of punishment, as punishment, the negation of the offender’s anti-social
will, is in some way to be secured. But these conditions are included in
the preventive or deterrent theory of punishment, if completely under-
stood; if, that is to say, it is made clear precisely what it is that is to be
prevented.
If we speak of punishment, then, as having for its aim to be deter-
rent or preventive, we must not understand this to mean that a majority,
or any persons in power, may rightly prevent, by the threat of penalties,
any acts that seem to them to be inconvenient.
That which is to be prevented by punishment is a violation of the
State-maintained system of rights by a person who is a party to that
system, and therefore the above-mentioned conditions, implied in a true
understanding of the reformatory and retributive aspects of punishment,
are also involved in it as deterrent. But, this being admitted, we may add
to them the distinctive principle on which a deterrent theory insists. If a
lighter punishment deter as effectively as a heavier, it is wrong to im-
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of rights; and if rights are effectively maintained without the heavier
punishment, the aim of the State does not justify its imposition. It is well
known that success in the maintenance of rights depends not only on the
severity of punishments, but also on the true adjustment of the rights
themselves to human ends, and on that certainty of detecting crime which
is a result of efficient government. And it must always be considered, in
dealing with a relative failure of the deterrent power of punishment in
regard to certain offences, whether a better adjustment of rights or a
greater certainty of detection will not meet the end more effectively than
increased severity of punishment. We have seen that the equivalence of
punishment and offence is really a meaningless superstition. And there
is no principle on which punishment can be rationally graduated, except
its deterrent power as learned by experience. This view corresponds to
the true limits of State action as determined by the means at its disposal
compared with the end which is its justification, and is therefore, when
grasped in its full meaning as not denying the nature of punishment, the
true theory of it.
We saw, in speaking of punishment as retributive, in what sense it
can and cannot rest upon a judgment imputing moral guilt. Of degrees
of moral guilt as manifested in the particular acts of individuals, the
State, like all of us, is necessarily ignorant. But this is not to say that
punishment is wholly divorced from a just moral sentiment. Undoubt-
edly it implies and rests upon a disapproval of that hostile attitude to the
system of rights which is implied in the realised intention constituting
the violation of right. Though in practice the distinction between civil
and criminal law in England carries out no thoroughly logical demarca-
tion, yet it is true on the whole to say with Hegel that, in the matter of a
civil action, there is no violation of right as such, but only a question in
whom a certain right resides; while in a matter of criminal law there is
involved an infraction of right as such, which by implication is a denial
of the whole sphere of law and order. This infraction the general con-
science disapproves, and its disapproval is embodied in a forcible deal-
ing with the offender, however that dealing may be graduated by other
considerations.
I may touch here on an interesting point of detail, following Green.
If punishment is essentially graduated according to its deterrent power,
and not according to moral guilt, how does it come to pass that “extenu-
ating circumstances” are allowed to influence sentences? That they do
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not that they indicate a less degree of wickedness in the offender than
the offence in question would normally presuppose? It would seem that
judges themselves are sometimes under this impression. But it may well
be that they act under a right instinct and assign a wrong reason. For it
is impossible to get over the fact that moral iniquity is something which
cannot be really estimated. The true reason for allowing circumstances
which change the character of the act to influence the sentence is that, in
changing its character, they may take it out of the class of offences to
which it prima facie belongs, and from which men need to be deterred
by a recognised amount of severity. If a man is starving and steals a
turnip, his offence, being so exceptionally conditioned, does not threaten
the general right of property, and does not need to be associated with
any high degree of terror in order to protect that right. A man who steals
under no extraordinary pressure of need does what might become a com-
mon practice if not associated with as much terror as is found by expe-
rience to deter men from theft.
It may be said, in some exceptional emergency, “but many men are
now starving; ought not the theft of food, on the principle of prevention,
to be now punished with extreme severity, as otherwise it is likely to
become common?” Or in general, ought not severity to increase with
temptation or provocation, as a greater deterrent is needed to counter-
balance this? The case in which the temptation or provocation is excep-
tional has just been dealt with. But if abnormal temptation or provoca-
tion becomes common, as in a famine, or in some excited condition of
public feeling, then it must be remembered that not one right only, but
the system of rights as such, is what the State has to maintain. If starva-
tion is common, some readjustment of rights, or at least some temporary
protection of the right to live, is the remedy indicated, and not, or not
solely, increased severity in dealing with theft.206 If provocation becomes
common, then the rights of those provoked must be remembered, and
the provocation itself perhaps made punishable, like the singing of fac-
tion songs in Ireland. Punishment is to protect rights, not to encourage
wrongs.
Thus, we have seen the true nature and aims of punishment as fol-
lowing from the aim of the State in maintaining the system of rights
instrumental to the fullest life. The three main aspects of punishment
which we have considered are really inseparable, and each, if properly
explained, expands so as to include the others.207
We may, in conclusion, sum up the whole theory of State action in150/Bernard Bosanquet
the formula which we inherit from Rousseau—that Sovereignty is the
exercise of the General Will.
First. All State action is General in its bearing and justification,
even if particular, or rather concrete, in its details. It is embodied in a
system of rights, and there is no element of it which is not determined by
a bearing upon a public interest. The verification of this truth, through-
out, for example, our English system of public and private Acts of Par-
liament, would run parallel to the logical theory of the Universal Judg-
ment as it passes into Judgments whose subjects are proper names. But
the immediate point is that no rights are absolute, or detached from the
whole, but all have their warrant in the aim of the whole, which at the
same time implies their adjustment and regulation according to general
principles. This generality of law is practically an immense protection
to individuals against arbitrary interference. It makes every regulation
strike a class and not a single person.
And, secondly. All State action is at bottom the exercise of a Will;
the real Will, or the Will as logically implied in intelligences as such,
and more or less recognised as imperative upon them. And, therefore,
though in the form of force it acts through automatism, that is, not di-
rectly as conscious Will, but through a system which gives rise to acts
by influences apparently alien, yet the root and source of the whole
structure is of the nature of Will, and its end, like that of organic au-
tomatism, is to clear the road for true volition; it is “forcing men to be
free.” And in so far as by misdirection of the automatic208 process it
encroaches on the region of living Will—the region where the good
realises itself directly by its own force as a motive—it is “sawing off the
branch on which it sits, and superseding the aim by the instrument.
Chapter IX.
Rousseau’s Theory as Applied to the Modern
State: Kant, Fichte, Hegel.
1. Probably no other philosophical movement has ever focussed in itself
so much human nature as the post-Kantian Idealism. It has fallen to the
present writer to show elsewhere209 how the “finding of Greek art,” which
it owed to Winckelmann, gave it unrivalled insight into mind as embod-
ied in objects of sense. Here we have to deal with another source of its
ideas. As we pointed out in the first chapter, the ethical and political
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Jean Jacques from which the French Revolution drew its formulae. It
would not be true to say that it springs from this alone. Great philoso-
phers know how to fuse the materials they work in; and particularly the
modern abstraction of “freedom” was blended, for Hegel, with the idea
of concrete life through the tradition of the Greek city, with its affinity
for autonomy on the one hand and for beauty on the other. Nevertheless,
few lines of affiliation are better established in the history of philosophy
than that between Rousseau’s declaration that liberty is the quality of
man and the philosophy of Right as it developed from Kant to Hegel.
It has been suggested that the literary intercourse of France, En-
gland, and Germany was far closer in the eighteenth century than it is
to-day, in spite of the immense mechanical development of communica-
tion in the interval. National selfconsciousness and the divergent growth
of national minds have, it is urged, raised a barrier between peoples,
which existed in the last century to a far smaller degree.210 This question
of literary history lies beyond my subject; but at least it seems probable
that Rousseau had a power in Germany which no French writer of to-
day could possibly exercise outside his own country. His educational
influence211 alone forms a considerable chapter in the history of
Pädagogik, and touches closely on philosophy. Our psychologists of
childhood are his spiritual descendants, and indeed the question of the
development of the human being is closely akin to the question of lib-
erty.
His literary influence, as the prophet of nature and feeling, and the
champion of sentimental religion against the Philosophes, carried ev-
erything before it. He struck into the path which had been opened in
Germany by the translation of Thomson’s Seasons before 1750, and
followed by the Swiss critics and the idyllic poets, who were opponents
of the dominant pseudo-classicism.212 Jacobi, who passed some years of
his youth at Geneva, owed his doctrine of feeling as the faculty of reli-
gious truth in part at least to Rousseau. Klinger, whose drama, Sturm
und Drang, gave its name to the romantic and naturalist revolution,
marked by Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen (1773) and Schiller’s Räuber
(1781), was responsible, we are told, in later years, for the surprising
judgment that Rousseau (in Emile) is the young man’s best guide through
life.213 Even Schiller and Herder passed through a period of enthusiastic
admiration for Rousseau. It is exceedingly significant that Schiller’s
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Humanity are addressed expressly
to the problem of reconciling the claims of Nature214 and of the State152/Bernard Bosanquet
upon individual man. For, when Schiller suggests that the clue to the
required reconciliation between Nature and the State lies in the union of
feeling and intelligence which is found in Beauty, we have before us in a
single focus three main types of experience, from the fusion of which a
new idealism was to emerge.
2. Returning to our immediate subject, the Philosophy of Right, we
will consider for a moment the specific relation of Rousseau’s idea of
Freedom to Kantian or post-Kantian thought. It is permissible, perhaps,
to embody the chief part of what has to be said in extracts from works of
great original value and not very generally accessible. Not only the po-
ets and sentimentalists of Germany, but also the great philosophers,
distinctly recognised the debt of the German genius to the ideas of
Rousseau. The conception of the “Social Contract” has an importance
which surprises the modern reader in the political philosophy of Kant
and more especially of Fichte, and it is not till we come to Hegel that the
literal interpretation of the “Social Contract” is completely discrimi-
nated from the truth conveyed by the doctrine of the General Will. Apart
from all questions about the literal meaning of the “Social Contract,” it
is simple fact that the whole political philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and
Fichte is founded on the idea of freedom as the essence of man, first
announced —such was Hegel’s distinct judgment—by Rousseau. I be-
gin by citing the crucial passage from Hegel’s History of Philosophy,
which gives in a few lines the basis of his own theory of Right, as well
as his view of Rousseau’s position.215
After explaining that Rousseau treated the right of Government as
on one side, in its historical aspect, resting216 on force and compulsion,
Hegel continues:
“But the principle of this justification (the ‘absolute justification of
the State’) Rousseau makes the free will, and, disregarding the positive
right (or ‘law’) of States, he answers to the above question217 (as to the
justification or basis of the State) that man has free will, seeing that
‘Freedom is the distinctive quality of man.218 To renounce one s free-
dom, means to renounce one’s humanity. Not to be free is therefore a
renunciation of one’s human rights, and even of one’s duties.’ The slave
has neither rights nor duties. Rousseau says, therefore,219 ‘The funda-
mental problem is to find a form of association which shall protect and
defend at once the person and the property of every member with the
whole common force, and in which each individual, inasmuch as he
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free as before.220 The solution is given by the Social Contract; it
(Rousseau says) is this combination, to which each belongs through his
will.
“These principles, thus set up in the abstract, we cannot but take as
correct; yet ambiguity begins at once. Man is free; this is no doubt the
substantive nature of man; and in the State it is not only not abandoned,
but in fact it is therein first established. The freedom of nature, the
capacity of freedom, is not the actual freedom;  historical aspect, this is
incorrect unless it means that, this for nothing short of the State is the
actualisation of freedom.
“But the misunderstanding about the ‘General Will’ begins at the
following point. The notion of Freedom must not be taken in the sense
of the casual free-will of each individual, but in the sense of the reason-
able will, the will in and for itself.221 The general will is not to be re-
garded as compounded of the expressed individual wills,222 so that these
remain absolute; else the proposition would be true, ‘where the minority
has to obey the majority, there is no freedom.’ Rather the general will
must be the rational will, even though people are not aware of it; the
State, therefore, is no such association as is determined upon by indi-
viduals.
“The false apprehension of these principles does not matter to us.
What matters to us is that by their means it comes as a content into
consciousness, that man has in his mind Freedom as the downright ab-
solute, that the free will is the notion of man. It is just freedom that is the
self of thought; one who repudiates thought and talks of freedom knows
not what he is saying. The oneness of thought with itself223 is freedom,
the free will. Thought, only taken in the form of will, is the impulse to
break through224 one’s mere subjectivity, is relation to definite being,
realisation of one’s self, inasmuch as I will to make myself as an exis-
tent adequate to myself as thinking. The will is free only as that which
thinks.
“The principle of freedom dawned on the world in Rousseau, and
gave infinite strength to man, who thus apprehended himself as infinite.
This furnishes the transition to the Kantian philosophy, which, from a
theoretical point of view, took this principle as its basis. Knowledge was
thus directed upon its own freedom, and upon a concrete content,225
which it possesses in its consciousness.”
Everyone is familiar, in general terms, with the part played by the
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point out how definitely it comes to him in the form given it by Rousseau.
Omitting the whole subject of Kant’s educational interest,226 I will refer
to two passages from Kant’s early notes227 in connection with the tract
on the Feelings of the Sublime and the Beautiful, and two from the
Philosophy of Right, which first appeared in the autumn of 1796.
First, then, to establish the definite impulse communicated to Kant
in his earlier years by Rousseau in particular. “I am myself,” he writes,228
“a student by inclination. I feel the whole thirst for knowledge, and the
covetous restlessness that demands to advance in it, and again the satis-
faction of every step of progress. There was a time when I believed that
all this might constitute the honour of humanity, and I despised the crowd
that knows nothing. It was Rousseau who set me right. That dazzling
privilege disappeared; and I should think myself far less useful than
common artisans if I did not believe that my line of study might impart
value to all others in the way of establishing the rights of humanity.”
Kant seems, from the context, to be foreshadowing the idea of his
critical philosophy, as putting man in his place in the order of creation.
“If there is any science,” he says just below, “which man really needs, it
is that which I teach, to fill properly that place which is assigned to man
in creation; a science from which he can learn what one must be in order
to be human.”
This throws light on the curious passage in the same set of notes,229
where, in a discussion of the idea of Providence, Kant first refers to
Newton’s discovery of order in the multiplicity of the planetary mo-
tions, and then proceeds, “Rousseau first discovered, beneath the multi-
plicity of the forms assumed by man, the deeply latent nature of human-
ity, and the hidden law, according to which Providence is justified by his
observations. Before that the objection of Aiphonsus and of Manes230
held the field. After Newton and Rousseau, God is justified, and
henceforwards Pope’s doctrine is true.” “Pope’s doctrine” is no doubt
his Leibnitzian optimism, founded on a supposed insight into man’s true
place in creation. Rousseau’s “discovery,” which Kant here connects
with this doctrine, must be his assertion of man’s natural goodness and
freedom, which he tends to forfeit by departing in civilisation from the
place assigned him by nature. It is clear that Rousseau’s impeachment
of literature and civilisation had at this time made a considerable im-
pression upon Kant. It is all the more interesting to see Kant retracing,
on a very different scale, the development which Rousseau had initi-
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I subjoin two passages from the Philosophy of Right (1796), which
exhibit this later development, still in its connection with Rousseau’s
phraseology.231
“The innate Right is one only.—Freedom (independence of the con-
straining will of another), in as far as it can co-exist with the freedom of
every other according to a universal law, is this unique original right,
belonging to every human being by reason of his humanity.” An indica-
tion of the embodiment of this freedom in the State may be given as
follows:232
“All those three powers in the State (Sovereignty or the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial), are offices; and, as essential, and nec-
essarily proceeding from the idea of a State in general with reference to
the establishment (Constitution) of one, are offices of State. They con-
tain the relation of a universal supreme Power (which, considered ac-
cording to laws of freedom, can be no other than the united people), to
the crowd of individuals which compose it qua the governed; that is, of
the ruler (imperans) to the subject (subditus). The act whereby the people
constitutes itself into a State, or strictly speaking only the idea of that
Act, according to which idea alone the justice of the Act can be con-
ceived, is the original contract, according to which all (omnes et singuli)
of the people surrender their external freedom, in order at once to re-
ceive it back again as members of a commonwealth, that is, of the people
regarded as a State (universi). And one cannot say, The State, or man in
the State, has sacrificed a part of its innate outward freedom for a cer-
tain end; but rather, he has totally abandoned his wild lawless freedom
in order to find his entire freedom again undiminished in a lawful depen-
dence, that is, in a condition of right or law; (undiminished), because
this dependence springs from his own legislative will.” It is remarkable,
in face of these general views, that both Kant and Fichte follow Rousseau,
for reasons which Kant explains from the political conditions of the
time, in distrusting representative government.233
The passage just cited is of course a reproduction of Rousseau’s
view modified by interpretation very much in the sense in which we
interpreted it above.
3. When we pass to Fichte (whose earlier work upon Natural Right
was published actually before that of Kant), we observe the idea of
contract in the act of transmuting itself, though by an imperfect transi-
tion, into the idea of an organic whole. For Fichte, the State is a neces-
sary implication of the human self; for a self involves a society of selves,156/Bernard Bosanquet
and law or right is the relation between selves in a bodily world. And the
“contract” on which citizenship rests, by the fact that it is general,234
forges an indiscernible unity of the social whole. In this connection,
Fichte makes the remarkable claim to be first to apply the simile of an
organism to the whole civic relation. I cite an important passage:235
“As far as I know, the idea of the whole of the State has so far only
been established through the ideal combination of individuals, and thereby
the true insight into the nature of this relation has been cut off.” You
must, he urges, not merely have an idea of combination; you must show
a bond of union beyond the idea, or making the idea necessary. “In our
account this has been achieved. In the notion of that which is to be
protected, in accordance with the necessary uncertainty which individual
will need the visible protection, and still further, which it will have
advantaged invisibly in the case of a wrongful will suppressed by the
law before its outbreak, all individuals are forced into unity.
“The most fitting simile to elucidate this notion is that of an organised
natural product, which has often been employed in modern times to
describe the different branches of the public power as a unity, but not,
so far as I know, to throw light on the whole civic relation. Just as, in the
natural product, every part can be what it is only in this combination,
and out of this combination simply would not be this (indeed outside all
organic combination there would simply be nothing...): just so it is only
in the combination of the State that man attains a definite position in the
series of things, a point of rest in nature; and each attains this determi-
nate position towards others, and towards Nature, only through the fact
that he is in this determinate combination. . . . In the organic body every
part continually maintains the whole, and while it maintains it, is itself
maintained thereby; just such is the citizen’s relation to the State.
Here we seem to be back with Plato and Aristotle. We are in fact too
near to Plato; for the distinction between maintenance of the citizen s
determinate activity, and maintenance of the general conditions of such
activity, being destroyed by Fichte in his desire to make State action
positive and not negative, the conclusion necessarily arises that the citi-
zen must be secured and maintained in his definite activity or occupa-
tion, and from this springs the notion of the closed commercial State;
“closed” against foreign trade in order that the government may be able
to determine prices and assign occupations. In other words, the basis of
the State is still the Ego conceived as the individual self; it is not the
social good operating by its own power on intelligent will. And, arisingThe Philosophical Theory of the State/157
from this individualism, the precautions which seem necessary to pro-
tect and sustain the individual in his fixed relation to the whole, make
Fichte’s “Closed Commercial State” perhaps the earliest document of a
rigorous State Socialism. Freedom, as he himself recognises to be prima
facie the case, is annihilated by the provisions for its protection.236 It is
curious to see Rousseau’s phrase “forced to be free,”237 which refers in
him to the supremacy of law, reappearing as a defence of the enforce-
ment of leisure time,238 as though freedom were not realised in labour
and in loyalty. Here is Hegel’s judgment of the transition we have just
been considering. “Kant began to found right on freedom, and Fichte
too in his Natural Right made freedom his principle; but it is, as in
Rousseau, the freedom of the particular individual. This is a great be-
ginning; but in order to get to particular results they were obliged to
accept presuppositions. The universal (for them) is not the spirit, the
substance of the whole, but the external mechanical negative power
against individuals. . . . The individuals remain always hard and nega-
tive against one another; the prison-house, the bonds, become ever more
oppressive, instead of the State being apprehended as the realisation of
freedom.”239
4. To apprehend the State as the realisation of freedom was the aim
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which has perhaps been more grossly
misrepresented than any work of a great political philosopher, except-
ing Plato’s Republic.
Popular criticism will tell us that Hegel found his ideal in the Prus-
sian bureaucracy, and will further hint that his doing so was to his ad-
vantage. Such suggestions imply two misapprehensions, for one of which
Hegel’s tactlessness was responsible, while the other depends on a genuine
difficulty attending any philosophical analysis of society. I will try to
throw light on each of these misapprehensions.
(a) If Hegel had wished to have a partisan tendency attributed to his
book, he could not have timed it better nor written a preface more cer-
tain to mislead. In 1820, when the book was published, the minds both
of governments and of peoples were full of irritation. The anti-constitu-
tional reaction had recently declared itself.240 The demonstration at the
Wartburg, celebrating the anniversary of the Reformation, and of the
Battle of Leipzig, took place in October, 1817. The unaccountable change
in the ideas of the Czar from Liberalism to reaction took place, we are
assured,241 in June, 1818. The murder of Kotzebue, a Russian agent,
reactionary journalist, and decayed dramatist, took place in March, 1819.158/Bernard Bosanquet
Kotzebue seems to have been popularly credited with perverting the
views of the Czar. His assassination had an effect in no way related to
his real importance. Hardenberg, the Prussian minister, exclaimed on
hearing of it that a Prussian constitution had now become impossible.
Innocent persons were arrested in Prussia at Metternich’s instigation,
and private papers were seized and published in a garbled form. The
publication of Hegel’s book with a preface attacking Fries for some
expressions used by him at the Wartburg festival, took place, as we
said, in 1820, and Hegel had moved from Heidelberg to Berlin, having
obtained the honour of a Berlin professorship, in 1818. Small wonder
that “it was pointed out that the new professor was a favourite of the
leading minister, that his influence was dominant in scholastic appoint-
ments, and that occasional gratuities from the Crown proved his accept-
ability,” or that Fries remarked that Hegel’s theory of the State had
grown, “not in the garden of science, but on the dunghill of servility.”242
Hegel himself “was aware that he had planted a blow in the face of a
shallow and pretentious sect, and that his book had given great offence
to the demagogic folk.”243
And yet, so far as the essence of Hegel’s political philosophy is
concerned, there is nothing in all this. The first sketch of the Philosophy
of Right was published in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sci-
ences in 1817, before Hegel left Heidelberg. His political interest, in its
gradual development, can be traced back in unpublished writings to
1802.244 He started from the conception of the Greek State, on which his
early sketch of the ethical system (1802, unpublished in his lifetime)
was founded. And his subsequent development consisted in enlarging
this conception by drawing out its framework to include the more ac-
cented freedom of modern life, as he divined it from the attentive study
both of English and of German politics. His substantive political theory
never changed, except by development, in accordance with his general
attitude towards the differences between Greek and modern life.
(b) “But,” popular criticism will rejoin, “here we have Hegel’s ideal
State, depicted by his own hand, and it is pretty much the Prussian State
of his time, tempered by a few references to English politics. Is not this
a narrow horizon and a low ideal ?” This criticism is of value, because
it leads up to an important feature of true political theory.
To depict what most people call “an ideal State” is no more the
object of political philosophy than it is the object, say, of Carpenter’s
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political philosophy is to understand what a State is, and it is not neces-
sary for this purpose that the State which is analysed should be “ideal,”
but only that it should be a State; just as the nature of life is represented
pretty nearly as well by one living man as by another.
“Every State,”245 Hegel says, “even if your principles lead you to
pronounce it bad, even if you detect this or that deficiency in it, always
has (especially if it belongs to the more developed States of our time)
the essential moments of its existence in it. But because it is easier to
discover defects than to grasp the affirmative, people easily fall into the
error of allowing particular aspects to lead them to forget the inner or-
ganism of the State. The State is no work of art, it stands in the world,
that is, in the sphere of caprice, accident, and error; evil behaviour is
able to mar it in many respects. But the ugliest human being, a criminal,
a sick man, or a cripple, is all the same a living human being; the affir-
mative, his life, persists in spite of the defect, and this affirmative is
what we are concerned with here.”
Of course, no comparison is quite precise, and it may be urged that
the State is more artificial than a human body. However this may be,246
we shall at least understand Hegel’s attitude better, and, as I venture to
think, adopt by far the most fruitful standpoint for ourselves, if we look
at political philosophy like one who is trying to ascertain what is the
nature of human life as he observes it in any or every human body. If the
life is there, its essentials are there, and his aim is to understand them.
No doubt a door is here opened to argument with regard to what logi-
cians call a pure case.’‘ In understanding life “as such,” you must, it
would seem, purge out its mere defects, in regard to which it is not
“life,” and the remainder, what you pledge yourself to as essential, must
be ex hypothesi your “ideal” of life. And perhaps there is no reason to
reject this responsibility if confined to the emphasis of elements and
interconnection of facts. It cannot apply to more.
We cannot construct an ideal body by reducing life, nor an ideal
polity by reducing mind, to its pure case or essentials, since we cannot
construct organisms247 or history at all. And it is because this is always
being forgotten that the duty of understanding rather than constructing
has to be insisted upon. It is true that in understanding, as in construct-
ing, we imply essential relations, and so incur responsibility, and are
liable to betray a bias; but still, life can be understood by help of any
creature that is alive, and. therefore it is not the example with which the
student works, but the insight which he shows, that is the decisive point.160/Bernard Bosanquet
5. We have to begin by realising what is involved in the fact that we
are about to treat the analysis of a Modern State as a chapter in the
Philosophy of Mind. For Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (or of Law), though
published by him as an independent work, is essentially an expansion of
paragraphs which form one subdivision of his Philosophy of Mind, it-
self the third and concluding portion of the Encyclopaedia of Philoso-
phy, of which the two earlier portions are the Logic and the Philosophy
of Nature.
We saw in the second chapter of the present work that the mere
force of facts has driven modern sociologists to handle their science in a
more or less intimate connection with Psychology. The differentia of
society, we saw, has been stated in various formulae of a psychological
character. But it seemed to us that, owing to a neglect of the logic of
identity, the nature of mind was broken up by such unreal distinctions as
that between invention and imitation, varied by the unreal reduction of
the one to the other,248 and also that an unexplained separation and par-
allelism survived as between the individual and the social mind, bearing
witness to the vitality of the superstition which Rousseau’s insight picked
out for condemnation. We do not deny that mind may be more than
social; but in as far as it is social it is still real mind, and that means that
it is not something other than what we know as individual lives,249 a pale
and unreal reflection of them, but it is a characteristic which belongs to
their most intimate constitution. This was Plato’s analysis of moral au-
tonomy, and his work remains classically valid, needing only expansion
and interpretation in applying it to modern free intelligence and social
self-government.
The position of the analysis of a State in the Philosophy of Mind
may be briefly indicated as follows. When we embark on the study of
ordinary Psychology, we take the individual human being as we find
him to-day. We accept him as a formed individual, distinguishing him-
self from external things, and possessing what we call a will—a capac-
ity of seeking his own satisfaction, which he represents to himself in
general ideas by the help of language. We analyse the self and will with
their aspects of memory, attention, association, impulse, and emotion.
But all modern psychologists are aware that this formed self and will
has much history behind it, and presupposes a long genesis connecting
it with simpler forms of soul-life. Hegel, indeed, was among the first in
modern times to see how far back the story of mind must be taken. The
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phase in the romance of which mind is the hero. Before it come the
chapters of Anthropology, which treat of the fixation of a soul in the
disciplined powers and habits of a human body, and then the account250
of a consciousness which gradually rises from a struggling perception
of objects around it to a moral and scientific certainty of being at home
in the world.
The story of mind, then, begins long before the free mind, the object
of Psychology to-day, has appeared on the scene. And as to this there
would be no great difference of opinion. The peculiarity of Hegel’s treat-
ment is that his romance of the intelligence not only begins long before
the phase of free mind is reached, but continues long after. Investigation
can no more stop at the individual of to-day than it can begin with him.
His “mind” is not a separable entity, and throughout the story no such
entity has appeared. It has been convenient for Hegel to treat the earlier
division of the Philosophy of Mind, comprising the Anthropology, Phe-
nomenology, and Psychology, as dealing par excellence with Mind Sub-
jective. This is because its main purpose was to trace the growth of
“subjectivity,” the emergence of the man of full mental stature, aware of
himself, of his ideas and purposes, and confident in his “subjectivity”—
his self-hood— against all comers.
But the following division of the work, under the title of Mind Ob-
jective, deals with a necessary implication which might have been noted
at any point of the entire history of consciousness, though at any earlier
point it could have been treated as referring to mind only by anticipa-
tion.
Here, however, the problem can no longer be deferred. The “free
mind” does not explain itself and cannot stand alone. Its impulses can-
not be ordered, or, in other words, its purposes cannot be made determi-
nate, except in an actual system of selves. Except by expressing itself in
relation to an ordered life, which implies others, it cannot exist. And,
therefore, not something additional and parallel to it, which might or
might not exist, but a necessary form of its own action as real and deter-
minate, is the, actual fabric in which it utters itself as Society and the
State. This is what Hegel treats in the second division of the Philosophy
of Mind under the name of Mind Objective. It is not for him ultimate. A
particular society stands in time, and is open to criticism and to destruc-
tion. Beyond it lies the reality, continuous with mind as known in the
State, but eternal as the former is perishable, which as Absolute Mind is
open to ‘human experience in Art, Religion, and Philosophy.162/Bernard Bosanquet
We will pursue in the following chapter Hegel’s analysis of the
modern State as Mind Objective, a magnified edition, so to speak, of
Plato’s Republic, bringing before the eye in full detail distinctions and
articulations which were there invisible.
Chapter X.
 The Analysis of a Modern State. Hegel’s
“Philosophy of Right.”
1. We are about to analyse a modern State into groups of facts which
are also ways of thinking. And a question may arise in what sense the
connection is to be understood which will be alleged to bind together
these groups of facts or points of view. When it is urged that group b or
view b is suggested and made necessary by the shortcomings of group a
or view a, does this imply that group a or its idea came into existence
first, and group b or the notion of it sprang up subsequently or as an
effect of the former? And could such a relation be reasonably main-
tained as between the component parts of a unity like the State?
An answer may be indicated as follows. We are dealing, in society
and in the State, with an ideal fact. As a fact, a form of life, society has
always been a many-sided creature, meeting the varied needs of human
nature by functions no less varied. As an ideal fact, however, its ad-
vance has partaken of the nature of theoretical progress. In the continu-
ous attempt to deal satisfactorily with the needs of intelligent beings, the
mind, the intelligent will, has thrown itself with predominant interest
now into one of its functions and now into another. And this has not
been a chance order of march. Obviously, what it has emphasised and
modified in the second place has depended both positively and nega-
tively on what it had emphasised and modified in the first place. Posi-
tively, because when one step is thoroughly secured the next may be
definitely attempted. Negatively, because the definite attainment of one
step exposes the limitations of what has been achieved, and the need for
another. At every stage the will is dissatisfied with the expression of
itself which it has created. Till some public order has been established,
morality can hardly find expression; but when a legal system is thor-
oughly in force it becomes apparent how far the letter may fall short of
the spirit. We see the same action of intelligence in pure theory. Every
conquest of science leads to a new departure. It suggests it by its suc-
cess, and demands it by its failure.The Philosophical Theory of the State/163
Now, in science it may or may not be the case that the connection
which has led to a discovery enters permanently as a discernible factor
into the structure of knowledge. The re-organisation of experience may
sweep away the steps which led to it. But in the living fact of society this
is not so. Its many sides are actual and persist, and the emphasis laid
from time to time on the principle of each— e.g. on positive law, on
family ties, on economic bonds—merely serves to accent an element
which has its permanent place in the whole. Thus, there must always be
family ties and economic bonds. But at one time everything tends to be
construed in terms of kinship, at another time in terms of exchange. And
the tendency means a difference of actual balance between the functions
as well as a different theory. The positive and negative connection of
elements like these, the true place and limit of each, is permanently
rooted in human nature, but may be elucidated by the explicit logic of
their attempt and failure to give the one—to the whole social fabric. It
follows that the social whole grows, like a great theory, in adequacy to
the needs which are its facts; and the dissatisfaction of the will with its
own expression, in other words, the contradictions which practical in-
telligence is continually attempting to remove, becomes more like sug-
gestion than flat contradiction—or change, as we say, becomes less revo-
lutionary. It may seem to be a difference between the social whole and a
scientific theory that the former, as it grows, creates new difficulties, by
creating new and freshly contradictory matter, as in the social problems
of civilisation; while the latter, as we imagine, deals with an unchanging
experience. But this distinction is less true than it appears, and the com-
parison with the growth of a theory will always throw light on the true
nature of the will and its continuous effort to satisfy itself.
2. Right or Law may be taken in the widest sense as including the
whole manifestation of Will in an actual world—“the actual body of all
the conditions of freedom,”251 the realm of realised freedom, the world
of mind produced out of itself, as a second nature.”252 It is a merit of the
German term “Reckt”253 that it maintains the connection between the
law and the spirit of law,254 and almost of itself prohibits the separation
between positive law, and will, custom or sentiment, which underlies
such a theory as Austin’s.
This whole sphere of Right or Law, the mind as actualised in Soci-
ety and the State, naturally divides itself on the principle which has just
been explained, into three connected groups of ideal facts or points of
view. The first, or simplest and most inevitable, of these, may be called164/Bernard Bosanquet
the “letter of the law” as we come upon it most especially in the law of
property—Shylock’s law —the sheer fact, as it seems, that the world is
appropriated by legal persons
The second, obviously conditioned by the first both positively and
negatively, may be described as the morality of conscience; the revolt of
the will against the letter of the law, though this was its own direct
expression of itself (e.g., in taking things as property); and its demand
to recognise as right nothing but what springs from itself as the good
will.
And thirdly, there is the reality or concrete experience in which the
two former sets of facts, or ideas, find their true place and justifica-
tion.— the completed theory, so to speak, which adjusts and explains
the narrower views founded on onesided contact with life. This is indi-
cated to consist in “social observance,” or “ethical use and wont”; the
system of working mind where the true will appears as incarnate in a
way of living. This, like the others, it must be remembered, is a tact,
though akin to a theory. Not only does it explain and justify the other
factors, but its existence has enabled them to exist, as theirs has also
been essential to it. And yet each of the three, as one aspect of society
which under certain influences may catch the eye, has at times claimed
—is, indeed, constantly claiming—predominance, and has thus brought
into relief its own defects and the need of the complementary ideas. We
will speak of these moods of mind or kinds of experience in their order,
expecting a further sub-division when we come to treat of the third.
3. “Law,” then, in the directest possible sense —the minimum sense,
so to speak—is the hard literal fact that it is a rule of the world we live
in for things to be appropriated by persons. This is the first or minimum
change of the world from mere matter into the instruments of mind, and
it is a necessary change. Things have no will of their own, and it is by
having a will asserted upon them that they become organs of life. In the
same way, it is by assertion in external things that the will first becomes
a fact in the material world. Property is “the first reality of freedom.”255
It is not the mere provision for wants, but the material counterpart of
will. Contract belongs to this sphere, the sphere of property. It is an
agreement of persons about an external thing—a “common will,” but
not one “general” or in its own nature like that involved in the State.
Thus, it is a confusion of spheres to apply the idea of contract to the
State, for the State is an imperative necessity of man’s nature as ratio-
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certain external things. The idea of the social contract is a confusion of
the same type as that by which public rights and functions were treated
as private property in the middle age. The attributes of private property
are nothing more than the conditions of “personal” existence, and ab-
surdity results if they are transferred to functions of the State.
This phase or view of law as, in its letter, an ultimate and absolute
rule, may be illustrated, Hegel says, by the Stoic notion that there is
only one virtue and one vice; by the Draconic conception that every
offence demands the extreme penalty; and by “the barbarity of the for-
mal code of honour, which found in every injury an unpardonable in-
sult.” It might also be illustrated by Austin’s theory of law as a com-
mand enforced by a penalty; or by the theories which account for prop-
erty simply by the fact of occupancy or of labour mixed with the thing.
The common point of all these views is that they treat the law, not as a
part of a living system, ultimately resting on the will to maintain a cer-
tain type of life, but as something absolute in its separateness, and equally
sacred in all its accidents and inequalities.
Now, this emphasis and idea of law, being the exaggeration of a
single and direct necessity, the necessity of order and property, may be
called “primitive” or barbarous, but it cannot of course be identified
with the earliest state of social authority known to history or to anthro-
pology. There we should probably find law undifferentiated from cus-
tom and from religious sentiment, and consequently, though rigid enough,
not in any such one-sided absoluteness as we have been describing. All
we can say is that this is the way in which law must come to be regarded
whenever its living spirit is forgotten, and an unreal absoluteness is
assigned to it; and this connection of principle verifies itself as a fact in
recurrent historical phenomena, and in fallacies which perpetually reap-
pear.
4. Within the whole fabric of right or realised will, the element which
naturally asserts itself by antagonism to the letter of the law is the mo-
rality of conscience, conscientiousness, or the idea of the Good Will. It
is connected with the letter of the law, as Hegel puts it, by the various
degrees of wrong. The will, that is to say, finds itself at variance in or
with256 the order of law and property which it has created as its direct
and necessary step to freedom. Its realised theory, so to speak, is found
to break down at a certain point, by being in contradiction with the
needs which it was created to meet. “Summum jus, summa injuria.” We
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again it may not be so. What the will has awakened to, whether right or
wrong, is that it can acquiesce in nothing which does not come home to
it as fulfilling its own principle. What so comes home to it is what it
calls “good,” and it cannot accept any order or necessity which it cannot
will as good, i.e., as satisfying its own idea.
When this phase of reaction is pushed to its logical extreme, we
have the modern doctrine of my conscience and my pure will. It is the
conflict of the inner self with the outer world, expressed in history through
the Stoic and through some forms of the Christian consciousness (espe-
cially the Protestant consciousness), and in philosophy through the
Kantian doctrine of the good will, uttered in the famous sentence, “Noth-
ing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it which can be
called good without qualification except a good will.”257 Nothing is worth
doing but what one ought, and because one ought.
The criticism to which this principle has been subjected is familiar
to students of ethics. Its point is, in brief, that there is no way of con-
necting any particular action with the mere idea of a pure will. The
forms assumed by evasions of this difficulty, which we fall into when
we desire wholly to separate the inner from the outer, or the “ought”
from the “is,” are treated by Hegel with unsurpassable vigour and
subtlety, as indeed the annihilating criticism of this conception is prima-
rily due to him. The essence of the matter is that the pure will directed
towards good for the sake of good having no real connection with any
detailed conduct, may be alleged by self-deception in support of any
behaviour whatever, and out of this may spring the whole sophistry and
hypocrisy of “pure intention.” He makes the shrewd observation,258 which
is still of interest, that the extreme Protestant doctrine of conscience
may take the form of ethical vacuity or instability, and that this had in
his time been the cause of many Protestants going over to Rome, to
secure some sort of moorings, if not precisely the stability of thought.
Still, out of all this one-sidedness, there survives the permanent ne-
cessity that an intelligent being can acquiesce only in what enters into
the object of his will. It is his will which affirms the aim to which his
nature draws him, and he is absolutely debarred from reposing in any-
thing which does not appeal to his will. The subjective will is the only
soil on which freedom can be a reality.
So, within the general organism of Right or realised Free-will, we
have found two opposite groups of facts—for the aspirations of intelli-
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opposition, and yet are necessary to the expression of the same underly-
ing need—the letter of the law, and the freedom of conscience.
5. Hegel’s name for the third term, which, as he puts it, expresses
the “truth” of these extremes, may be rendered “the Ethical System,” or
“the Moral Life,” or “Social Ethics.” It expresses “the truth” of the
extremes, as a good theory may express the truth of two one-sided views.
Only, as we have said, it is a fact as well as a theory, and therefore is
something which actually contains what these two views demand, and
does the work which they, and the facts they rely on, exhibit as neces-
sary to be done. This relation is not obscure or unprecedented. Every
institution, every life, works as a theory, and either masters its facts or
fails to master them; though not every theory is a life or an institution.
The German word which the above-mentioned phrases attempt to
render is “Sittlichkeit.” The word takes its meaning from “Sitte,” which
in common usage is equivalent to “custom.” Hegel’s use of the term, in
his later writings, as opposed to “Moralilät,” and as indicating, in com-
parison with it, a fuller and truer phase of life, is an intentional declara-
tion of war against the Kantian principle of the pure good will, and is
the gist of Hegel’s ethico-political view in a nutshell.259 The word would
most naturally apply to the life of a community in which law, custom,
and sentiment were not yet very sharply distinguished. According to
accepted views, the communities of ancient Greece, before they were
stirred by the reflective movement which is associated with the names of
Socrates and the Sophists, would be examples of a disposition and or-
der of life which the word “Sittlichkeit” might denote. And it was in the
Greek communities, as is shown by the work which he sketched as early
as 1802,260 that Hegel found this suggestion of a whole in which law and
custom, duty and disposition, were absolutely at one. He subsequently
modified the conception in accordance with the modern idea of freedom,
by allowing a greater emphasis and relief to its component parts, and
insisting (against Plato’s Republic, for instance,) on the principle of
individual choice, initiative, and property, as necessary to the complete
communion of intelligent beings. As we have just seen, indeed, he intro-
duces reflective morality or conscientiousness into the sphere of Right,
to represent the full nature of mind, which is only exhibited in a con-
sciousness which pursues its aims of its own choice and for their own
sake.
The Ethical System, then, or Social Ethics, is put forward as the
ideal fact which includes, and does the work of, both the literal law and168/Bernard Bosanquet
the moral will, alike in practice and as a theory. It is the idea of freedom
developed (i.) into a present world, and (ii.) into the nature of self-con-
sciousness.
For (i.), in the first place, the ethical system, or the ways of acting
which make up social ethics, constitute a present and actual world. So
far it partakes of the nature of the literal law and order, the system of
property-holding, which, as we have seen, is all but a natural fact. So-
cial Ethic, we might say, is a physical fact. The bodily habits and exter-
nal actions of a people lncorporate it. It transforms the face of a coun-
try, “domesticating the untamed earth.”261 Each individual has his own
bodily existence in a deterinmate mode as a part of the ethical life of
society. The rules and traditions of ethical living are, as has been said,
“the nature of things.” They are as hard, as “objective” an order as
“sun, moon, mountains, rivers, and all objects of nature.”262 Man lives
according to them before he knows that he does so, and always, in a
great degree, independently of knowing that he does so. As this group of
facts, or considered from this point of view, the ethical system is the
body of the moral world.
(ii.) But it is also and no less the very nature of self-consciousness.
It is as much a demand of man’s intelligence or an inner and universal
law as the “pure will” itself.263 The difference between them is that the
Ethical System is a system, a world, though from the point of view of
will regarded as inner, that is to say, as something which is the motive
and fulfils the demand of consciousness. Thus, it bears the character of
a thoroughly systematised theory, as contrasted with the idea of a good
will, which is a mere general point of view. And it is because of this
systematic character that it is enabled to connect the individual or par-
ticular will with the universal spirit of the community. It is only in a
system that a particular fact can be connected with a universal law, as
the planetary motions are with the law of gravitation. The particular
will, as we have explained above, is universalised by its relation to a
systematic purpose which it partly implies and partly realises. A man
wishes for this thing or that thing, but not at any price. The reservations
to which his wish is subject, by reason of other purposes and postulates
of life, are known to him only in part; but if they could be stated in full,
they would constitute the system of his life as realised in the universal
life of the community. It is precisely analogous to the process which a
common judg ment of perception has to go through in becoming a scien-
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modified in accordance with them. And when this is done, we have no
longer a fact, but a science.
Regarded from this point of view, as the substance of the individual
Will, the Ethical System is the Soul of the moral world.
In analysing the Ethical System, we shall say nothing of “duties or
“virtues.’‘ Duty is in each case what the relation requires—the attach-
ment of the universal system of will to the individual life. Virtue is a
habit of such action, considered as embodied in the nature of an indi-
vidual. The idea of virtue and virtuousness is not, in Hegel’s view, alto-
gether suitable to the members of an ethical commonwealth. It belongs
rather to a time of undeveloped social life, when ethical principles and
the realisation of them are ascribed to the nature of peculiarly gifted
individuals. Virtue or excellence, to the Greek moralist, for instance,
suggested doing something better than the average, or being in some
way specially gifted, and it is still apt to indicate the desire to be some-
thing exceptional, and not simply to find yourself in genuine service.
The meaning of the words to-day tends to narrow itself to certain spe-
cial relations, and does not indicate that life of the member in the whole,
which is the essence of what we really value.
The Ethical System, or the Order of Social Ethics, then—the mind
and conduct of the citizen in Christendom—may be regarded as affirm-
ing freedom in three principal aspects, necessarily connected, and supple-
menting one another. Outwardly these aspects are different groups of
facts—different institutions; inwardly they are different moods or dis-
positions of the one and indivisible human mind.
Thus, Hegel’s analysis regards the social whole or system of social
ethics from three points of view. First, in respect of the Family; sec-
ondly, in respect of what he has entitled Bourgeois Society; and thirdly,
in respect of the Political Organism, or the State in the strict sense.
It is to be borne in mind that, like the three principal divisions in the
sphere of Right, these headings represent explicit theories of society, as
well as groups of facts.
6. Beginning once more, within an ordered social sphere, at the
ethical factor which stands nearest to the natural world, and has taken,
so to speak, the minimum step into the realm of purpose and conscious-
ness, we start from the family. As the family exists in a modern civilised
community, it is something necessary to society and the State, but abso-
lutely distinct from both,
It first (a) represents the fact of the natural basis of social relations,170/Bernard Bosanquet
being the embodiment of natural feeling in the form of love, both as
between the parents, and as embodied for them in the children. It is in
accordance with Hegel’s general views of the meaning of a system that
he sees this element of mind primarily represented by the family, as an
organ preserved and differentiated ad koc, and not, or not merely, dis-
tributed indefinitely throughout the community. Thus, the modern fam-
ily represents for him a higher stage of civilisation—an organ to a fuller
embodiment of mind—than the clan or tribe, or, in short, than any form
of community in which the whole bond of union rests on merely natural
feeling, kindness, generosity, or affection. In the nation, indeed, a tinge
of natural affection, a colouring of unity by kinship, survives, just as
feeling runs through the experience of the individual mind. But the dis-
tinctive character of the State is clear intelligence, explicit law and sys-
tem, and so the natural basis of feeling, though necessary to be pre-
served and spiritualised, achieves these needs in the family as a special
organ, and not in the State as such.
All those theories, therefore, which tend to assimilate the State to a
family by a sort of levelling down of the former or levelling up of the
latter (Plato’s Republic, the phalanstery, paternal government, and the
like) involve for Hegel a mere confusion of relations. They recognise an
element which is essential to society, and may truly be said to be even its
foundation. But they do not see its right place in the whole, and do not
understand that in order to attain a stronger and deeper unity (which is,
in short, a stronger and deeper mind) the different elements must be
allowed a greater emphasis and relief, and their respective characteris-
tics must not be slurred or scamped.
But (b), in the second place, the family is a factor in the rational
whole, the State, though its function par excellence is that of the natural
basis of society. Hence its nature and sanction is ethical—it rests neither
on mere feeling on the one hand, nor on mere contract on the other. It
has a public side, and the acceptance of a universal obligation by a
declaration in explicit language (language being the stamp of the uni-
versal), in face of the community, is an essential part of marriage, and
not a mere accident or accessory, as the votaries of feeling have urged.
This view is aimed against the confusion which finds the sole essence of
marriage in feeling. This is a perpetually recurring contention, repre-
sented in Hegel’s day by Friedrich von Schlegel’s Lucinde, which ar-
gues that the form of marriage destroys the value of passion. Hegel’s
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tinct sides of a many-sided fact.
(c) The ethical aspect of the family264  shows itself in the nature and
organisation of the household, as an institution embodying permanent
interests and relations of the two persons who are its head, and as an
organ of public duties in the bodily and spiritual nurture of the children.
The permanent and equal relation of the heads of the household, in-
volved in its nature as the ethical aspect of the family, implies monogamy,
and it is the monogamous family alone which can count as a true ele-
ment of the ethical order.
(d) The household, being the true and operative ethical organ which
makes parentage into family, is the unit which demands to be respected
and protected by the State against the less differentiated forms of con-
sanguinity, such as the clan. The true family starts from marriage and
the foundation of a household, and in the early development of law we
find the State, with a just instinct, protecting the household against the
clan, e.g.,by conferring the power of bequest. This power, though now
it may imply a discretion mainly hostile to the family, presented itself in
early law rather as a means of perpetuating the separate household as
against the pretensions of the clan to interfere with its property.
Thus, the monogamous family is naturally and necessarily, to some
extent, a unit in respect of property ; the children, at least, being inevi-
tably under tutelage and incapable of self-support, even if economic
equality asserts itself as between husband and wife. This peculiar rela-
tion in respect of property is rooted in the unique nature of the house-
hold, as an organ for the guardianship of immature lives, and as a unity
of feeling rather than of explicit thought. It is noticeable that progress
tends to introduce the distinctions of property within its unity265 (though
for children this can never go very far), and very slightly to introduce
the relations of the family into the outside world. In as far as such dis-
tinctions come to be made, the nature and functions of the household
being undisturbed, a somewhat higher intensity of ethical union is ren-
dered necessary, and will no doubt assert itself.
7. When the man (or woman266) arrives at maturity and leaves the
safe harbour of the family, he finds himself, prima facie, isolated in a
world of conflicting self-interests. He has his living to make, or his
property to administer. He is tied to others, in appearance, only by the
system of wants and work, with the elementary function which is neces-
sary to it, viz, its police functions and the administration of justice.
It is this phase of social life, and the temper or disposition corre-172/Bernard Bosanquet
sponding to it, which Hegel indicates by the expression Bourgeois Soci-
ety.267 It presents itself to him as the opposite extreme of life and mind to
that embodied in the family. It is an aggregate of families—for the units
of the Bourgeois Society are heads of households— as seen from the
outside, in the great system of industry and business, where a man has
to find his work and do it. It is, in mind, the presence of definite though
limited aims, calculation and self-interest.268
Bourgeois Society is the aspect of the social whole insisted on by
the classical political economy, by which, as an achievement in the way
of reducing complex appearances to principles, Hegel was much im-
pressed. It is, again, the view of society embodied in the conception of
the purely legal269 State, and its principle is confused with that of the
State proper by one set of theorists, as that of the family is by another.
It is the peculiarity of Hegel’s view—probably the most definitely
original, as it is the most famous, of all his political ideas—to contend
that this aspect of society, with the form of consciousness belonging to
it, is necessary to a modern State. According to his logic, indeed, it is
inevitable that every true whole shall have an aspect of “difference,” of
breaking up into particulars.
The principle of the ancient State, as concentratedly expressed in
Plato’s Republic, was weak and undeveloped, and fell short of the true
claims of intelligence,270 just because it dared not really let the indi-
vidual go—let him assert himself as himself. “Subjectivity” was a prin-
ciple fatal to it. Not that there was an iron oppression in the States of
antiquity. The individual was, for an onlooker, magnificently developed.
His limitations were in him, and did not oppress him; but for all that,
free choice and the career open to talents were not for him.
The modern demand—such is Hegel’s conception—is harder and
higher. The individual’s life is not predetermined by his birth, but he is
thrown face to face with economic necessity, which is a form of the
universal end. He has to strip off his crudeness and vanity, and, of him-
self, mould himself into something which fulfils a want. This is a step
without which there can be no true freedom—the giving one’s self by
one’s own act a definite place in the region of external necessity, the
“becoming something,” or attaching oneself to a definite class of service
renderers. Thus, we are startled to find culture or education treated in
general, and in respect of its indispensableness, under the head of the
Bourgeois Society. For culture is the liberation from one’s own caprices,
and the acceptance of a universal task. It is a severe process, and there-The Philosophical Theory of the State/173
fore unpopular, but it is a necessary one if we are to have true freedom.
The criticism that such a world and temper is the world and temper of
self-interest does not appeal strongly to Hegel. We shall have to treat of
it more fully below.
It may be noted in passing that the insecurity of life, which may
seem to attach to dependence on the vast system of wants and work, is
more and more seen, as modern economic relations develop, not to be
insecurity at all, except in as far as “culture” in the form of industrial
training is absent. There is, indeed, in modern life, nowhere any abso-
lute and oyster-like stability. The highest stability to be anywhere at-
tained is that due to fitness for service in the interdependent system of
needs.271
Therefore, as Hegel saw, but in more ways than he saw, the system
of Bourgeois Society—the economic and industrial world—is not a sepa-
rate reality, but only an appearance within a larger system. The member
of it is not so detached as he may seem, or think. He is within, and
sustained by, the general life of the State, as the aims which are his
motives in “business” or industry are within and inseparable from the
whole structure of his intelligence.
Thus, the world of Bourgeois Society—a world, on the whole, of
cash nexus and mere protection by the State—has a structure or ten-
dency of its own which brings it back by necessary steps to connection
with the State proper or explicit and determinate social unity. It is, we
must observe, posterior to the State in time. It is only within the State
proper, and resting on its solid power, that such a world as that of Bour-
geois Society could arise or be conceivable. Its priority to the State is,
like that of the family, the priority of comparative narrowness or sim-
plicity, of dealing with fewer factors, and of representing human nature
in a more special, though necessary, aspect. And for this very reason it
could not exist by itself. It has not the many-sided vitality indispensable
to anything which is to hold its own in the actual world.
The working of the Bourgeois Society, then, exhibits an inevitable
connection with the State proper, and, so to speak, leads up to it.
In the first place, the economic world implies the administration of
justice. In this, as involving a developed system of civilised law, there is
an advance on the “letter of the law” in its crudest and most barbarous
acceptation. The system of law of a modern State is, and still more
ought to be,272 a fairly reasonable and intelligible definition of the rights
and relations of persons. By this determination the economic system of174/Bernard Bosanquet
particular wants and services enters upon a first approximation, as it
were, to a unity of principle. The law only professes, indeed, to protect
property and exchange, but in doing so it unavoidably recognises that
the particular want has a general bearing; for the developed system of
law only comes into existence to enable wants to be supplied, and takes
its definite shape according to the system of wants. We may illustrate
this first approximation to universality, which law confers upon the par-
ticulars of private interest, by a suggestive view which M. Durkheim
has propounded.273 He has pointed out that the current formula for so-
cial change, “from status to contract,” has a subtler significance than is
apt to be recognised.274 For contract is not really indeterminate, as if it
arose in vacuo without a precedent. It runs in forms determined by so-
cial experience through law and custom; and thus the law, which pro-
fessedly aims at protecting property and exchange, necessarily regu-
lates them by the modes in which it chooses to protect them.
A more intimate relation to the State proper— to a definite prin-
ciple, as we might say, of common good—grows out of the interests of
Bourgeois Society which take the shape of what a German calls “Police
and Corporation,” i.e., State regulation and Trade Societies.
The basis of State regulation is the emergence of aspects of com-
mon interest in the system of particular interests. The region of particu-
lar interests (supply and demand) has an accidental side, and the State
has a right and a duty to protect the general good against accidental
hindrances. On the whole, no doubt, the right relation between producer
and consumer arises of itself, but miscarriages may occur which call for
interference on behalf of the explicit275 principle of the general good.
The general possibility of the individual’s obtaining what he wants is a
public interest, and the State has a right to intervene with this end in
view, both by execution of necessary public works, by sanitary inspec-
tion and the like, and by inspection and control of fraud in the case of
necessary commodities offered for sale to the general public. For the
public offer of goods in daily use is not a purely private concern, but a
matter of the general interest. If indeed there was complete official regu-
lation, there would be a risk of getting work like the Pyramids, that
represented no private want at all; but yet, in the system of private wants,
there is a public interest that demands vigilance.
A similar approximation of Bourgeois Society to the State is consti-
tuted by the “Corporation,” which rests on the facts of class. Every
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this breaking up into classes is a consequence of the division of labour
which prevails in the economic sphere, disguising the common good as
private interest or necessity. But in the formation of classes society be-
gins as it were to recover from the dispersion which private interest has
occasioned. As a member of his class276 or “estate,” the citizen acquires
solidarity with his fellows, and his particular interest becomes ipso facto
a common one. As a member of the class, again, he is, or ought to be, a
member of his “trade society” or “corporation.” In this he finds his
honour or recognition,277 a definite standard of life (apart from which he
is apt to assert himself by aimless extravagance, for want of a recognised
respectability), a standard of work, insurance against misfortune, and
(as a candidate for admission) the means of technical education.
If the family is the first basis of the State, the classes or estates are
the second. The Corporation or Trade Society is a second family to its
members. It is the very root of ethical connection between the private
and the general278 interest, and the State should see to it that this root
holds as strongly as possible.279
“If,” Hegel writes,280 “in recent days the ‘Corporation’ has been
abolished, this has the significance that the individual ought to provide
for himself. This may be admitted; but the corporation did not alter the
individual’s obligation to earn his livelihood. In our modern States the
citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the State;
but it is necessary to permit the ethical human being a universal activity
over and above his private end. This universal, which the modern State
does not always provide for him, he finds in the ‘Corporation.’ We saw
before that the individual providing for himself in the Bourgeois Society
also acts for others. But this unconscious necessity is not enough; it
needs the Corporation to bring it to a conscious and thoughtful social
ethics. Of course the Corporation needs the higher superintendence of
the State, or it would ossify, shrink into its shell, and be degraded into a
wretched guild. But in and for itself the Corporation is no closed guild;
it is rather the bringing of an isolated trade into an ethical connection,
and its admission into a sphere in which it wins strength and honour.”281
8. The State proper, or political constitution, presents itself to Hegel
as the system in which the family and the Bourgeois Society find their
completion and their security. He was early impressed, as we have seen,
with the beautiful unity of  the ancient Greek commonwealths. And the
first and last idea which governs his representations of the modern State
is that of the Greek commonwealth enlarged as it were from a sun to a176/Bernard Bosanquet
solar system. The family feeling and the individual interest are in the
modern State let go, accented, intensified to their uttermost power; and
it is out of and because of this immense orbit of its elements that the
modern State has its “enormous strength and depth.” It is the typical
mind, the very essence of reason, whose completeness is directly as the
completeness of each of its terms or sides or factors; and secure in the
logical confidence that feeling and self-consciousness, the more they
attain their fulness, must return the more certainly to their place in the
reasonable system which is their very nature. As ultimate power, the
State maintains on one side the attitude of an external necessity towards
the spheres of private life, of the family, and of the economic world. It
may intervene by force to remove hindrances in the path of the common
good, which accident and immaturity may have placed there. But, in its
essence, the State is the indwelling and explicit end of these modes of
living, and is strong in its union of the universal purpose with the par-
ticular interests of mankind. It is, in short, the incarnation of the general
or Real Will. It has the ethical habit and temper of the family as a per-
vading basis, combined with the explicit consciousness and purpose of
the business world. In the organism of the State, i.e., in as far as we feel
and think as citizens, feeling becomes affectionate loyalty, and explicit
consciousness becomes political insight. As citizens we both feel and
see that the State includes and secures the objects of our affections and
our interests; not as separate items, thrown together by chance, but as
purposes transformed by their relation to the common good, into which,
as we are more or less aware, they necessarily pass. This feeling and
insight are the true essence of patriotism. It is easier to be magnanimous
than to be merely right, and people prefer to think of patriotism as a
readiness to make great sacrifices which are never demanded. But true
patriotism is the every-day habit of looking on the commonwealth as
our substantive purpose and the foundation of our lives.
The division of functions in the State is a necessary condition of its
rational organisation. But, as Rousseau had insisted, it is altogether
false to regard these separate functions as independent, or as checks on
one another. There could be no living unity, if the functions of the State
were ultimately independent and negative towards each other. Their dif-
ferentiation is simply the rational division of labour. The State is an
image of a rational conception; it is “a hieroglyph of reason.
Sovereignty, therefore, resides in no one element. It is, essentially,
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That is to say, it resides only in the organised whole acting qua organised
whole. If, for example, we speak of the “Sovereignty of the People” in a
sense opposed to the Sovereignty of the State— as if there were such a
thing as “the people” over and above the organised means of expressing
and adjusting the will of the community—we are saying what is, strictly
speaking, meaningless. It is just the point of difference between
Rousseau’s two views. We saw that Rousseau clearly explained the
impossibility of expressing the general will except by a determinate sys-
tem of law. But what he seemed to suggest, and was taken to mean, by
popular Sovereignty, was no doubt just the view which Hegel condemns.
It is essentially the same question as how a constitution can be made.
Strictly, a constitution cannot be made except by modification of an
existing constitution. If, to put a case, you have a multitude new to each
other in some extra-political colony, they must assume a constitution, so
to speak, before they can make one. Law and constitution are utterances
of the spirit of a nation.
The form of State which Hegel analyses is a modern constitutional
monarchy, with an executive (ministers sitting in the chambers, as he is
careful to urge) and Chambers or Estates representing the classes devel-
oped in the civic community. Representation, he urges, is of bodies or
interests rather than of masses of individuals, and the Corporations or
Trade Societies have also an important place directly, by their touch
with the departments of the executive government.282 The general prin-
ciple is, as indicated above, that the problems of connection between
considerable particular interests and the universal interests of the com-
munity are, so to speak, prepared on the ground of the Corporation and
Bourgeois Society for a solution in the interest of the common good by
the Legislative and the Executive Government.
The logical division of power, in his language, is that the Legisla-
ture has to establish universal principles, the executive has to apply
these. principles to particular cases, and the prince has to bring to a
point the acts of the State by giving them, “like the dot on the i,” the
final shape of individual volition.
The distinction of States into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democ-
racy, Hegel refuses to regard as applicable to the modern world. At
best, it could only apply to the undeveloped communities of antiquity.
The modern State is a concrete, and, according to its principle, all the
elements of a people’s life are represented in it as an indivisible unity.
A curious point is Hegel’s insistence on the function of the personal178/Bernard Bosanquet
Head of the State. By a junction of the extremes, he connects it with the
recognition of free individuality, which is usually regarded as the demo-
cratic principle of the modern world. There is no act, we may say in
illustration, according to the modern idea of an act, if it is not done in
the end by an individual, though in a developed political system the
monarch’s action may only consist in signing his name. It is at least
remarkable to compare this view with the tendency to one-man govern-
ment in the administration of the United States of America.
The State, then, is on one side the external force and automatic
machinery implied in the maintenance and adjustment of the rights and
purposes of the family and the Bourgeois Society as an actual life. On
the other side, and most essentially, it is that connection of feeling and
insight, working throughout the consciousnesses of individuals as parts
in a connected structure, which unite in willing a certain type of life as
a common good in which they find their own. It has the same content as
that of Religion.; but in an explicit and rationalised form as contrasted
with the form of feeling. Only the separation of Church and State, and
the division of the Churches against one another, have made it possible
for the State to exhibit its own free and ethical character in true fulness,
apart from both dogmatic authority and anarchic fanaticism.
9. Publicity of discussion in the assembly of the classes or estates is
the great means of civic education. It is not in the least true that every
one knows what is for the good of the State, and has only to go down to
the House. and utter it. It is in the work of expression283 and discussion
that the good takes form by adjustment of private views to facts and
needs brought to bear by criticism. “The views a man plumes himself on
when he is at home with his wife and friends are one thing; it is quite
another thing what happens in a great assembly, where one shrewd idea
devours the other.”284
The free judgment of individuals based on the publicity of political
discussion is “public opinion.” In public opinion we have an actual ex-
istent contradiction. As public, it is sound and true, and contains the
ethical spirit of the State. As expressed by individuals in their particular
judgments, on which they plume themselves, it is full of falsehood and
vanity. It is the bad which is peculiar, and which people pride them-
selves on; the rational is universal in its nature, though not necessarily
common. Public opinion is a contradictory appearance, in which the
true exists as false. It is no accident, but inevitable insight, that leads
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vox Dei,” contrasted with Ariosto’s
“Che’l Volgare ignorante ogn’un’ riprenda
E parli piu di qual che meno intenda”285
or Goethe’s
“Zuschlagen kann die Masse
Da ist sie respektabel;
Urtheilen gelingt ihr miserabel.”286
or the “mostly fools” of Carlyle.
Now, as public opinion thus combines truth and falsehood, the pub-
lic cannot be in earnest with both, i.e., both cannot be its real will. But
if we restrict ourselves to its express utterance, we cannot possibly tell
what it is in earnest with—because it does not know. Therefore, the
degree of passion with which a given opinion is maintained throws no
light on the question, on what points the public is really in earnest, in the
sense of the “real will.” This can only be known from the substantive
reality, which is the “true inwardness” of public opinion. This substan-
tive reality, the true merits of any case, is not to be got by the study of
mere public opinion as expressed, but when it is successfully divined
and asserted, public opinion will always come round to it. If we ask how
it is to be divined or known, we must go back to the analogy of a theory.
The solution must be constructed so as to satisfy the real facts or needs,
and the real facts or needs only become known in proportion as it is
constructed, just as in scientific discovery. The man who can see and do
what his age wills and demands is the great man of the age. Public
opinion, then, demands to be at once esteemed and contemned; esteemed
in its essential basis, contemned in its conscious expression. It is, how-
ever, the principle of the modern world that every one is allowed to
contribute his opinion. When he has contributed it, and so far satisfied
the impulse of self-assertion, he is likely to acquiesce in what is done, to
which, he can feel, he has thrown in some element of suggestion or
criticism.
10. In concluding this chapter, we will attempt to estimate the near-
ness of such an analysis of the State to the actual facts of life, admitting
certain appearances against it, but rejecting pessimistic views which
rest on false abstractions.
I will state the difficulties as they appeared to T. H. Green, a cau-180/Bernard Bosanquet
tious and practical Englishman, well experienced in local politics, and
acquainted with different classes of men.
“To an Athenian slave, who might be used to gratify a master’s lust,
it would have been a mockery to speak of the State as a realisatiori of
freedom; and perhaps it would not be much less to speak of it as such to
an untaught and underfed denizen of a London yard with gin shops on
the right hand and on the left.”287 “It is true that the necessity which the
State lays on the individual is for the most part one to which he is so
accustomed that he no longer kicks against it; but what is it, we may
ask, but an external necessity, which he no more lays on himself than he
does the weight of the atmosphere or the pressure of summer heat and
winter frosts, that compels the ordinary citizen to pay rates and taxes, to
serve in the army, to abstain from walking over the Squire’s fields, snar-
ing his hares, or fishing his preserved streams, to pay his rent, to respect
those artificial rights of property which only the possessors of them
have any obvious interest in maintaining, or even (if he is one of the
‘proletariate’) to keep his hands off the superfluous wealth of his
neighbour when he has none of his own to lose ?” “A conception does
not float in the air. It must be somebody’s conception. Whose concep-
tion, then, of general good is it that these institutions represent?” “Is it
not seriously misleading, when the requirements of the State have so
largely arisen out of force directed by selfish motives, and when the
motive of obedience to these requirements is determined by fear, to speak
of them as having a common source with the morality of which it is
admitted that the essence is to be disinterested and spontaneous?”
I have quoted these passages—the whole section should be care-
fully read—in order to state plainly a paradox which affects the theory
of society from beginning to end. It continually shows itself in the pes-
simistic criticism of economic motive, political motive, and of every-
day social motive.
The whole question really depends on our understanding of the rela-
tion of abstract and concrete. It is plain, as Green says, that the idea of
a common good has never been the sole influence operative in the for-
mation or maintenance of States. And, in as far as it has operated at all,
it has only done so in very imperfect forms. Green goes so far as to say
that Hegel’s account of freedom as realised in the State does not seem to
correspond to the facts of society as it is, or even as, under the unalter-
able conditions of human nature, it ever could be; though, no doubt,
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agencies, is constantly carrying on for the individual.
Now, the truth of these criticisms may be granted in the same sense
in which we grant the imperfection of knowledge (as currently con-
ceived) or of morality—imperfections not accidental, but inherent in
each particular form of human  experience. The conflict of interests, the
failure to reconcile rights, and the weight and opaqueness, so to speak,
of law and custom to the individual mind, are contradictions of the same
type and due to causes of the same kind as those which arise in the
world of ethics and of theory. And, though the new relations which spring
up in society are perpetually resulting in new contradictions, there is no
reason to compare the State unfavourably, in this respect, with Morality
or with Science. The contradictions, in fact, are the material of
organisation.288
Without differing profoundly from Green in theory, therefore, we
venture to assign a greatly diminished importance to his criticisms. This
is due in part to the growth of a more intimate experience, owing in
some measure to his initiative, which seems to show the essentials of life
to be far more identical throughout the so-called classes of society than
is admitted by such a passage as that cited above about the dweller in a
London yard.289 It is due, further, and in connection with such experi-
ence, to the psychological conceptions developed in previous chapters,
according to which the place of actual fear of punishment in maintain-
ing the social system is really very small, while the place of a habitua-
tion, which is essentially ethical, is comparatively large. These sugges-
tions, which lead us to lay decreasing stress on Green’s criticism of
Hegel, point wholly in the general direction of his own convictions, and
we may finally meet the general difficulty, which expresses itself in pes-
simism, by considerations such as Green himself alleges in mitigation of
his own criticism.
We may approach the matter in this way. The paradox is, that if you
scrutinise the acts which have made States, and which carry them on, or
which go on under and within them, you will everywhere be able to urge
that they spring from selfinterest and ambition—not from a desire for
the common good. How then can we say that the State exists for a com-
mon good? Hegel’s large conception of a social fabric and the temper of
mind which maintains it should have done something to meet this prob-
lem. But we may come a little closer to the precise difficulty.
Nothing is so fallacious as mere psychological analysis applied to
the estimation of the purposes which rule a mind. In every act there is182/Bernard Bosanquet
necessarily an aspect of the agent’s particular self. One way or another
he is satisfied in it. So the pessimistic or superficial psychologist can
always—not in some acts merely, but in all—discover a form of
selfseeking. Life is a whole made up of particulars, and the universal is
a connection within them, not another particular outside them; it is a
mistake of principle to suppose that any act can be outside the tissue of
aims, impulses, and emotions which affect the sensitive self. Great pur-
poses work through these affections and transform them, but cannot
obliterate them without obliterating life. “There is nothing degrading in
being alive.”290 But there is a kind of eye which sees all these particulars
apart from the substantive aims which give them their character, and
treats them as if they were the sole determining motives of the agent.
Hegel calls such a critic—he is thinking especially of historians—“the
psychological valet, for whom there are no heroes, not because they are
no heroes, but because he is only a valet.” On the whole, a man is what
he does. If his series of actions has the root of the matter in it, it is wrong
either for him to be deterred, or for a critic to carp, because they bring
him gain or glory, or gratify him by activity and excitement. To shrink
from particular occasions of action because one’s self may find satis-
faction in them is to fall back into the mere general willing of the ab-
stract good. And “the laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never
have been green.
We may illustrate these ideas from the life of the ordinary members
of States, and from the career of a great ruler or conqueror.291
The life of an English labourer, for example, may concern itself
with no such abstract ideas292 as are expressed by the words “State” or
“common good.” But, to begin with, he is a law-abiding citizen. He
keeps his hands off others and their belongings by the same rule by
which he expects others to keep their hands off him and his belong-
ings.293 He recognises fairness of bargaining, and is prepared to treat
others fairly, as he expects them to treat him. He is aware of his claims,
that is to say, as depending on something in common between himself
and others; and if he does not practically admit any such community,
“he is one of the ‘dangerous classes,’ virtually outlawed by himself.”294
So far he is a loyal subject only. If he is to have a fuller sense of a
social good, he must either take part in the work of the State, or at least
be familiar with such work, through interest in his fellows’ share of it,
and in the organisations which connect his class interests with the pub-
lic good. His mind must not merely work in its place in the social mind,The Philosophical Theory of the State/183
but must be in some degree aware of the connection between its place
and the whole —of the appercipient structure to which it belongs. He
must, in short, have touch with the connection which Hegel represents
as that between the Bourgeois Society and the State proper. And this, in
modern States, is in principle open to him.
And, further, he must have the feeling for his State, which is con-
nected with the idea of home and fatherland. In a modern nation the
atmosphere of the family is not confined to the actual family. The com-
mon dwelling-place, history, and tradition, the common language and
common literature, give a colour of affection to the every-day citizen-
consciousness, which is to the nation what family affection is in the
home circle.
Thus, it is not true that either the feeling or the insight which consti-
tute a consciousness of a common good are wanting to the every-day
life of an average citizen in a modern State. It may seem full of selfish
care, but this is only a narrow view. If we look at the spirit of the whole
life we shall see that it is substantially dependent on the recognition of a
good, and feels that dependence in concrete form.
And, secondly, to take the paradox in its extreme shape, in which
the order of the State appears to arise out of the selfish ambition of the
most unscrupulous of men. The contradiction may be stated in the form
that the actions of bad men are “over-ruled” for good. But this would
mean that the “psychological” critic or historian had first misstated the
cause, and then had rectified his mis-statement by a meaningless phrase.
The great ideas and causes which were advanced, for example, by the
career of Napoleon, owed neither their nature nor their existence to his
selfish ambition. They did not, however, owe them to any non-human
cause; to any operation of ideas otherwise than in the minds of men.
They came into existence through the working of innumerable minds
towards objective ends by the inherent logic of social growth, with vari-
ous degrees of moral insight, and they were promoted by Napoleon’s
career in virtue of the common character which united his aims, in so far
as they had a reasonable side, with the movement shaped by the ideal
forces of the age. There is no reason to doubt, if we do not wilfully
narrow our view of the situation, that a conception of good was as much
operative in the cause as it is present in the effect—say, in the unity of
Italy. We cannot attempt, on the ground of mere ethical and political
philosophy, to deal with the problem of the existence of evil; and we are
not concerned to deny or to minimise the presence of greed and selfish-184/Bernard Bosanquet
ness as distorting forces in the minds of men, or in the organisation of
States. All that we needed to show, was that what makes and main-
tains295 States as States is will and not force, the idea of a common
good, and not greed or ambition; and that this principle cannot be over-
thrown by the facts of self-interest in ordinary citizens, or of selfishness
in those who mould the destinies of nations.
Chapter XI.
Institutions Considered as Ethical Ideas.
1. We have been guided throughout our argument by the idea that the
relation of a given mind to the mind of society296 is comparable to the
relation between our apprehension of a single object and our view of
nature as a whole. The former term, in each case, we cannot but sup-
pose to be an individualised case of the latter. The latter seems inevita-
bly to imply a universal principle corresponding to every feature of the
former. We can never see through the connections, and the connections
of the connections—e.g., of gravitation and of colour—in every part.
But our ideal as theorists would be to analyse the physical object into
features, every one of which should be a case of a natural law, and the
whole taken together a case of the whole system of natural law, which
would be our scientific view of the world.
In treating of a human mind in its relation to Society and the State,
our ideal is comparable to this. We should like to analyse any given
mind into features each of which should be an individual case of a uni-
versal principle, and the whole of which, taken together, should be a
case of the whole system of principles incarnate in the world, and proxi-
mately in the social world. Plato, simplifying for the sake of elucidation
the City-state, which to our minds was already simple, represented a
community, in diagrammatic form, as consisting in a threefold structure
of classes, in which were incarnate the three main features which he
discriminated in the individual soul—the desires necessary to living, the
spirit of action, and the power of seeing things as a whole.
2. The principles which constitute a society are facts as well as
ideas, and purposes as well as facts. This threefold character is united
in what we describe by the general term “institutions,” a term which
would apply perfectly well to Plato’s “classes” in virtue of the definite
relations with which he invests them.
It is unnecessary to insist on the external aspect of institutions as
facts in the material world; but it will be worth while to gather up theThe Philosophical Theory of the State/185
leading conceptions of our analysis by tracing the nature of some promi-
nent “institutions,” as ideas, constituent elements of the mind, which are
also purposes; that is, as ethical ideas. An institution may have grown
up without special ordinance, or may have been called into existence by
an act of public will. But it has always the character of being recognised
as if it had been “instituted” or established to fulfil some public or quasi-
public purpose.297 An old servant is sometimes said to be “quite an insti-
tution”—he is characterised by the function of keeping alive certain
common traditions of a school, perhaps, or a family—an annual custom
may be an institution in virtue of the same kind of recognition; Sunday
is an institution; the word is indeed very vaguely applied, for obviously
almost every object or event can have a significance of this kind at-
tached to it in jest or earnest. But for all that, we can see pretty plainly
what usage is driving at. An institution implies a purpose or sentiment
of more minds than one, and a more or less permanent embodiment of it.
“Of more minds than one,” because it is to fix the meeting point of
minds that the external embodiment is necessary.
In institutions, then, we have that meeting point of the individual
minds which is the social mind. But “meeting point” is an unhappy
term, suggesting objects in space that touch at certain spots. Rather let
us say, we have here the ideal substance, which, as a universal struc-
ture, is the social, but in its differentiated cases is the individual mind.
And it is necessary to observe that the material of this fabric has deter-
minate sources.  Mind is not an empty point. It is the world as experi-
enced. The institutions, which as ethical ideas constitute mind, are, like
a theory, attempts at unity in face of needs, pressures, facts, and sugges-
tions which arise in what we call our surroundings, and to each of which
mind reveals a different quality; as every tone of a landscape elicits its
peculiar shade of feeling, which but for it might have remained latent
for ever. It takes the whole world to call out the whole mind. But it will
be enough if we can trace, in some prominent examples, the nature of an
institution as at once a dealing with surroundings,298 an ethical idea, and
a social principle.
3. The family starts from the universal physical fact of parentage,
but takes its ethical value mainly from the special phase of parental
relation which leads to the formation of a household. The association of
parents and children in a household, which is permanent until broken up
into other households, is due to economic conditions. Calling to mind
the original meaning of words, we see that we are asserting the forma-186/Bernard Bosanquet
tion of a household to be due to “household”299 conditions. And this is
something more than a pun. Whatever the surroundings may be which
favour the formation of households, whether the difficulty of procuring
livelihood, which makes the father’s continued care essential,300 or the
chances offered by agriculture to a stable group, they operate as ele-
ments in a human world, in a world which is constituted by the focus-
sing of “surroundings” (circumstances) in a whole. Conditions which
have become “economic” have ceased to be material. They are motives,
interests, means to ends. They bring the world into the mind, but in
doing so they become factors in the purposiveness and re-adjustment,
which the mind, as unity asserting itself throughout varied suggestions,
is busied in bringing to pass. By demanding permanence, for instance,
economic conditions elicit in the relation of parent and child the sim-
plest form of universality necessary to an ethical idea.
We will not venture upon the history of phases of the family life, but
will attempt at once to sketch its position and value in the typical
civilisation of a modern State. Only it must be insisted on once more,
that the family or household as an ethical structure is not anterior to the
State, but is rather a growth dependent on the spirit and protection of
the State, and intentionally fostered by it as against forms of kinship
which do less justice to the ethical possibilities of parentage.
As an ethical idea, then, the monogamous family, which is in the
normal case also a household, has a unique place in the structure of the
citizen mind.
Its peculiarity is in being a natural union of feeling with ideal pur-
pose. That is to say, the ideal purpose, a permanent interest in a com-
paratively permanent and external life, attaches itself by imperceptible
links to the most universal incident of animal existence. The mere re-
maining together of the units, a demand of their physical needs, is al-
most enough of itself to transform their inevitable mutual dependence
into a relation of intentional service, rooted in affection, and tinged with
some degree of forethought.
And, being thus “natural,” the idea of the family has a hold like no
other upon the whole man. In this respect it anticipates the powers which
have been claimed for the love of beauty. The very animal roots of life,
and every detail of man’s appetitive being, are made, without conscious
effort or moralising interference, factors in a round of social service.
The meal of a lonely individual301 is perhaps, at best, a refined and
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religionism, has in it, as a plain matter of fact, the fundamental elements
of a sacrament, none the less effective that they are not thought of by
that name. And both through maintaining the fitness of the parents for
their life work, and through the training of the children to the same end,
the natural ethics of the family have an indispensable logical hold upon
the more explicit common good known to the social will.
And, in the last place, it should be noted that a feeling and atmo-
sphere of this kind is not confined to members actually living in house-
holds formed by families. There is no race, it has been said, that parts
with its children so readily, or retains their affections so permanently, as
the Anglo-Saxon race. When the type and spirit are once formed, they
are contagious and persistent; they affect all who have seen or known
them, and even those who have never formed part of a household bound
by kinship.
If we contrast the idea of the household with monasticism as its
repudiation, and with the tribal state or phalanstery as its exaggeration,
we shall see its uniqueness in the strongest light. The naturalness of its
foundation, and the completeness of the reciprocal interest (involving
monogamy) on which its idea rests, distinguish it from all other forms of
union or disunion in which the sexes are concerned. It may be added that
the family, and it alone, has the right adjustment of population in its
power. The fully trained and equipped human being can never be super-
fluous in the world. And the production of the fully trained and equipped
human being depends on the capacity of forming a true family and meeting
its requirements, and when this capacity and idea regulate the union of
the sexes no growth nor apparent decrease of population need cause
anxiety.
It seems as idle to discuss whether civilisation is conceivable with-
out the family as whether human nature can change. All that we can
attempt, as philosophers, is to ascertain the distinctive part which its
idea plays in human life as such. There must be, we can see, some such
idea—an ethical idea covering some such sides of life—while man is a
spiritual animal. But by what precise “institution” such an idea might
come to be represented in circumstances which we do not know, it would
be beyond the modesty of philosophy to predict.
The institution of Property may be mentioned as a corollary to the
household-family. Its natural basis and ethical value are very markedly
correlative to those of the latter. The outlook upon life which it essen-
tially implies is co-extensive with that demanded by the household, al-188/Bernard Bosanquet
though in the relations of acquisition and exchange many further rights
and duties may attach to it. It depends on the fact that, in order to ex-
press a will in an individual life (which is incomplete except as the life
of a household), there must be a power of moulding the material world
in the service of ideas, which is conditioned by free acquisition and
utilisation. The institution of property, then, as an ethical idea, consists
in the conception of individual (properly speaking, household) life as a
unity in respect to its dealings with the material instruments of living. It
is not merely the idea of provision for the future; still less the certainty
of satisfying wants as they arise from day to day. It is the idea that all
dealings with the material conditions of life form part of a connected
system, in which our conceptions and our abilities express themselves.
It binds together the necessary care for food and clothing with ideas of
making the most of our life and of the lives dependent upon us. A being
which has no will has so far no property—a child has in practice, and a
slave had by Roman law, property in a secondary sense—and a being
which has no property has so far no actual will. The “person,” or re-
sponsible head (or heads), of a household, is the true unit to whom the
idea of property attaches, because he is the unit to which we normally
ascribe an individualised will, a single distinctive shape of the social
mind. A child has not yet such a will; a group of mature persons has
more than one. The change which is passing over the household in con-
sequence of the recognition of married women as individual wills is
highly instructive on this point. They can hold and manage their own
property, because it is admitted that they can have their own view of
life. It is not proposed that young children should hold and manage
property, because every one knows that they have no mature
individualised view of life. The corporate person of the household is so
far dissolved by legal recognition of its more individual components;
and it is most important, theoretically, to note that its unity is not dimin-
ished by the recognition, but is raised to a higher power.
4. It might seem fanciful to say that our district is to our family as
space to time; but it would suggest something of the point of view from
which it is well to look at the structure of our ethical ideas. It is desir-
able to realise how the simplest characters of our surroundings and their
necessary connections are ethically important, not because they impose
anything upon us, but because they respond to something within us, or
rather, to a possibility which is to be realised by the world, as in us its
variety strives towards unity. Parentage, we saw, was a universal ani-The Philosophical Theory of the State/189
mal fact, and from it, in an experience capable of unity and permanence,
springs the family household and all that it implies for our lives. One’s
district, as an element of life, implies, of course, some stability—a home,
not merely permanent as a home, like the Scythian’s waggon, but lo-
cated on some spot of earth. The nomad, we must suppose, to a great
extent carries his neighbourhood—his tribe—along with him, and for
that very reason the fact of neighbourhood has not its full effect on him.
But when a permanent home is fixed on some spot of earth, presum-
ably with the beginnings of agriculture, a new condition begins to oper-
ate—the “indifference” of space. Perhaps we are surprised that “indif-
ference” should be an ethical stimulus. But nothing is more instructive
than to note how qualities of our surroundings, which by themselves
seem negative or the barest natural necessities, spring into significance
when taken up into the unity of life. Locality means a potential
neighbourhood. It may be long before any one comes near you except
your own cousinhood, your tribe or clan. But the indifference of space
is a standing invitation, and it is pretty certain that some day strangers
will become your neighbours, and that you will have to take up some
mental attitude towards them. Historians and jurists have described to
us the struggle between the principle of kinship and the principle of
neighbourhood. When we read that a plebeian, in the eyes of a Roman
patri ian, simply could not make a real marriage any more than the
beasts of the field, this is not, as it may have become by survival, inten-
tional arrogance on the patrician’s part. It was rather the state of mind
of Mrs. Transome towards Rufus Lyon, “sheer inability to consider
him.” A proof of what a struggle it involved to reach a new attitude of
mind as regarded the resident alien is given by the half-way house at
which it was found necessary to pause in the process. The recognition
of kinship on the ground of residence was the fiction, we are told, by
which the mind assisted itself to a positive attitude towards those whom
the indifference of space insisted on bringing within its range. And the
positive attitude towards which it was groping its way was of course the
recognition of humanity, the equality of man in the truest sense which
that ambiguous phrase will bear.
In modern States, in which this struggle is on the whole behind us,
our district or locality asserts its full indifference. Its “negative” here
becomes a “positive.” That is to say, on the whole,302 and under some
reasonable reservations as to evidence of intention to accept duties, and
to renounce incompatible ones, men are full members of the district to190/Bernard Bosanquet
which they choose to belong. The challenge thrown down by the indif-
ference of space has resulted in a recognition of universal humanity.
Our district is our neighbourhood. We will look a little more closely at
the ethical idea implied. We notice at once, at least in English experi-
ence, that each of us belongs to a variety of districts which are concen-
tric as regards him. Each of these districts represents a different pur-
pose, and we are told that for practical purposes great confusion results.
But it is a useful training to be made aware of the distinct purpose of
each organised locality which surrounds us—to have the care of our
health, of public order, of education, of the relief of the destitute, and of
religion according to our view of it, represented by different, or possibly
different, boundary lines on the map. Each of these boundaries indicates
some common element of thought and feeling—some common inter-
est—in the mind of the neighbourhood, and the difference of the bound-
aries, where they differ— the difference, e.g., between the civil and eccle-
siastical parish—may have a long growth of ideas behind it. At any
rate, all these are moral or physical needs, which, like our household
necessities, draw us out of ourselves, and reveal us to ourselves as cases
of a larger mind.
Every locality, then, is, however imperfectly and unconsciously, a
body which has a mind. It is, as an idea which enters into us, the spiri-
tual reflection of our adjacent surroundings, both human and natural, as
the family is of our animal parentage. The neighbourhood is for the
mind its immediate picture of the world, the frame into which its further
vista of society as a whole must be fitted, or, in other words, its sphere
of direct relations. The family is a group of natural relations; but the
neighbourhood consists of relations which are as natural in a different
way, not through blood, but through contact. It is not a selection, but
rather a specimen of life as a whole, for it must include as a rule all the
necessary elements of the social fabric. It includes all that comes to us
by direct sense-perception from day to day; all our chance meetings and
dealings with those outside our household, and probably the nearer and
more reliable illustrations of all social and political problems. For it is a
context of life which we know and feel in its total working, which is
impossible with what we only gather from writings or from hearsay.
As such a reflection of our direct surroundings, it colours our whole
basis of feeling. A peculiar tinge of happiness, anxiety, depression, or
resolution attaches to the streets or fields which we pass through day by
day, and the faces which we meet. How far these feelings are true inter-The Philosophical Theory of the State/191
pretations of what we see, and how far they spring from superficial or
sentimental associations, is one of the greatest tests of the mind and
heart. Do we see the body of a soul, the symbols of character and hap-
piness, in the houses, the streets, the tillage, the workshops, or the gar-
dens?
No other element of mind can be the substitute for the neighbourhood.
It is the faith in which we live, so far as embodied in our contact with a
sensuous world. It is a microcosm of humanity, in which, by the very
indifference of space, we are liable to the direct impact of all possible
factors. It is particularly the sphere of charity and courtesy, of the right
behaviour in immediate human relations of all possible kinds.
The District or Neighbourhood, in short, as an ethical idea, is the
unity of the region with which we are in sensuous contact, as the family
is that of the world bound to us by blood or daily needs. Local self-
government, for example, acquires a peculiar character from the possi-
bilities of intimate knowledge of each other among those who carry it
on. A man’s whole way of living is in question when he sets up to be
locally prominent, and though the result may often be corruption or
vulgarity,303 these are only the failure of what, at its best, is a true type
of the relation of fellow-citizens.
As with the family, we may illustrate the significance of
Neighbourhood by the case in which it fails to be duly recognised, and
that in which nothing else is recognised.
To a great extent, in the life of modern cities, especially when supple-
mented by suburban residence, the principle is disregarded. In a great
city, the actual neighbourhood is more than can be dealt with, and has
often no distinctive physical character—at least no attractiveness—and
the idea of a special relation to it falls away. The fact, indeed, is less
universal than is often asserted, and nearness in space, together with
local government, retain and will retain a certain predominance over the
mind. The total disregard of an ethical purpose connecting us with the
surroundings nearest to us in bodily presence, tends to deprive the gen-
eral life of its vitality, its sensuous health, strength, and beauty. In many
ways, circuitous perhaps, but ultimately effective, it may be that this
factor of immediacy will regain a proper place in the national mind. We
may observe that in as far as electoral districts are treated as mere cir-
cumscriptions of such and such numbers of electors, the life of a
neighbourhood is disregarded. To make the constituency a mere number
(Hare’s scheme) would be the climax of this tendency.192/Bernard Bosanquet
In the ancient City-state, on the other hand, the district was all pow-
erful. The State was almost a sensuous fact. The members of the State
were essentially friends and neighbours, who for business or pleasure
were meeting all day long. When the district thus absorbs the State,
there is a want of what we call freedom, though there may be enough of
sensuous unconstraint. The State and its ideal purposes are not clearly
set above all flesh and blood. A great legal system is not created till the
State ceases to be a neighbourhood. Individual intimacy304 and the “hard
case” obscure the idea of universal law. The possibility of representa-
tive government, of a political faith which does not work by sight, is not
conceived. The district, as a natural fact, was at first only a degree more
liberating than the natural fact of kinship.2 It was not conceived that
man, as man, belonged “neither to this place nor to Jerusalem.” With the
ideal unity of a modern nation such conceptions harmonise much more
readily, and the neighbourhood can lend them flesh and blood without
hiding them.
5. “Class” is in democratic countries no longer a political institu-
tion. A man’s vote is secured to him on a minimum qualification, and
his practical influence and acceptance depend neither on birth nor on
occupation, but on the power which he can exercise by his qualities or
his possessions. This is a consequence of the recognition of humanity as
such, and has its bad side and its good side according to the baseness
and nobility of the influences which tell de facto upon human nature. It
is horrible, we may say, that influence should belong to wealth without
any security whatever for a discharge of social function. But this, given
human nature as it is to-day, is a result of the same causes which enable
us to boast, with some truth, that a man ranks in the general world by
his powers, character, and behaviour, and that we do not know or care
whether his livelihood comes to him as a miner or as a duke. Wealth has
weight because people give it weight; but no one need give weight to
wealth in politics or social intercourse unless he likes. It is a conse-
quence, then, of the recognition of free humanity that “class” no longer
is an institution in political right as such, while in social intercourse,
though it practically exists as an institution, it claims to be an expres-
sion of what people are in character and behaviour, and its differences
are not annexed by any iron bond to differences of occupation.305
But though occupation no longer determines either social or politi-
cal class, in the sense of graduation by any formal bond, yet it remains
and must always remain a determinant of class in a narrower sense, andThe Philosophical Theory of the State/193
one of the main ideas which constitute the ethical structure of the mind.
The necessities which we compared roughly to time and space—the
proximate permanent group and the adjacent locality—give a value to
man s animal routine, and a significance to the area of his every-day
perceptions. It is when the division of labour, the requital of one service
by a different one, becomes prominent in a community, that a further
grasp is laid upon the distinctive capacities of the individual conscious-
ness, in which must be reckoned the surroundings which constitute its
horizon of possibilities. We still answer the general question, “What is
he?” by naming a man’s industry or profession. The family and the
neighbourhood sustain and colour the individual life, but the vocation
stamps and moulds it. The more definite and articulate summons of the
organising world—in which of course intelligence is active, ever dis-
cerning new purposes in old routine—elicits a deeper response from, or
takes a more concrete shape in, the particular centre of consciousness.
The individual has his own nature communicated to him as he is sum-
moned to fit himself for rendering a distinctive service to the common
good. He becomes “something”; an incarnation of a factor in the social
idea.
The Roman word “class,” which the English language has adopted,
not for every separate employment, but for the character and position
roughly connected with a whole group of employments, has an origin
worth recalling. Plato’s classes were “genera” = clans, extended fami-
lies. The German classes were “Stände” = statuses, positions, estates
(compare the French “état,” which practically = trade). But the Roman
“classis” was “a summoning” to public service; the first and second
classes were the first and second summonings;306 then indeed to military
service in an order based on wealth. But the idea may survive. Our
“class” may be thought of as the group or body in which we are called
out for distinctive service.
One’s class, then, in the sense in which it indicates the type of posi-
tion and service involved in one’s occupation, approaches very near the
centre of one’s individuality. In principle, as an ethical idea, it takes the
man or woman beyond the family and the neighbourhood; and for the
same reason takes him deeper into himself. He acquires in it a complex
of qualities and capacities which put a special point upon the general
need of making a livelihood for the support of his household. In prin-
ciple, his individual service is the social mind, as it takes, in his con-
sciousness, the shape demanded by the logic of the social whole. He is194/Bernard Bosanquet
“a public worker,”307 by doing the service which society demands of
him. And just because the service is in principle something particular,
unique, and distinctive, he feels himself in it to be a member of a unity
held together by differences. And in this sense the bond of social union
is not in similarity, but in the highest degree of individuality or
specialisation, the ultimate point of which would be to feel that I am
rendering to society a service which is necessary, and which no one but
me can render—the closest conceivable tie, and yet one which, in a
sense, really exists in every case. Your special powers and functions
supply my need, and my special powers and functions supply your need,
and each of us recognises this and rejoices in it. This ethical idea of
unique service, or the service of a unique class, involves of course a
more or less conscious identity in difference. That is to say, the
individual’s mind is not reduced to his special service, or he would be a
machine. Rather, the whole social consciousness is present in him, but
present in a modified form, according to the point of view from which it
is looking. The problem is simply put by Plato’s diagrammatic scheme
of classes. The statesman’s function is to be wise for the community; the
carpenter’s to carpenter for the community. But plainly the community
for which the statesman knows that he has to be wise, must include the
carpenter’s life and the conditions of his work, and the community for
which the carpenter knows that he has to work must include some of the
order and organisation which belong to it in the statesman’s vision. The
individual, in short, is unique, or belongs to a unique class, not as an
atom, but as a case of a law, or term of a connection. This is what is
meant by individuality in the true sense; the character of a unit which
has a great deal that, being his very self, cannot be divided from him;
not one which has so little that there is nothing by subtraction of which
he can be imagined less. Such individuality is in a sense the whole ethi-
cal idea, but more particularly is embodied in the idea of a vocation.
Our vocation, like our neighbourhood, and usually of course in connec-
tion with it, stamps both mind and body; and what we consider most
intimately ourself is really the structure of ethical ideas which we are
describing, with the feelings and habits in which they are rooted, but
none of which are unmodified by them.
Like the other ideas of which we have spoken, the idea of class or
specialised function may be illustrated both by the extreme in which it is
nothing, and the extreme in which it is everything. The less a society is
differentiated—the less that, considered as a mind, it has developed in-The Philosophical Theory of the State/195
tense and determinate capacities—the more its structure repeats itself
from household to household,308 and fails to exhibit lines of formation
pervading the community as a whole. Dicey’s The Peasant State309 gives
an idea of a social mind thus undifferentiated, without classes, without
ambitions, and without interests. Both in this case and in that of the
Boers of the Transvaal it would be rash for an outsider to pronounce
dogmatically on the value of the life which is achieved. But as cases of
social formation and of social minds, they illustrate our present theme.
To say that there is no specialised function, is the same as to say that
there is no developed intelligence.
“Class” appears to be everything, an absolute and inflexible rule of
precedence and privilege, when it has lost or has not gained the power of
accommodating itself to function, and function to social logic. Such
denials of free adjustment, of the career open to talents, may take the
form of a confusion of the principle of class with that of birth, or even
with that of private property. In the former case function and position
are inherited, in the latter they are bought and sold. The two confusions
may even be combined, as when public functions are inherited like or
with a house or an estate.310 Such a “class” system may be an oppres-
sion to its members,311 or to the community, or to both. But the essence
of the evil is that a function of mind is divorced from its characteristic of
free logical adaptation within the social system. The institution has be-
come ossified; and instead of moulding itself, like a theory or a living
organism, to the facts and needs which it is there to meet, it nails itself to
an alien principle, and becomes a fallacy in social logic, or a dead organ
in the social body.
In both of these extreme cases individuality is minimised. In the
former the individual does not pretend to any high capacity. In the latter
he pretends to a considerable capacity, but this being cut apart from the
principle of the whole, and pretending to be everything in itself—to
exist absolutely or for its own sake—has lost the connection which gave
it value, and becomes a mere pretension.
There is a strange and sad institution in which, it may be suggested,
the two extremes of error are combined. This is the institution of “the
poor” as a class, representing, as an ethical idea in the modern mind, a
permanent object of compassion and self-sacrifice. “Poverty,” it has
been said, “has become a status.” The “déclassés” have become a so-
cial class, with the passive social function of stimulating the goodness
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regards ethical ideas as an embodiment of human or social purposes,
the offertory sentences of the Church of England. It is needless to press
the criticism, for no one would be likely to deny that here we have ideas
gathered from other soils and climates, and rightly applicable only in
the spirit, but not in the letter. “Give alms of thy goods, and never turn
thy face from any poor man; and then the face of the Lord shall not be
turned away from thee.” “He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto
the Lord, and look, what he layeth out it shall be paid him again.” The
victims of misfortune in a small community, under strict regulations, as
were the Jews, for the promotion of industry, are one thing. The recog-
nition of a class marked by the function of dependence—to use a con-
tradictory expression —in a vast community whose industrial
organisation rests on the individual will, is another thing. The idea of
pity and self-denial, inherited, I presume, largely from the Jewish scrip-
tures as also from the New Testament, has tended, in the modern world,
to become mechanical, and combine with a false class-conception. All
who know the inner life of evangelical Christians a generation ago313
will admit that, among earnest persons of this type, the notion of the
tithe—the devotion of one tenth or more of the income to purposes of
religion or benevolence—had been inherited as a gui ding idea, repre-
senting an end valuable per se, almost according to the letter of the
offertory. I am not suggesting any vulgar charge of other-worldliness,
but recalling a genuine conviction that the surrender of a portion of
income to a less fortunate class of the community was in itself desirable
and a religious duty.
It would not be difficult to show that the true and highest idea of
Christian charity is remote from this conception of a dependent status
as inherent in a certain portion of society. What seems to be needed
here, as in so many aspects of morality and religion, is to combine the
inspiration and abandon of the modern mind with the definiteness of
purpose and lucidity of plan that characterised the ancient City-state.
Socialism, at its best,314 unites with recent political economy and
with those who try to “organise” or rationalise charity, in challenging
the preconception that poverty must be recognised as a permanent class-
function. And this brave denial may remain written to its credit when
the controversies of immediate method are forgotten.
We may attempt to indicate in a few words the direction in which
the ethical idea incarnate in the institution of the “poor” is tending to
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arise. It may be observed, by way of introduction, that we cruelly mis-
conceive the Greek mind when we ascribe to it a want of love and com-
passion, because we miss in its utterances the religious note of devotion
to the poor.315 To a great extent the truest idea of charity was presup-
posed in the very axioms of a Greek commonwealth. The Greek spoke
little of “the poor,” because he recognised no such status.316 It would
have meant to him a functionless class, a dislocation of the body politic.
This, in fact, is what it did mean when pauperism began to press upon
the Greeks, and the philosopher317 at once diagnoses the evil, and uses
the term, “people without means,” i.e., without ways of supporting them-
selves, instead of the older word, which rather suggests the “object of
‘charity.’” To get them back into a function, “a means, is the course
which ipso facto rises before him; not to create a new ethical idea for
their sake qua déclassés.
The full modern conception of the “poor” as an institution, if they
must be an institution, ought at least to avoid the pitfall of acquiescence.
Granting the fire and love of the Christian mind to be a gain, yet its
object must be brought into relation with the true meaning of a mind or
a commonwealth. Devotion to man at his weakest must not be separated
from devotion to the possibilities of man at his strongest—possibilities
either existent or at least symbolised in the most unhappy of the func-
tionless poor. Self-sacrifice for the poor should not mean a tribute to the
maintenance of a vicious status, but an abiding and pervading sense of
the claims which the weaker humanity has to be made strong.
6. The Nation-State, we have already suggested, is the widest
organisation which has the common experience necessary to found a
common life. This is why it is recognised as absolute in power over the
individual, and as his representative and champion in the affairs of the
world outside. It is obvious that there can be but one such absolute
power in relation to any one person; and that, so far as the world is
organised, there must be one; and, in fact, his discharge from one alle-
giance can only be effected by his acceptance of another. The analysis
of the previous chapter releases us from the task of setting out the ele-
ments which combine in the Nation State, as the conception of sover-
eign and ultimate adjustment between the spheres which realise the ele-
ments of our ethical life. It should be noted, however, that the principles
of the family, the district, and the class, not only enter into the nation in
these definite shapes, but affect the general fabric of the national State
through the sense of race, of country, and of a pervading standard of life198/Bernard Bosanquet
and culture. The reaction of ideal unity on the natural conditions of a
state is exemplified by the tendency to substitute ideal frontiers—a me-
ridian or a parallel—for frontiers determined by natural boundaries.
The Nation-State as an ethical idea is, then, a faith or a purpose—
we might say a mission, were not the word too narrow and too aggres-
sive. It seems to be less to its inhabitant than the City-state to its citi-
zens; but that is greatly because, as happens with the higher achieve-
ments of mind, it includes too much to be readily apprehended. The
modern nation is a history and a religion rather than a clear cut idea. Its
power as an idea-force is not known till it is tried. How little the out-
sider, and even members of the community concerned, were able to gauge
beforehand the strength of the sentiment and conception that pervaded
the United States through the war of secession.318 The place of the idea
of the NationState in the whole of ethical ideas may be illustrated by the
Greek conception of Happiness, as that organisation of aims, whatever
it may be, which permits the fullest harmony to life. The State, as such,
we saw, is limited to the office of maintaining the external conditions of
a good life; but the conditions cannot be conceived without reference to
the life for which they exist, and it is true, therefore, to say that the
conception of the Nation-State involves at least an outline of the life to
which, as a power, it is instrumental. The State, in short, cannot be
understood apart from the nation, nor the conditions from the life, al-
though in exerting political force it is important to distinguish them. As
an ethical idea, the idea of a purpose, it is essential to hold the two sides
together, if we are not to walk blindly.
7. Our analysis of the Nation-State suggests a point of view which
may be applied to the vexed question of whether State action is to be
judged by the same moral tests as private action.
The first step is to get a clear idea of the nature of State action. It
must be confined, one would think, to what is done in the name of the
State, and by something approaching to an act of will on its part as a
State. We only pass moral judgment on individuals in respect of their
acts of will, and we ought to extend the same justice to a State. The
question is complicated by the fact that a State has, as its accredited
agents, individuals whose acts it must normally avow. But it can hardly
be saddled with moral responsibility for their personal misdoings, ex-
cept under circumstances which are barely conceivable.319 The State, as
such, can have no ends but public ends; and in practice it has none but
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order of his executive superior, commits a breach of morality, bona fide
in order to what he conceives to be a public end desired by the State, he
and his superior are certainly blamable, but the immorality can hardly
be laid at the door of the public will.
Indeed, a strict definition of State action might raise a difficulty like
that of defining the General Will—if the act was immoral, can the State,
as such, really have willed it? And waiving this as a mere refinement, it
still seems clear that the selfishness or sensuality, which has at least a
good deal to do with the immorality of private actions, can hardly be
present in an act of the public will, Ifl the same sense as in a private
volition. The State, as such, certainly cannot be guilty of personal im-
morality, and it is hard to see how it can commit theft or murder in the
sense in which these are moral offences. To speak of the question as if it
concerned the conduct of statesmen and their agents, instead of the voli-
tion of a State as such, seems to introduce confusion. We are discussing
the parallel between public and private acts, and we are asked to begin
by treating the public acts as private.
It may be said that this distinction between public and private acts
leads to the casuistry of pure intention. We are saying, it will be urged,
that the State remains pure, because its will is on the whole towards a
public interest, whatever crimes its agents may commit. And, no doubt,
this line is often taken in practice. A successful agent finds his evil
deeds are winked at; an unsuccessful one is disavowed In either case the
State pleads innocence. But this danger cannot alter the conditions of a
moral action, and we cannot impute that as an action to the State, of
which it knew no particulars, which it never willed, and which can hardly
indeed be the object of a public will. It has a duty to see to the character
of its agents and punish their excesses; but the conditions under which it
is true that qui facit per alium facit per se, can seldom apply to a public
body with regard to actions of its agent which are not of a nature to
embody public ends.
Promises and treaties, however, are acts which embody public ends.
And here the State, on its side, is bound to maintain good faith; but still
its agent is likely to go wrong if he mixes up the obligations of the State
with his private honour. The question for him, if he has to keep or break
a public undertaking, is, to what is the State substantially bound, not to
what extent would he be bound if he had made the promise or engage-
ment in question in his private capacity? He, or the power which is to
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work for the best fulfilment of them as a whole. The question may be
parallel to that of a private case of honour, but it is not his honour nor
his promise that is in question. Just so, if he introduces his private con-
science about religion or morality into his public acts on behalf of the
State, he may cause frightful persecutions or. disasters. The religious
persecutions, and our position in India, supply examples.
The State, then, exists to promote good life, and what it does cannot
be morally indifferent; but its actions cannot be identified with the deeds
of its agents, or morally judged as private volitions are judged. Its acts
proper are always public acts, and it cannot, as a State, act within the
relations of private life in which organised morality exists. It has no
determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme
community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within
an organised moral world. Moral relations presuppose an organised life;
but such a life is only within the State, not in relations between the State
and other communities.
But all this, it may be urged, is beside the question. The question is
not, can a State be a moral individual (though this is certainly one ques-
tion)? but, does an interest of State justify what would otherwise be
immorality or wrong-doing on the part of an officer of State?
Again, I think, we must distinguish between acts essentially private
and acts essentially public. To steal or murder, to lie, or to commit
personal immorality, for instance, as we said, cannot be a public act.
Such acts cannot embody a general interest willed by the public will. A
State agent who commits them in pursuit of information or to secure a
diplomatic result cannot be justified on the ground that they are not his
acts but the State’s; and they are as immoral in him as in anyone else.
Ultimately, indeed, it may be true that there is no act which is incapable
of justification, supposing some extreme alternative; and in this sense,
but in this sense only, it might be that, treating the interest of a common-
wealth like any other ethically imperative interest, such acts might be
relatively capable of justification. But this justification would only mean
that some supreme interest was subserved by them, and would have no
special relation to the supposed public character of the interest. It is
then a case of the conflict of duties. And the commoner occurrence,
which  results in doubtful acts, probably is that an agent, charged with
some public service, finds it easiest to promote it by some act of rascal-
ity, and acts on his idea. But over readiness to make capital out of an
apparent conflict of duties is neither made worse nor better by the factThe Philosophical Theory of the State/201
that one of the duties is the service of the State.320
A public act which inflicts loss, such as war, confiscation, the repu-
diation of a debt, is wholly different from murder or theft. It is not the
act of a private person. It is not a violation of law.321 It can hardly be
motived by private malice or cupidity in the strict sense, and it is not a
breach of an established moral order by a being within it and dependent
upon it for the organisation and protection of his daily life. It is the act
of a supreme power, which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the
form of life of which it is the guardian, and which is not itself protected
by any scheme of functions or relations, such as prescribes a course for
the reconciliation of rights and secures its effectiveness. The means
adopted by such a supreme power to discharge its responsibilities as a
whole, are of course subject to criticism as respects the conception of
good which they imply and their appropriateness to the task of realising
it. But it is mere confusion to apply to them names borrowed from analo-
gous acts of individuals within communities, to impute them, as it were,
to individuals under dyslogistic predicates, and to pass moral judgment
upon them in the same sense as on private acts. The nearest approach
which we can imagine to public immorality would be when the organs
which act for the State, as such, exhibit in their public action, on its
behalf, a narrow, selfish or brutal322 conception of the interests of the
State as a whole, in which, so far as can be judged, public opinion at the
time agrees. In such a case the State, as such, may really be said to be
acting immorally, i.e., in contravention of its main duty to sustain the
conditions of as much good life as possible. This case must be distin-
guished, if I am right, from the case in which the individuals, acting as
the public authority, are corrupted in their own private interests323 not
shared with the public. For then the case would rather be that the State,
the organ of the public good, had not been given a chance to speak, . but
had simply been defrauded by those who spoke in its name.
We do not suggest, then, that the action of States is beyond moral
criticism, nor that action of individuals in their interest is above or be-
low morality, except in the sense in which one moral claim has con-
stantly to be postponed to another. But we deny that States can be treated
as the actors in private immoralities which their agents permit them-
selves in the alleged interest of the State; or, again, can be bound by the
private honour and conscience of such agents; and we deny, moreover,
that the avowed public acts of sovereign powers, which cause loss or
injury, can be imputed to individuals under the names of private of-202/Bernard Bosanquet
fences; that someone is guilty of murder when a country carries on war,
or of theft when it adopts the policy of repudiation, confiscation, or
annexation.
8. It is obvious that the idea of humanity, of the world of intelligent
beings on the surface of our earth, conceived as a unity, must hold such
a place in any tolerably complete philosophical thinking, as in some
way to control the idea of particular States, and to sum up the purposes
and possibilities of human life. The idea of humanity is universal, and
whatever limits we have tacitly in mind—whatever limits the Greek
thinker had in mind while he based his ethics on the distinction between
man and beast—yet, when we rely on the idea of man as man, we are
committed to treat in some way of the world of mankind.
(a) The first point which forces itself upon our attention is, that the
idea which we tacitly entertain when we refer to humanity, is not true of
the greater part of mankind. No doubt, we are quite aware of imperfec-
tion and incon sistency in the family and the State. But here, in the case
of mankind, the problem reaches an acuter form. According to the cur-
rent ideas of our civilisation, a great part of the lives which are being
lived and have been lived by mankind are not lives worth living, in the
sense of embodying qualities for which life seems valuable to us.324 It is
true that, in all to whom we give the name of man, we suppose a possi-
bility of such living, in the sense that they have an intelligence distin-
guishable from that of animals. But it is a possibility which, for the
most part, has been very slightly realised, and which involves no con-
scious connection, so far as we can see, with any realisation. Our idea
of man is not formed by simple enumeration, but by framing a law
which explains the less perfect and consistent facts with reference to the
more perfect and more cohsistent facts.
(b) This being so, it seems to follow that the object of our ethical
idea of humanity is not really mankind as a single community. Putting
aside the impossibilities arising from succession in time, we see that no
such identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is neces-
sary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a
general will. It does not follow from this that there can be no general
recognition of the rights arising from the capacities for good life which
belong to man as man. Though insufficient, as variously and imper-
fectly realised, to be the basis of an effective community, they may, as
far as realised, be a common element or tissue of connection, running
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rest. Such a relation as that of England and India brings the matter
home. Englishmen cannot make one effective self-governed community
with the Indian populations. It would be misery and inefficiency to both
sides. But our State can recognise the primary rights of humanity as
determined in the life of its Indian subjects, and enforce or respect these
rights, whether India be a dependency or an independent community.
The problem is not unlike that raised by the idea of a universal lan-
guage. As a substitute for national languages, it would mean a dead
level of intelligence unsuited to every actual national mind, the destruc-
tion of literature and poetry. As an addition to existing languages, or
more simply, if it became customary for every people to be acquainted
with the tongues of other nations, there would be a common understand-
ing no less firm, and a vast gain of appreciation and enjoyment, a level-
ling up instead of levelling down. The recognition of human rights through
communities founded on organic unity of experience may be compared
in just these terms to the idea of a universal society including the entire
human race.
(c) The contrast between humanity and mankind has always uttered
itself through a dichotomous mode of expression—Jew and Gentile,
Greek325 and barbarian, Mussulman and infidel, Christian and heathen,
white civilisations and the black and yellow races. It will be noted at
once that some of these divisions contradict each other, and this fact
may suggest the probability that to every people its own life has seemed
the crown of things, and the remainder of mankind only the remainder.
Such a suggestion may have a real bearing on our problem, and we will
return to it. In the meantime, however, it is plain that humanity326 as an
ethical idea is a type or a problem rather than a fact. It means certain
qualities, at once realised in what we take to be the crown of the race,
and including a sensibility to the claims of the race as such. Sensibility
to the claims of the race as such, is least of all qualities common to the
race as such. The respect of States and individuals for humanity is then,
after all, in its essence, a duty to maintain a type of life, not general, but
the best we know, which we call the most human, and in accordance
with it to recognise and deal with the rights of alien individuals and
communities. This conception is opposed to the treatment of all indi-
vidual human beings as members of an identical community having iden-
tical capacities and rights. It follows our general conviction that not
numbers but qualities determine the value of life. But qualities, of course,
become self-contradictory if they fail to meet the demands imposed on204/Bernard Bosanquet
them by numbers.
And thus we recur to a suggestion noted above. Every people, as a
rule, seems to find contentment in its own type of life. This cannot con-
tradict, for us, the imperativeness of our own sense of the best. But it
may make us cautious as to the general theory of progress, and ready to
admit that one type of humanity cannot cover the whole ground of the
possibilities of human nature. Our action must, no doubt, be guided by
what we can understand of human needs, and this must depend ulti-
mately on our own type of life. But it makes a difference whether we
start from the hypothesis that our civilisation as such stands for the goal
of progress, or admit that there is a necessity for covering the whole
ground of human nature. And it may be that, as the ground is covered,
our States may go the way which others have gone, without, however,
leaving things as they are. If the State, moreover, is not ultimate nor
above criticism, no more is any given idea of humanity; and reference to
“the interests of mankind” only names the problem, which is to find out
what those interests are, in terms of human qualities to be realised.
(d) Neither the State, however, nor the idea of humanity, nor the
interests of mankind, are the last word of theory. And even political
theory must so far point ahead as to show that it knows where to look
for its continuation. We have taken Society and the State throughout to
have their value in the human capacities which they are the means of
realising, in which realisation their social aspect is an inevitable condi-
tion (for human nature is not complete in solitude), but is not by itself,
in its form of multitudes, the end. There is, therefore, no breach of con-
tinuity when the immediate participation of numbers, the direct mould-
ing of life by the claims and relations of selves, falls away, and the
human mind, consolidated and sustained by society, goes further on its
path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into
unity. Art, philosophy, and religion, though in a sense the very life-
blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the
needs and uses of the multitude, and their aim is not in that sense “so-
cial.” They should rather be regarded as a continuation, within and
founded upon the commonwealth, of the work which the commonwealth
begins in realising human nature; as fuller utterances of the same uni-
versal self which the “general will” reveals in more precarious forms;
and as in the same sense implicit in the consciousness of all, being an
inheritance which is theirs so far as they can take possession of it.
We have thus attempted to trace in outline the content of the self,The Philosophical Theory of the State/205
implied, but imperfectly and variously reached, in the actual individual
consciousness. It is because of this implication, carrying the sense that
something more than we are is imperative upon us, that self-government
has a meaning, and that freedom — the non-obstruction of capacities—
is to be found in a system which lays burdens on the untamed self and
“forces us to be free.” What we feel as mere force cannot as such be
freedom; but in our subtle and complex natures the recognition of a
force may, as we have tried to explain, sustain, regularise, and reawaken
the operation of a consciousness of good, which we rejoice to see main-
tained, if our intelligence fails of. itself to maintain it, against indolence,
incompetence, and rebellion, even if they are our own. This is the root of
self-government, and true political government is self-government.
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Hegel’s general judgment. “All the charges of narrowness, hardness,
meaninglessness, which are so often directed against thought from
the quarters of feeling and immediate perception, rest on the perverse
assumption that thought acts only as a faculty of abstract identifica-
tion” (Encycl. sect. 115, Wallace’s translation).
26. Cited ch. ix. 2 below.
27. Mr M’Dougall’s Introduction to Social Psychology, for example, is
full of interest, and traces the origin of many types of feeling and
activity which, in a sense, appear in human society. But the actual
structure of a society is simply not there at all.
28. Pragmatism, Lect. i. T. H. Green is mentioned in this connection.
29. There is more human nature and insight into human experience in
the Prolegomena to Ethics than in any philosophical writing of simi-
lar or later date, except Mr Bradley’s Ethical Studies; and its influ-
ence on practice has been enormous. It is an extraordinary thing that
hostile critics like Professor James never at all commit themselves,
except by the most fragmentary reference, to deal with any actual
human achievement or utterance; while those whom they criticise
deal, one might fairly say, with nothing else. Before dealing with the
absolute, for instance, why not deal with society? It is a problem of
the same type, but nearer current experience, and we find in the critic
no mention of it.
30. Natural Rights, p. 8.
31. See the very interesting collection of documents in the Appendix to
Professor Ritchie’s Natural Rights. The reference to “representatives”
as taking part in the formation of the general will, in two of the revo-
lutionary declarations of right, is interesting as an improvement on
Rousseau’s theory which must have been introduced by the politi-
cians. See my article “Les idées politiques de Rousseau,” Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, May, 1912, p. 335.
32. J. D. Rogers in Palgrave’s Dict, of Pol. Econ., art. “Social Sci-
ence.”
33. See Giddings’ Sociology, p. 6.
34. De Morgan, Budget of Paradoxes, p. 355.
35. By a “sociologist as such” I mean a writer who is professedly deal-
ing with sociology as such. Any independent researches, such as Mr.
and Mrs. Webb’s Industrial Democracy, may of course be ranked
under the beading “Sociology.” But works of this kind do not, as a
rule, attach themselves to the peculiar method and language of socio-The Philosophical Theory of the State/209
logical writers.
36. Sociology, I. 586.
37. Sociology, vol. I., ch. i.
38. Evolution and Ethics, p. 82.
39. Geddes, in Encyclo. Brit., vol. XVIII. 253a: “Further details of the
process of retrograde metamorphosis and of the enormously impor-
tant phenomena of degeneration cannot here be attempted; it must
suffice if the general dependence of such changes upon simplification
of environment—freedom from danger, abundant alimentation and
complete repose, etc. (in short, the conditions commonly considered
those of complete material well-being)—has been rendered clearer.”
40. Cf. Sutherland, Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, vol. I.,
pp. 28, 29.
41. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p.31; Spencer, Man v. State, p. 98.
42. Quite probably there may be in the Marxian view an echo of true
materialism—the idea that will and consciousness are “epiphenom-
ena”—i.e., are effects which are not causes—generated by molecular
movements. Such a view cannot be criticised here, only it may he
pointed out that, on such a basis, the “bodily” passions, etc., are in
no way more “material” than, e.g., the moral “categorical impera-
tive,” and therefore no more causal.
“Material” desires may be taken to mean selfish desires, on the analogy
of the possession of physical objects, which cannot be shared. But in
this sense the term would be quite a false characterisation of eco-
nomic motive, as the facts of the family or of clan loyality clearly
demonstrate.
43. Cf. e.g. Durkheim, Année Sociologique, 1897, p. 159.
44. I.e. as if economic conditions were a sort of iron girders put up to
begin with and civilisation was the embellishment of them. It is the
old story of forgetting that the skeleton is later than the body, and is
deposited and moulded by it.
45. I have never, for example, seen the great work of Ernst Curtius, on
the geography of the Peloponnese in connection with its historical
development, referred to in any sociological treatise; nor, again,
Duncker, nor Büchsenschütz, nor Mr. Newman’s edition of Aristotle’s
Politics. Boeckh’s Treatise on the Public Economy of Athens re-
ceives only a word of contemptuous notice in M’Culloch’s Litera-
ture of Political Economy. (On the great mass of current technical
Sociology, the above criticism appears to me still to hold good. But I210/Bernard Bosanquet
recognise—how gladly—that a new spirit is abroad in the study of
Greek antiquity, in which Sociology joins hands with Archaeology,
and both with an enlightened estimate of the meaning of civilisation.
Professor Gilbert Murray’s Rise of the Greek Epic is a brilliant ex-
ample of the combination of methods to which I refer.)
46. De la Division du Travail Social, Alcan, 1893.
47. Principles of Sociology, bk. II., ch. i. Few things are more interest-
ing in this respect than Mr. Poore’s observations in Rural Hygiene on
the mechanical conditions of modem city life, as regards drainage
and water supply, with their results in encouraging an overcrowded
and insanitary mode of living.
48. Durkheim, Op. cit., livre I., ch. ii.
49. See ch. viii. below.
50. Freeman’s Comparative Politics, and Seeley’s Introduction to Po-
litical Science.
51. Cf. Aspects of the Social Problem (Macmillan, 1895), C. S. Loch
on “Returns in Social Science,” p. 287.
52. Tarde, Les Lois de l’Imitation, p. 115.
53. Giddings, p. 17.
54. Le Bon, Psychologie des Foules.
55. Tarde, Des Lois de l’Imitation.
56. Durkheim, La Division du Travail Social.
57. Tarde, La Logique Sociale.
58. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Develop-
ment.
59. Perhaps this expression originates with Fustel de Coulanges in La
Cité Antique.
60. Methods of Ethics, ed. I, p. 374. In ed. 6, p. 405, the passage is
greatly modified.
61. Les Lois de l’Imitation, p. 83.
62. M. Tarde’s view just mentioned might seem to conflict with this.
But note that he regards the man influenced by others as under an
illusion in thinking that he is himself; i.e., with Spencer and Huxley,
he regards the “self” and the “other” as irreconcilable factors.
63. Le Bon, Op. cit.
64. Durkheim, Op. cit.
65. Tarde and Baldwin, Op. cit.
66. Compare Professor A. E. Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, p. 123.
67. Division du Travail, 216.The Philosophical Theory of the State/211
68. Cf. Professor Geddes’ idea of a “Regional Survey,” with which
visitors to his delightful “Summer School” become acquainted.
69. Stout, Analytic Psychology, Introduction.
70. Ib. From a logical point of view this idea of explanation seems seri-
ously defective. See Bradley’s Principles of Logic, p. 491.
71. Republic, 430, 431.
72. Professor Holland in Encycl. Brit., art. “Bentham.”
73. Bentham, Principles of Legislation, p. 48.
74. Ib. p. 94.
75. It is not really the widest, as will appear in the sequel.
76. Essays, vol. i., “Calvin.”
77. On Liberty, ch. iv.
78. See ch. viii. below.
79. On Liberty.
80. As, for example, in Rousseau’s attempts to explain the action of a
collective mind, in which he constantly falls into the advocacy of a
soulless régime of mass-meetings.
81. Man v. State, p. 95.
82. Ib., p. 88.
83. Man v. State, p. 25. Cf. Seeley, Introd. to Political Science, p. 119:
“Perfect liberty is equivalent to total absence of government.” I have
attempted to point out the fallacy of this in a way applying to its
practical and everyday meaning in my essay on “Liberty and Legis-
lation,” in the volume of essays called The Civilisation of
Christendom.
84. Man v. State, p. 98.
85. Evolution and Ethics, pp. 27 and 31.
86. For the Greek, it is society which is natural, positive, and promotive
of man’s individuality. See ch. ii. above.
87. So early an analysis of government as that made by Plato in the
Republic shows indeed that this was never the sole theory, as it is not
the truest, of the cohesive forces of any community whatever. But it
has a certain validity, proportioned to the degree of political imper-
fection.
88. Man v. State, p. 83 sq.
89. It is a remarkable testimony to the inherent vitality of associations
of human beings that even a joint-stock company often finds its work
and aims so developing on its hands that it has to obtain additional
powers from Parliament. It transcends, therefore, the limits of the212/Bernard Bosanquet
shareholders’ original contract, and Herbert Spencer’s loud complaints
of this procedure show how little he recognises the nature of social
necessity.
90. See Nettleship’s Remains, i. 160.
91. Thus, if we say what Bentham implies, that all the individuals (=
“the individual”) are the end, then there is no theoretical limit to the
sacrifice which may he demanded from every individual on behalf of
all the individuals. And thus the Society becomes the imperative end.
92. B. Jowett, in conversation, to author.
93. The whole piece breathes a spirit of prize essay paradox, and though,
if sympathetically read, it is seen to be most characteristic of the
author, no serious conclusion should be drawn from it as to his hos-
tility to civilisation. A comic instance of his vacillation is produced
by the necessity he felt himself under, of excepting, from his general
dispraise of modern letters, such Academies as that of Dijon, which
was to judge his essay. For an excellent appreciation of these earlier
works, and of Rousseau in general, see the essay on “Our Natural
Rights,” in the Lectures and Essays of the late Professor W. Wallace,
Clarendon Press, 1898.
94. He seems to regard the beginnings of industrial co-operation as the
end of the “state of nature” in the widest sense. The remark that “iron
and corn civilised man and ruined the human race,” anticipates much
in later speculations.
95. We find Rousseau actually drawing attention to this in the Contrat
Social. See Cont. .Soc., 1. ix. fin., where observe (1) that he half
believes himself to have spoken of natural equality, and not of natu-
ral inequality, in the “Essay”; and (2) the “hedging” footnote on the
illusoriness of social equality.
96. Professor Henry Sidgwick and Professor Ritchie are notable excep-
tions. See also, and pre-eminently, the essay of the late Professor
Wallace referred to above.
97. Contrat Social, bk. I., ch. vi.
98. Contrat Social, bk. II., ch. v.
99. Bk. II., ch. v.
100. Contrat Social, bk. II., ch. v.
101. From Rousseau’s footnote in loc. “The true sense of this word is
almost entirely effaced among the moderns; most of them take a town
for a city, and a townsman for a citizen. They are not aware that the
houses make the town, but the citizens make the city.” Cf. Thuk. vii.,The Philosophical Theory of the State/213
77, ¥ndrej g¦r pÒlij.
102. See, e.g., Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obliga-
tion, p. 61.
103. For the meaning of “person,” see account above. Note on the mean-
ing of “moral” as here used that it is determined by a general opposi-
tion to physical, as in “moral certainty.” None the less, this use of
“moral person” forms an interesting stage in the advance from the
physical individual through the legal “person” towards the notion of
a higher or greater self.
104. The trivial case which he takes, of its being no curtailment to free-
dom to keep a man off an untrustworthy bridge, as he certainly does
not want to be drowned, has received terrible illustration of late (June,
1898) by the disaster at the launch of the “Albion.” The disaster
occurred because not enough force was used against the passionate
momentary eagerness of individuals, and in favour of what it is fair
to presume their real will would be.
105. See below, ch. viii.
106. Cf. the well-known lines of Faust:
“Em wenig besser wurd’ er leben,
Hätt’st Du ihm nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben;
Er nennt’s Vernuaft, und braucht’s allein
Nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu seyn.”
107. Note the sentence in Émile, “C’est le peuple qui compose le genre
humain; ce qui n’est pas peuple est si peu de chose que ce n’est pas la
peine de le compter.” (Bk. IV., 3rd maxim.)
108. Rousseau’s brilliant criticism, bk. i., ch. iii., has finally destroyed
the conception of a right, whether natural or social, founded merely
on force.
109. Bk. I., ch. iv.
110. See bk. i., ch. i.
111. M. Dreyfus-Brisac.
112. Civil Government ii. 22.
113. Bk. i., ch. vi.
114. Bk. II., ch. i.
115. Bk. i., ch. vii.; cf. i., ch. i.
116. Leviathan, pt. ii., ch. xvii. Italics mine.
117. The referendum is not really such a means. It can only work within
a well organised constitution, and could not be used to re-make the
whole constitution—the forms and conditions of sovereignty—at a214/Bernard Bosanquet
blow.
118. Bk. ii., chs. i. and ii. Here Rousseau is following Hobbes very
closely.
119. Bk. ii., ch. iii.
120. Bk. iv., ch. i.
121. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 82.
122. Contrat Social, ii. iii..
123. Ib., II. iv.
124. Contrat Social, ii. iv.
125. Bk. iii. xv.; cf. IV. ii.
126. “Renoncer sa liberté, c’est renoncer à sa qualité d’homme.” Contrat
Social, i. iv.
127. Contrat Social, bk. II., ch. vi.
128. There is a prima facie contradiction in this rhetorical antithesis; if
all private individuals were enlightened, but selfishly interested, there
could be no public good will. Compare, to illustrate Rousseau’s mean-
ing here, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, ch. vii.
“Le législateur en corps est impossible à corrompre, mais facile
tromper. Les représentants sont difficiles à tromper, mais aisément
corrompus, et il arrive rarement qu’ils ne le soient pas.” Dreyfus-
Brisac, Contrat Social, p. 169, n.
129. Contrat Social, ii. vii.
130. There is a difficulty in stating this point without confusion, just
because the “ordinary” individual, being at the bottom different from
what he seems, is actually determined in all sorts of ways, consciously
and unconsciously, by demands and ideas which go far beyond what
he would admit to determine him.
131. ‘For limitations see ch. viii. below.
132. In principle, actual individual assent is not needed. The question
when the assumption breaks down belongs to the subject of the duty
of rebellion and the significance of punishment
133. The resemblance between Hesiod’s dream of the Golden Age and
modern doctrines of intensive culture is startling, and there is prob-
ably a true historical continuity between them. This does not involve
the assertion that there can be no truth in the latter, but it does sug-
gest that the disproportionate emphasis laid upon it (e.g. by Fourier
and in Merrie England) indicates an element of the old “Nature” fal-
lacy.
134. Rep., 358 E.The Philosophical Theory of the State/215
135. Annals, iii. 26: cf. Germania, ch. xix. 20, “Neque corrumpere et
corrumpi ‘seculum’ vocatur.... “Note the identification of “our age”
with corruption; cp. use of fin de siècle.
136. Argument cited by Aristotle, Eth., v. 10.
137. Plato, Gorgias, p. 484.
138. Aristotle, Pol., i. 1.
139. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 116.
140. Republic, x. 597.
141. Laws, 889 ff. abridged.
142. We are not dealing here with Platonic interpretation, but it seems
necessary to point out that, literally taken, this passage accepts the
principle that nature = primary genesis, and sets out to prove mind to
be natural in this sense. We might rather reject the appeal to succes-
sion in Time altogether, as at bottom Plato means to. But we see how
emphatically mind is for Plato the superlatively natural.
143. Cited in Dreyfus Brisac’s edition of the Contrat Social, p. 39.
144. Note the value of “natural law” as a middle term equivalent to the
general and rational features of positive law, and forming a step by
which the “natural” is carried beyond the supposed “state of nature.”
145. Seeley, quoted above.
146. We must assume, I suppose, that in Seeley’s sentence “Govern-
ment” = “Constraint,” or its vraisemblance is lost.
147. H.D.T., v. 78.
148. In this and the following section I have made great use of Green’s
discussion in the first chapter of the Principles of Political Obliga-
tion.
149. Perhaps I may refer on this head to “Liberty and Legislation” in
my Civilisation of Christendom.
150. Republic, 430 E.
151. Principles of Psychology, ii, 548.
152. See Green’s Principles of Political Obligation, p. 1.
153. This remains substantially true, even if we agree with Socrates
that it is impossible to know the better and prefer the worse at a given
moment. Our normal self will repudiate the view we took at some
moment.
154. There is something worthy of Dante in Rousseau’s observation
(Contrat Social, Bk. iv. ch. 2, note) that the convicts in the galleys at
Genoa had “Liberty” stamped on their chains. The fetters of the bad
self are the symbol of freedom. Rousseau turns his remark to com-216/Bernard Bosanquet
monplace, after his fashion, by referring it to the mere liberation of
society from malefactors.
155. Republic, ix. 577 E.
156. Green’s Principles, p. 18.
157. Loc. cit.
158. Nettleship’s Remains, i. 27 and 30.
159. Not “of our individuality.” Individuality is not, in principle, a limi-
tation which makes us unequal to our part in the whole.
160. The faith may of course exist in minds which would absolutely
repudiate the theoretical form here propounded for it. No one could
have had a more ardent actual faith in the reality of the greater self
than Bentham and Mill.
161. An “Association,” it may be urged, generally has a definite pur-
pose, and so far, as indeed we said above, the associates come to-
gether, and do not merely find themselves together. But this is only an
apparent difficulty. In comparison with the whole compass of their
nature, associates who come together for some limited purpose—
Bimetallism, Philanthropy, a political cause—do merely find them-
selves together. They form, as the cynic will say, an extraordinary
menagerie, and their association may break up without any apparent
effect upon their nature. Obviously, however, there are some pur-
poses which go deeper into men’s characters, and others which are
shallower; and this merely illustrates our point that the most casual
association is a universal connection of qualities in disguise.
162. The illustration was suggested to me by a passage in Mr. Stout’s
Analytic Psychology.
163. Ultimately, of course, the distinction is one of degree. What oper-
ates is always a general connection between members of a whole; the
only question is what kind of whole, and, therefore, what kind of
connection.
164. Claude Halcro in the Pirate.
165.  For the psychological theory of such control see Stout, Analytic
Psych., ii. 3.
166. If it has not enough control to complete a significant sentence, of
course there is insanity or idiocy.
167. Steinthal, in James’ Psychology, II., 108.
168. See Mr. Stout on “Proportional Systems,” Analytic Psychology, ii.
167.
169. The group to which he belongs, as bound together by differences,The Philosophical Theory of the State/217
is often rather that of his clients or customers than of his colleagues
in his vocation. But there is generally a differentiation within the
vocation-group also.
170. I owe this comparison to a lecture by Prof. S. Alexander.
171. This is well put, if slightly exaggerated, by Mr. Marett, Threshold
of Religion, 159–60: “Primarily and directly the subject, the owner,
as it were, of religious experience, is the religious society, not the
individual.”
172. See Introd. to ed. 2, p. xxviii.
173. See, however, p. 150 ff., and Introd. to ed. 2, p. xxvii.
174. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, pp. 34, 35.
175. The theory of punishment will modify this proposition in some
degree.
176. On this question vide Green’s very thorough discussion. It is true,
of course, that the law takes account of intention, and does not, e.g.,
treat accidental homicide as murder, the difference between them be-
ing a difference of intention. But it is obvious that, in attempting to
influence human action at all, so much account as this must be taken
of intention; for intention is necessary to constitute a human action.
An unintentional movement of the muscles cannot be guarded against
by laws and penalties; it is only through the intention that deterrent or
other motives can get at the action, and a constant lawabiding dispo-
sition is the best security for law-abiding action. On the importance
of intention and disposition as affording a certainty of action, Bentham,
who wholly rejects judgment according to moral motive, is as em-
phatic as possible.
177. W., ix. 34. Fichte remarked on the pregnancy of this principle. See
further on this question Introduction to ed. 2, p. xxv.
178. “You will admit,” it was once said, “that compulsory religion is
better than no religion.” “I fail to see the distinction,” was the reply.
179. Among true students bona fides is presupposed. The range opened
to sophistry by a principle of this kind, which commends positive
action with a negative bearing for a positive end, is, of course, im-
measurable. Practically, I believe that bona fides is about the first
and last necessity for the application of political ideas.
180. Perhaps I may adduce an instance of real interest. It has been ar-
gued that ship-masters should be induced by a premium to ship boys
as apprentices to the trade of seamanship, and that training for this
trade should be fostered by local authorities like any other form of218/Bernard Bosanquet
technical education. The argument which really told in the discus-
sion, consisted of statistics which seemed to prove a wide-spread
eagerness on the part of boys and their parents that they should enter
a maritime life, and the existence of a hindrance simply in the ab-
sence of adequate training for a few years during boyhood.
181. Principles of Political Obligation, p. 38.
182. See the author’s essay, “Liberty and Legislation,” in Civilisation
of Christendom.
183. See further Introduction to ed. 2. xxxi. ff.
184. See Thring on the importance of this, in Parkin’s life of him. Note,
however, also the modification of his view by the adventure of
Uppingham on the Sea.
185. Subject to what will be said on the theory of rights and punish-
ment.
186. The policy of a deadlift in the housing of the people is justified by
the arrears incurred during the war, and by the public demand that
has been awakened. But it is quite plain that if a recurrence of the
deficit is to be avoided, a quite new and thoroughly popular interest
in the work must be sustained. (1919)
187. Many forms of social co-operation, it must be remembered, need
no deadlift from the State as such. We are not setting self-help against
co-operation, but will against automatism.
188. This is a right in the fullest sense. The nature of a merely legal or
merely moral right will be illustrated below.
189. Krause and Henrici, cit. by Green, Principles of Political
Obligalion, p. 35. Cp. “The system of right is the realm of realised
freedom, the world of the mind produced by the mind as a second
nature” (Hegel, Philosophie d. Rechts, sect. 4).
190. I do not say merely social functions, i.e., functions dealing directly
with “others” as such.
191. I do not know that I can compel my parents to be maintained by
me, and therefore it is not my legal right to maintain them; but at least
the obligation, if I claim it, ceases to depend on force. An East End
Londoner will say, “He had a right to maintain his father,” meaning
that he was bound to do so; and Jeanie Deans says, “I have no right to
have stories told about my family without my consent,” representing
her own claim as an obligation on herself as well as on others. She
represents the thought, “I have a right that you should not tell stories,
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right to tell stories,” disregarding the distinction between herself and
others as accidental.
192. The law used to interfere with bad sanitation only as a “nuisance,”
i.e., as an annoyance to “others.” It now interferes with any state of
things dangerous to life as such, which probably means that a change
of theory has unconsciously set in. Legislation for dangerous trades
almost proves the point, though here it is possible to urge that the
employer is put under obligation for the sake of his workers, and not
the workers for their own sake. But the distinction is hardly real.
193. To call this imitation is something like calling fine art imitation.
Really, in both cases, we find a re-arrangement and modification of
material, incident to a new expression. The process, if we must name
it, is “relative suggestion” rather than imitation.
194. As distinct from hunting. We do not go to war with lions and tigers.
195. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 149.
196. “Speech of Pericles,” Thucyd., ii. 46: “Where there are the great-
est rewards of merit, there will be the best men to do the work of the
State.” Contrast Plato’s principle that there can be no sound govern-
ment while public service is done with a view to reward.
197. The precise theory of the grants in money made to soldiers or sail-
ors, for distinguished service, is not easy to state. But it seems clear
that they are not intended to act as motives. They are essentially a
recognition after the act, not an inducement held out before it.
198. It is perhaps permissible to observe in general, what is very well
known to all who have much experience of what is called philan-
thropy, that the tendency to distinguish it by public honours is ex-
ceedingly dangerous to its quality, which depends entirely on that
energy and purity of intelligence which can only accompany the deepest
and highest motives. Mere vulgar self-seeking is not the danger (though
it does occur) so much as obfuscation of intelligence through a mix-
ture of aims and ideas.
199. Republic, 409, 410.
200. Plato’s reformatory theory seems to involve this. And the author of
Erewhon, to the best of my recollection, only half adheres to his prin-
ciple that disease is to be punished, and wickedness medically treated.
For his “treatment” of wickedness is plainly punitive, and thus he
altogether abandons the idea of medical cure which his antithesis
suggests.
201. Mr. Bradley, in the International Journal of Ethics, April, 1894.220/Bernard Bosanquet
202. We saw that, even in its earliest forms, it cannot really be taken to
exclude the other aspects.
203. See the account of the Mafia in Marion Crawford’s Corleone.
Accepting this as described, it simply is the social will in which the
population of a certain region find their substitute for the State.
204. It may be noted that Durkheim, relying chiefly on early religious
sentiment, denies Maine’s view that criminal law arises out of private
feud.
205. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 184.
206. Though for the sake of all parties, and to avoid temptation, a strong
policing of threatened districts may be desirable in such circumstances.
207. See further the essay “On the growing Repugnance to Punish-
ment” in Some Suggestions in Ethics, Macmillan, 1918.
208. It must not be forgotten that the State is, by its nature, under a
constant temptation to throw its weight on the side of the automatic
process. A most striking example is its adoption of the automatic
water-carriage system in drainage, with far-reaching economic con-
sequences. See Poore’s Rural Hygiene and The Dwelling House.
209. History of Aesthetic (Sonnenschein).
210. See M. Lévy-Bruhl, “De l’Influence de Jean Jacques Rousseau en
Allemagne,” Annales de l’Ecole libre des Sciences Politques, Juillet,
1897.
211. Cf. Kant et Fichie et la Problême de l’Education, Duproix, Alcan.,
1897; and on Rousseau’s varied initiative, see Amiel, Journal Intime,
E. tr. I. 202, “J. J. Rousseau is an ancestor in all things. It was be
who founded travelling on foot before Töpffer, reverie before Réne,
literary botany before George Sand, the worship of nature before
Bernardin de St. Pierre, the democratic theory before the Revolution
of 1797, political discussion and theological discussion before
Mirabeau and Rénan, the science of teaching before Pestalozzi, and
Alpine description before De Saussure.”
212. See author’s History of Aesthetic, p. 214.
213. Lévy-Bruhl, Loc. cit., p. 330. The citation appears to be from a
romance, and I have not seen the context.
214. Letter 3 contains a profound criticism of the supposed actual “state
of nature,” and it might be said with truth that the whole subject of
the letters is the problem “how man is to be free without ceasing to be
sensuous.”
215. Hegel’s Geschichte der Philosophie, iii. 477, E. tr. iii. 401.The Philosophical Theory of the State/221
216. In the place referred to, Contrat Social, Bk. I. chs. iii., iv., Rousseau
points out clearly that force gives no right. So when Hegel describes
him as saying that the right of rule rested on force, etc., in its “histori-
cal” aspect giving no explanation of right, the term “right” is a mere
name so far as it is concerned.
217. Cont. Social, Bk. I., iv.
218. I retain Hegel’s paraphrastic rendering of Rousseau’s words.
219. Cont. Social, Bk. I., iv.
220. Hegel’s italics.
221. Anything is “in and for itself” when it has become “for itself,” i.e.,
consciously and explicitly, what it is “in itself,” i.e., in its latent or
potential nature.
222. Rousseau’s Will of All.
223. i.e., Anything is free, in as far as it is able to he itself. Thought, as
the embodiment of the return upon oneself or being with oneself, is
for Hegel the strongest case of this.
224. i.e., By going beyond it.
225. i.e., Philosophy, by basing itself on the idea of freedom, is led to
scrutinise the life in which mind realises itself, before it becomes, and
on the way to becoming, reflectively philosophical; and which is there-
fore “its own freedom”—as one texture with knowledge—and also a
“concrete content,” i.e., an actual system of living, as an object in
which mind can find itself expressed—a relation which = freedom.
226. See Duproix, Loc. cit.
227. Between 1765 and 1775.
228. Kant’s Werke (Rosenkrantz), xi., p. 240. Cf. ib., p. 218.
229. Ib., p. 248.
230. The Manichean doctrine.
231. Kant’s Werke (Rosenkrantz), ix. 42.
232. Ib., 160.
233. Ib., 166 (the deputies are practically dependent on the Ministry).
But further cf. op. cit. p. 193, which shows that in a true Republic the
representative system might, according to Kant, be a reality, and then
would be the ideal form. The whole discussion is full of reference to
Rousseau.
234. Fichte (Werke, iii. 203 ff.) says, “Indeterminate”; viz., I undertake
to aid in protecting whoever is injured. Now, I can never know (he
argues) who in particular is to be benefited by this undertaking; many
are invisibly benefited by it through the suppression of the injurious222/Bernard Bosanquet
will before it comes to be manifest. Therefore the relation is really
organic; every part strives to conserve every part, because injury to
any part may concern any part. It is the general as indeterminate;
really less of a unity than Rousseau’s “moi commun.”
235. Werke, iii. 207. The “ideal combination” the = imaginary contract.
236. Fichte, Nachgelassene Werke, ii. 535.
237. Ibid., 537.
238. Of course such enforcement may have justification.
239. Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, iii. 576. The idea of organism
was thus mechanically apprehended.
240. See Fyffe’s History of Modern Europe, vol. II, ch. ii.
241. Fyffe, Loc. cit.
242. Wallace, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, p. clxxix.
243. Wallace, Loc. cit.
244. See Wallace, Op. cit., clxxx. and clxxxvii.
245. Phil. d. Rechts, p. 313.
246. The comment will probably betray the type of pessimism indicated
by Rousseau.
247. “No human mind bas ever conceived a new animal.” Ruskin, Mod-
ern Painters, ii. 148.
248. Prof. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretation, p. 105, at least
suggests this unreal reduction.
249. “Lives,” and not merely “consciousnesses,” as objective mind is
largely in the form of habit.
250. For this account, to which he has devoted perhaps the greatest of
his works, Hegel has coined the term “Phenomenology of the Mind.”
It is the history of the emergence of the free or modem spirit from the
undeveloped consciousness of the ancient world, to which, for in-
stance, slavery seemed a natural thing.
251. Hegel, Philos. of Mind (E. Tr.), p. 104.
252. Recktsphil., sect. 4.
253. Cf. the Greek’s idea of “nomos.”
254. See ch. ii. above on Montesquieu and Rousseau.
255. Rechtsphil., sect. 41. Not, in its developed form, the first in time.
Hegel lays stress on the fact that true, free, property was hardly realised
even in his own day.
256. “In it,” when my will does not conflict with right as such, but
claims the right in an object A to be mine and not yours—a civil
dispute. “With it,” when my will rebels, and by its act, so far as in itThe Philosophical Theory of the State/223
lies, denies and destroys the whole fabric of right, e.g. takes the ob-
ject A, without alleging a right to it—theft, a criminal offence.
257. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik d. Sitten, sect. I.
258. Recktsphil., sect. 141.
259. The most striking representation of this point of view in English is
Mr. F. H. Bradley’s Ethical Studies (1876).
260. The System d. Sittlichkeit. The Rechtsphil. was not published till
1817, in its earliest form. See Wallace, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind
p. 187.
261. Aeschylus, Eumenides, 1. 14.
262. Rechtsphil., sect. 146.
263. On all this portion of the subject, see Mr. Bradley’s Essay, “My
Station and its Duties,” in Ethical Studies.
264. Cf. Green’s Principles of Political Obligation, p. 235.
265. Married Women’s Property, Protection of Earnings of Children,
Property assigned by understanding within household to young chil-
dren.
266. Hegel would say only or chiefly the man, who is for him the natural
earner and chief of the household.
267. Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. “Society,” Wallace points out, is here
opposed to “community,” and indicates a looser phase of union.
268. Cf. the merchant in Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre, viii. 2. “I can
assure you that I never reflected on the State in my life. My tolls,
charges, and dues I have paid for no other reason than that it was
established usage” (cited from Wallace, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind,
p. cci).
269. On the question of terminology, see Bluntschli, The Theory of the
State, E. Tr., p. 69. “Police State,” the term used here in ed. 1, means
more properly what we call a paternal government. The State here
referred to, that which tries to restrict itself to protecting life and
property, is rather the “legal” State (Rechtsstaat).
270. “Was not ideal enough” (Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, ii.
254), E. Tr. ii. 108. The “notion” for him necessarily involves iden-
tity, differentiation, and re-integration; and in this respect the ancient
State falls short of a true notion, while the modern realises it.
271.  I may refer to The Standard of Life, by H. Bosanquet, essay on
“Klassenhampf.”
272. Hegel pleads strongly for codification.
273. De la Division du Travail Social, 225 ff.224/Bernard Bosanquet
274. “The present progress of law is from contract to community.” The
New State, by M.T. Follett, p. 125, in a very striking chapter on
recent legal theory, especially in the United States. (1919)
275. The explicit idea of common good always belongs in Hegel to the
State proper.
276. The term “Stände,” it must be remembered, has for a German the
association of elements of the representative assembly; “états,” es-
tates of the realm.
277. Cf. the English workman’s phrase, “a good tradesman,” i.e., a
competent member of his trade.
278. “We can only say that these men, if they leave us, will bitterly
regret it. . . . The man who is so unselfish as to care nothing for
himself or his fellow-men will soon find himself, as years creep over
him, and grey hairs and glasses, completely cut out.”—“Branch Trade
Report (Birmingham) to National Union of Boot and Shoe Opera-
tives, January, 1896.”
279. Sects. 201 and 255. I omit Hegel’s characterisation of the classes,
which has a good deal in common with theories which represent oc-
cupations as determining character. The contrast between agricul-
tural and industrial or commercial life, between country and town, is
of great importance in his view. He almost seems to confine Bour-
geois industrialism as such to the life of town-dwellers; though, again,
ultimately the whole division into classes is characteristic of Bour-
geois Society (cf. sects. 256 and 305).
280. Sect 255.
281. It is obvious that this treatment of associations arising among classes
in industry and commerce does not apply in principle exclusively to
trade or professional societies. It would include, e.g., Friendly Soci-
eties and Co-operative Societies, by which members of the economic
world bind themselves together for help, recognition, and the asser-
tion of their general interests.
282. Much as through inspectors and commissions the opinion of Trade
Unions, Friendly Societies, and Co-operators is elicited by our Gov-
ernment Departments with a view to legislation, independently of the
House of Commons.
On the relation of the State to local and vocational groups see “The
State and Pluralism” with reference to Miss Follett’s The New State.
(1919)
283. It is a remarkable point in English politics to-day that legislation isThe Philosophical Theory of the State/225
practically in the hands of the Government departments. Bills are
rejected or “knocked about in Committee”; but the mass of organised
knowledge necessary to initiate legislation in a complex society can
hardly be found outside the gathered experience of an office which
has continuity in dealing with the same problems. This tendency more
than justifies Hegel’s point of view. An act of the “General Will” has
not only, as he said, to be moulded by running the gauntlet of public
and critical discussion, but has even to be first drafted by the help of
immense piles of experience, which the general mind does not pos-
sess, and could not deal with, but which, nevertheless, enable its typi-
cal wish and intention to be embodied in effective form.
284. Rechtsphil., sect. 315.
285. “That the ignorant vulgar reproves everyone, and talks most of
what it understands least.”
286. “The masses are respectable hands at fighting, but miserable hands
at judging.”
287. Principles of Political Obligation, p. 8; cf. p. 127 ff.
288. Take, for instance, the chaos of the medical charities of London. It
consists of endeavours to adjust help to needs, which endeavours are
themselves unadjusted to each other. Thus, precisely as in the theo-
retical progress, the unadjustment of adjustments brings out ever new
contradictions which demand readjustment.
289. Not much stress should be laid on an isolated expression of this
kind, used in making clear the difficulties of a theory which on the
whole he supported, and putting these difficulties, as was his custom,
as high as possible. But it is worth noting that no one, who really
knows the class thus rhetorically alluded to, fails to experience in
them the same great relations and recognitions which make life worth
living for more fortunate persons, and, as they feel very keenly, the
experience is often more emphatic there than in the richer class. Prob-
ably, in fundamental matters, there is as large a proportion of persons
untaught and bred up between temptations among the rich as among
the poor.
290. Recktsphil., sect. 123.
291. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, sects. 121 and 128.
292. Although the literary class are liable very seriously to under-rate
the significance of forms of thought unfamiliar to them.
293. Habits, such as our habit of relying on security of life and prop-
erty, are secondarily automatic, i.e., are very intimately connected226/Bernard Bosanquet
with ideas. See chap. viii.
294. Green, Loc. cit.
295. Aristotle’s saying of the State, that it “comes to be for the sake of
life, but is for the sake of good life,” expresses in the first instance an
apparent contrast between origin and purpose of States. But its real
point is that the purpose is implied in the origin, for the State is natu-
ral, and in every “natural” genesis its purpose is implied; and the
origin is implied in the purpose, for the State, in the processes which
maintain it, “originates,” i.e., renews its material basis, daily, and
must do so in order to “be.”
296. I neglect, for the moment, the difference between the mind of soci-
ety and mind at its best. The difference is practically considerable,
but I shall attempt to make it appear, in the course of the present
chapter, to be a difference of progress but not of direction.
297. Why is not a memorial statue or building, which expresses a public
idea, an “institution” apart from its uses? Apparently because it has
not the notion of bringing persons together or inducing persons to act
in some definite way. An “institution,” then, belongs to the level of
society, as such, conceived as a number of persons. Thus, a work of
art is hardly an institution, though it expresses the “universal” of
many minds; but a weekly concert is an institution, because many
persons act together in giving and attending it.
298. There are, of course, no absolute surroundings. At every point
experience rests on mind. But at any point at which we are observing,
we must take some facts as, comparatively speaking, given.
299. “Economy” = household management.
300.  It is said that the household does not readily form itself in very
easy conditions of life.
301. Note, however, what is said below of the secondary or transferred
idea of the family. The solitary may partake of the family sacrament,
so to speak, “by faith.”
302. Settlement, scholarships, fellowships, and charities generally,
“close” to localities, and perhaps domicile, maintain qualifications in
contradiction with actual residence, and in case of allegiance even
depending in part on birth. But some fixity is, of course, convenient;
and I believe that intention plus residence will cancel almost any op-
posing qualification.
303. The recriminations or interested intimacies of a vestry or parish
council rest at bottom on the personal knowledge which, rightly used,The Philosophical Theory of the State/227
gives security to local life.
304. Imagine a Roman or English judge being addressed as Demosthenes,
in his speech against Pantaenetus, addressed (in his client’s name)
the Athenian jury: “I know I have a hurried gait and a loud voice, and
it annoys people; but I am as I was made, and I have a right to justice
all the same.” It sounds like a speech to a jury of schoolboys.
305. It may be taken as proved that a “gentleman” can make his living
as a labourer or mechanic—at least in the U.S.A., where irrational
tradition is weaker than in England—and remain a gentleman in the
drawing-room sense of the term as well as in essentials. This being
so, there can be no inherent impossibility in men born and bred as
labourers or mechanics realising the same qualities. It would be cant,
I think, to say that full equality of social class, full pleasantness and
freedom of intercourse, could be attained without those qualities.
306. Mommsen Röm. Hist., i. 101, E. tr. The “classicus” was the trum-
pet.
307. Greek dhmiourgoj, “artisan.” Homer speaks of “those who are
public workers—the soothsayer, the doctor, and the carpenter.”
308. Durkheim’s “Segmentary Structure,” De la Division, p. 190.
309. See also H. Bosanquet, Standard of Life, p. 8.
310. As in the judicial privileges of the Baron of Bradwardine and his
likes.
311. The hereditary executioner in Maurus Jokai’s novel, Die schöne
Michal.
312. The incurably sick and helpless in all ranks of society do, no doubt,
rightly fulfil such a passive function.
313. Or for an earlier example see Clarissa Harlowe, iii. 154.
314. I cannot think that in detail its advocates are consistent with their
principles on this point. But controversy is not my object here.
315. Not altogether true, of course. In Homer “all strangers and poor
men come from Zeus.”
316. It is a mistake to treat all these problems as automatically solved
for the ancients by slavery. The citizen population had enough depen-
dence on industrial life to be liable to disaster from its dislocation,
and that this happened so little was a true success while it lasted.
317. Aristotle, Politics, 1320, b. 29. The older word is ptwcÒj; “one
who crouches or cringes, a beggar”; it always had a bad sense till it
was ennobled in the Gospels (Liddell and Scott). Aristotle’s word is
aporoj, “without ways and means.” Different from both is penhj,228/Bernard Bosanquet
for which we have no proper word, having spoilt “poor” by the idea
of dependence. It means a poor man in the sense of one who is not
rich enough to live without working. The speeches in which Poverty
(penia) defends her merits against Wealth, and in distinction from
Beggary (ptwceia), in Aristophanes’ Plutus, are fine, though mixed
with fallacies.
318. The dangers besetting the French Republic to-day (December, 1898)
are, in essence, tests applied to the strength of a national idea. If the
idea cannot maintain itself, we must reluctantly suppose that it ought
not—that the common life has not the necessary depth. This question
seems to have answered itself. (1919)
319. i.e., That it should actually order a theft, murder, or the like.
320. Cruelty, it has been said, is a good deal owing to laziness. It is
more comfortable to sit in the shade rubbing red pepper into a man’s
eyes to make him confess than to run about in the sun collecting
evidence. I quote from memory, from a lecture, I think, by Mr. Leslie
Stephen.
321. An act which violates its own law is not an act of the State. And the
State is not subject to the law of any other State.
322. e.g. If, with the knowledge of Parliament, and without a protest
from it, a price were offered for the killing of a hostile statesman or
general, or a merciless system of exploitation were pursued in a de-
pendent country. In such a case the guilty State is judged before the
tribunal of humanity and of history. But it is judged as a State, that
is, by the degree of its failure to cope with the duties of a State, all
conditions considered. Nothing is gained by treating its action on the
analogy of that of a private person.
323. e.g. Bribed by a foreign potentate, or pursuing Stock Exchange
interests.
324. This idea is embodied in the doctrine of Salvation confined to the
few, and contains perhaps a similar error. But it has a prima facie
truth.
325. It is remarkable that a limitation of the earth’s surface, raising an
idea of unity, has always, I believe, been presupposed. For the Greeks,
Delphi was the centre of the earth; for us, the earth being a sphere
and returning into itself gives a certainty that it does not stretch away
to infinity, so making unity of its inhabitants inconceivable. The re-
mark, I think, is Kant’s.
326. “Humanity” = “humaneness.” Scotch “Humanity” = Latin. Ox-The Philosophical Theory of the State/229
ford “Literae humaniores” = classics and philosophy. Greek
filanqrwpon, a sense of what is due to man, e.g., of poetical justice.